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Abstract 
In this thesis, my main objective is the presentation and evaluation of several versions of a 
thought  experiment  that  are offered for supporting a  functionalist  thesis  concerning the 
generation  of  conscious  phenomenal  experiences.  These  versions  depict  replacement 
scenarios that describe an imaginary process for creating functional duplicates of the brains 
of  conscious  beings.  It  is  assumed  that  the  brain  of  a  conscious  person  implements  a 
determinate functional organization or structure, which can be initially understood as the 
abstract pattern of interaction between the different  parts of the brain. The replacement 
process  begins  by  adopting  a  certain  level  of  functional  organization  by  identifying  a 
number of basic components in the brain that perform a certain function inside it. These 
basic components are then replaced by entities that may not share the same physiochemical 
composition of the original elements but that perform the same function inside the brain. 
When the replacement process is finished, the resulting system is a functional isomorph of 
the original system at the level initially determined. In this thesis, I will concentrate on two 
versions of the replacement thought experiment: the  neural version and the  interchange 
version.  My  first  main  claim  is  that  the  neural  version  of  the  replacement  thought 
experiment,  as  presented  in  this  thesis,  gives  adequate  support  to  the  thesis  that  the 
generation of conscious phenomenal experiences naturally supervenes on the property of 
instantiating the functional organization of the brain at  a neural level.  My second main 
claim is that a different version of the replacement thought experiment, which I call the 
interchange  version,  ultimately  fails  in  supporting  the  thesis  that  the  generation  of 
conscious phenomenal experiences logically supervenes on the property of instantiating the 
functional organization of the brain. 
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Consciousness,  Functional  Isomorphism and the  Replacement  Thought 
Experiment 
General Introduction 
During  the  last  thirty  years,  some  philosophers  have  proposed  a  number  of  thought 
experiments  that  depict  certain  replacement  scenarios  describing  a  process  in  which  a 
system that duplicates the functional organization of the brain is constructed. Among the 
authors that propose replacement strategies are Cuda (1985), Zuboff (1994), Kirk (1994), 
Chalmers (1996, 2010) and Tye (2006). Although the details of these thought experiments 
and their objectives varies with different versions of the thought experiment, in general the 
aim  is  to  support  a  functionalist  account  of  conscious  phenomenal  experiences.  The 
replacement process described in these versions begins with the assumption that the brain 
of a conscious person implements a certain functional organization or structure, which can 
be initially understood as the abstract pattern of interaction between the different parts of 
the  brain.  In  general,  the  process  consists  in  determining  a  certain  level  of  functional 
organization by identifying a number of basic elements in the brain that perform a certain 
function inside it. These basic elements are then replaced by entities that may not share the 
same  physiochemical  composition  of  the  original  elements  but  that  perform the  same 
function they have with respect to the original brain. In this way, when the replacement 
process is finished, the resulting system is a functional isomorph of the original system at 
the level initially determined. 
There  is  a  good  justification  for  adopting  the  strategy  of  considering  functional 
duplicates of the brain of conscious beings. After all, we have good empirical evidence in 
favour of the claim that the brain is the organ responsible for generating mentality. For 
instance, since the studies of the brains of aphasic patients made by Broca and Wernicke, 
we know that damage to some brain areas brings with it an impairment of certain mental  
functions.1 However, and in spite of this empirical evidence, we do not know exactly what 
1 In (2004), Rorden and Karnath evaluate the method of using brain injuries to infer mental function and 
discuss some of its limitations (including the questionable assumption that discrete brain modules deal with 
different mental functions). They argue, however, that complemented with new strategies for measuring brain 
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are the properties of the brain involved in the production of mentality.  It  is  simply not 
evident how a system composed, among other things, by ions, aminoacids and water is 
capable of generating mental phenomena, like thoughts, memories or emotions. McGinn 
has famously expressed this worry as follows:  
We know that brains are the de facto causal basis of consciousness, but we have, it seems, no under-
standing whatever of how this can be so. It strikes us as miraculous, eerie, even faintly comic. Some-
how, we feel, the water of the physical brain is turned into the wine of consciousness, but we draw a  
total blank on the nature of this conversion.2
The main topic of this thesis is precisely the problem of how a physical system can 
generate conscious phenomenal experiences. More precisely, I will examine a strategy that, 
according to several authors, supports a functionalist approach related to the generation of 
these  experiences.  According  to  this  functionalist  approach,  mentality  is  generated  or 
produced by the functional properties of the brain. Before I discuss these questions and the 
details of the replacement strategy, I want to briefly concentrate on the nature of the aspect 
of mentality known as phenomenal consciousness. 
The  proposal  that  the  mental  can  be  divided  into  two  different  aspects  that  are 
mutually autonomous or independent is well known and has been widely discussed. One of 
the main advocates of this distinction is Chalmers (1995, 1996, 2006). On the one hand, the 
mental involves all mental phenomena related to the production of behaviour.  On the other 
hand, there is an aspect of the mental concerned with conscious subjective experience, with 
phenomenal consciousness, with the “what it is like” of experience. 
At the root of all this lie two quite distinct concepts of mind. The first is the phenomenal concept of 
mind. This is the concept of mind as conscious experience, and of a mental state as a consciously  
experienced mental state. This is the most perplexing aspect of mind and the aspect on which I will 
concentrate, but it does not exhaust the mental. The second is the psychological concept of mind. This 
activity in healthy individuals, this method can still be very useful for scientific research. For an opposite  
point of view concerning the lesion method and the role of the brain in the generation of consciousness, see  
Majorek (2012). 
2  McGinn, (1989, p. 529) 
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is the concept of mind as the causal or explanatory basis for behavior. A state is mental in this sense if  
it plays the right sort of causal role in the production of behavior, or at least plays an appropriate role  
in the explanation of behavior.3
This difference is conceived, first, as a metaphysical distinction. Mentality per se can 
be differentiated between the aspect involved to the production of behaviour, and the aspect 
involved to the phenomenal characteristics of an experience. This difference can also be 
conceived as an epistemological distinction. It also concerns the way in which the mental is 
understood and explained. Chalmers suggests that one of the effects of the division between 
the psychological and the phenomenal aspects of the mind is that the problems related to 
consciousness can be divided into an easy part and a hard part. Among the easy problems 
related to consciousness are how a physical system can react to external stimuli, how can it 
process information and generate inferences, how it can access its internal states and in 
general how it controls its own behaviour. In contrast, the hard problem of consciousness 
concerns  how  a  system  (in  particular,  the  brain)  can  generate  conscious  phenomenal 
experiences.  According  to  Nagel,  although  consciousness  might  be  present  at  different 
levels or take several forms (for instance, there is surely a great difference between the 
conscious states that can be experienced by hominidae and the conscious states of rodents) 
conscious experience essentially involves a subjective element: that an organism is capable 
of  having  conscious  experiences  implies  that  there  is  something  it  is  like  to  be  that 
organism. 
... the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it  
is like to be that organism [...] But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only 
if there is something that it is like to be that organism – something it is like for the organism.4
Several authors, including Nagel and Chalmers, suggest that the subjective character 
of  conscious  experience  resists  a  physicalist  or  functionalist  explanation.  In  particular, 
Chalmers (1995, 1996) has raised a number of arguments in favour of the claim that the 
3  Chalmers (1996, p. 11) 
4  Nagel (1974, p. 436) 
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phenomenal character of conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical or functional 
properties. One of the most discussed arguments against a functional approach of phenom-
enal consciousness concerns the logical possibility of a complete physical duplicate of a 
conscious being that lacks the capacity of having conscious phenomenal experiences. In 
contemporary philosophy, a being like this is known as a philosophical zombie. 
In order to set up the problem I want to discuss in this thesis, I want to introduce first  
some reflections concerning the properties of physical models. A physical model is a device 
that is built in such a way that some of its properties mirror or represent the properties of 
another – perhaps much more complex – object. A very modest physical model of the Solar 
System made out of plastic balls and wires (like those created by school age children) may 
represent several interesting properties in spite  of its simplicity. It  could mirror,  for in-
stance, the respective size of the planets, the colour and shape of its surfaces and their order 
from the Sun (although such a model might not mirror all of these properties at the same 
time: a model of the Solar System representing the Sun as a sphere of 7cm together with a 
scale representation of the planetary orbits would be more than 30 meters long). More com-
plex physical models of the Solar System include orreries and astrariums, which are mech-
anical devices that were used in the past for showing the motion of the planets around the  
Sun and, sometimes, even for predicting eclipses. 
It is true, however, that these simple models cannot represent some other interesting 
properties of the bodies contained in the Solar System, like their gravitational interactions 
with other objects or the exact percentage of luminous radiation reflected by their surfaces. 
The motivations behind the construction of a physical model of determinate complexity 
depend on pragmatic grounds. Consider now a very simple physical model of the human 
brain  of  the  kind  that  can  be  found  in  secondary  schools.  Depending  of  the  level  of 
complexity of the model – which can be made out from different materials, like plastic or 
wood – its parts can correspond, for instance, to the right and left hemispheres, to the visual 
cortex, the cerebellum, the hippocampus, etc. Like the simple models of the Solar System 
discussed in the preceding paragraph, the properties of these models represent only a very 
small subset of the properties of a real, biological brain. We cannot put these models under 
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a microscope and see miniature pieces of wood or plastic representing synaptic connections 
and neurons firing. The accuracy of these physical models depends, among other things, not 
only on our technical possibilities, but also on the particular objectives we have for building  
the model. It is not necessary to find a way to mirror the gravitational interaction that exists 
among all the bodies of the Solar System if the model is used for teaching school children. 
Analogously, it will be useful for a secondary school model of the brain to have properties 
that represent larger sections of the brain, but it surely does not need to mirror the dendritic  
structure of Purkinje neurons in the cerebellum. 
Nevertheless, there does not seem to be any logical impediment to build a perfect 
physical duplicate of the brain of a conscious person. It is true that the technology needed 
for duplicating the causal properties of the brain – that is, the properties that allow it to 
generate mentality – is still unavailable, and it might be so for years to come. Nonetheless,  
building  a  perfect  physical  duplicate  of  the  brain  does  not  seem to  imply  any logical 
contradiction.  It  suffices  to  imagine  a  team  of  extremely  competent  neuroscientists 
possessing very advanced techniques for describing how the different elements of the brain 
work, together with a group of engineers that, with the help of the information provided by 
the neuroscientists, are capable of building physical devices able to duplicate the causal 
powers of the brain or parts of it. 
A perfect physical duplicate of a conscious person would be indistinguishable from 
this person under any medical examination: they would have the same blood type, the same 
DNA, and will be prone to the same diseases. Note also that this duplicate will be function-
ally identical to the original subject: after receiving an external stimulus, it will process it in 
the same way as the original subject, and will produce the same behaviour. This duplicate 
will have internal physical processes that are functionally identical to the original being: for 
instance, the visual cortex of this physical duplicate will receive certain electrochemical 
signals from the lateral geniculate nucleus (which is the part of the brain that initially re-
ceives visual information from the retina) and in turn will send corresponding electrochem-
ical signals to the areas in charge of the production of linguistic behaviour.   
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In order to illustrate the replacement process described by the replacement thought 
experiment,  I  would  like  to  remember  a  widespread  urban  legend  that  gained  a  great 
amount of attention during 1969. According to this legend, Paul McCartney had died three 
years before in a car accident and was secretly replaced by a look-alike person. Some fans 
of the Beatles reported that hidden clues concerning Paul´s death could be found inside 
album cover imagery, the lyrics of some songs and even when one of the songs was played 
backwards. Fortunately, the legend about the death of Paul McCartney in a car crash and 
his posterior replacement by a look-alike person was false (as far as I know). However, it is 
not impossible to conceive a situation in which something strange happened to Paul in 1966 
and he was secretly replaced not by a look alike person, but by something different. 
Suppose that Paul effectively had a car accident in 1966, but in contrast  with the 
original story, he survived the crash with apparently minor lesions in his head. However, 
when he was examined in the hospital, the physicians noticed that he started to develop a 
recently discovered but extremely harmful neural disease. The information possessed by the 
scientists concerning this illness was still minimal and inaccurate, but they at least knew 
that it was similar to motor neuron disease, a disorder that affects the control of voluntary 
muscle activity. This new disease, however, did not affect only the motor neurons, but all 
the  other  neurons  in  the  brain  of  the  patient.  The  prognosis,  thus,  was  extremely 
unfavourable: the physicians told Paul that, unless he was subjected to a very complicated 
operation, he would fall in a comatose state in less than a month.
The operation suggested by the physicians is very simple to conceive (although some 
people doubted that the technology necessary for performing it was available at that time). 
Among the scientists there were expert neurologists that were able to determine, for each of 
the neurons inside Paul McCartney´s brain, their precise input-output behaviour. Experts in 
computer engineering used the information provided by the neuroscientists for constructing 
miniature computers capable of duplicating this behaviour. Take for instance the sensory 
neurons inside Paul´s brain, which are responsible for converting external stimuli from the 
environment (light, sound, temperature, etc.) into electrochemical signals that are in turn 
transmitted  to  other  neurons  inside  the  brain.  The  scientists  provided  these  miniature 
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computers with tiny detectors for perceiving these external inputs,  and programmed the 
computers in such a way that, if the biological neuron generates a certain electrochemical 
signal when received a determinate stimulus, the computer would generate exactly the same  
signal.  Motor  neurons  and  interneurons  were  built  in  the  same fashion.  Once  that  the 
physicians  explained  the  process  to  Paul  McCartney,  and  assured  him  that  it  was 
completely safe, he accepted to be operated. 
Imagine now that the team of scientists isolate these miniature computers (we can call 
them from now “artificial neurons”) in the container of a fabulous operating machine, and 
put  Paul  McCartney  inside  it.  The  machine  then  removes,  one  by  one,  the  biological 
neurons inside his brain, and replaces them with these artificial neurons. Once the artificial 
neuron takes its corresponding place,  it  will  search for the neurons that  were originally 
connected to the organic neuron and restore all the corresponding synaptic connections. The 
replacement process continues until all the neurons inside Paul´s brain have been replaced 
by artificial neurons. When the replacement process reaches this point, the result will be a 
being whose “brain” (let's now call it an “artificial brain”) is functionally identical to Paul´s 
organic brain at the neural level. From now, we will call this being “F-Paul”. Paul´s organic 
brain and F-Paul´s artificial brain are physical systems that have the same number of parts 
at the neural level, and these parts, in turn, process and generate the same electrochemical  
signals. I will not discuss, at this point of the thesis, how is that these artificial neurons 
duplicate the input output behaviour of the organic neurons inside Paul´s brain. For now, it 
will suffice to say that they will receive and transmit the same electrochemical signals that  
are interchanged between the original and the neighbouring neurons, and that  is  in this 
sense in which we say that artificial neurons are duplicates of the original neurons. Also, I  
will  not  discuss  now  the  possibility  of  modifying  the  electrochemical  nature  of  these 
signals. In the next chapter we will see the details of this modification and its consequences 
for the replacement process
This replacement process varies with respect to the different versions of the thought 
experiments:  some  versions  consider  the  duplication  of  brain  regions  or  structures 
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associated to particular mental abilities5. In other cases the process is described as involving 
the duplication of the input-output causal behaviour of the organic neurons of the brain by 
entities  with  a  different  physical  makeup  as  these  organic  neurons,  along  with  the 
preservation of their  respective synaptic connections6.  Other versions consider a mutual 
replacement or interchange of the physical realizers of the phenomenal conscious states of a  
person.7 The common feature of all these thought experiments, however, is precisely the 
description  of  a  replacement  process  in  which  the  physicochemical  properties  of  the 
original systems might be modified, while preserving, at the same time, their functional or 
structural properties. 
It will be useful to compare this replacement operation with another one that, instead 
of replacing the damaged neurons inside Paul´s head by miniature computers, substitutes 
them with artificial systems that are – at the atomic level – identical to the organic neurons 
of Paul´s brain. Like the replacement process described earlier, there does not seem to be 
any logical impediment to build artificial organic neurons. It is true that the technology 
needed for doing it was not available during the sixties (when Paul had his accident), and 
most probably, it will not be available in the immediate future, if ever. Nonetheless, the 
point is that it is not logically inconceivable to imagine such operation. In this case, instead 
of  a  physical  system functionally  identical  to  Paul´s  brain,  the  scientist  constructed  a 
physical system that – at the atomic level – is completely indistinguishable from Paul´s 
brain. Lets call this system P-Paul. 
Perhaps it is easier to agree with the idea that P-Paul preserves the beliefs of Paul (for 
instance, that P-Paul believes that that the Beatles´ debut LP was Please Please Me, that the 
first drummer of the band was Pete Best and that he left the Beatles in 1962), that he is able  
to remember some of Paul McCartney’s past experiences before 1966, or that he is able to 
feel cold, pain and the peculiar sensations associated with sneezing. After all, P-Paul was 
designed to be physically identical to Paul McCartney in 1966. At a biochemical level, they 
5  Zuboff, (1994)
6  This is the strategy adopted in Cuda (1985), Kirk (1994) and Chalmers (1996) 
7  Tye (2006)
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are  completely  identical.  Moreover,  P-Paul´s  brain  was  originally  created  as  being  in 
exactly the same physical state as the brain of Paul McCartney when he died in 1966. So, 
P-Paul´s brain processes the information it receives from the external world in exactly the 
same way Paul McCartney’s brain would have processed it.  
In contrast, the doubts concerning F-Paul´s mentality rise mainly because instead of a 
biological brain, it has inside its skull a thing that – as scientists say – functions in exactly 
the  same way as  Paul  McCartney´s  brain.  As the  story was told,  this  explanation  was 
initially very obscure and at that time very few people were able to make sense of it. What 
is for a non-biological physical entity – they asked – to function in exactly the same way as 
a biological human brain? After all, the scientist was very clear when he explained that the 
ersatz brain of F-Paul was not composed of biological neurons connected by synapses. He 
also hinted that, whatever the way the internal parts of F-Paul interchanged and processed 
information,  there  were  no  chemical  neurotransmitters  involved  in  this  process.  At  a 
physicochemical level, Paul McCartney´s brain and the ersatz brain of F-Paul were two 
completely  different  things.  But  how  two  things  whose  internal  physicochemical 
composition is so different “function” in exactly the same way? Notice that if it is shown 
that Paul´s functional duplicate, F-Paul, preserves the capacity of experiencing conscious 
phenomenal states, then his perfect physical duplicate, P-Paul, would preserve this capacity 
as well. The reason is that the functional properties of Paul´s brain would also be shared by 
P-Paul´s brain. 
The aim of the replacement process just described was to create a functional duplicate 
of Paul McCartney´s brain. The point that interests me is whether the resulting system, F-
Paul,  is  capable  of  having  mental  experiences.  Does  it  share  the  memories  of  Paul 
McCartney? Is able to generate beliefs and to have desires? And more importantly, is it 
capable of experiencing conscious phenomenal states? 
In the first chapter of this thesis I have three main objectives. The first objective will 
be to present and evaluate two famous thought experiments whose aim is to show that to 
duplicate the functional organization of the brain of a conscious person does not suffice for 
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generating  mentality.  These  thought  experiments  are  the  Chinese  Nation  thought 
experiment  (proposed  originally  in  Block  (2007b))  and  the  Brain  Simulator  thought 
experiment (proposed by Searle in (1980)). The second objective of the first chapter of the 
thesis  is  to  formulate  the  functionalist  theses  supported  by  the  replacement  thought 
experiment. I claim that the best way for formulating these theses is with the notion of 
strong  supervenience  formulated  in  terms  of  quantifiers  over  possible  worlds.  This 
formulation will help to understand the differences among the theses that are supported by 
the several versions of the replacement thought experiment proposed by Cuda (1985), Kirk 
(1994), Zuboff (1994), Chalmers (1996, 2010) and Tye (2006). Finally, the third objective 
of the first  chapter of the thesis will  be the description of the variable  elements of the 
replacement scenarios described in these versions. 
In  the  second  chapter  of  the  thesis,  I  will  present  two  initial  versions  of  the 
replacement  thought  experiment.  My objective  is  to  determine  whether  these  versions 
support at least the claim that the property of generating conscious phenomenal experiences 
naturally supervenes  on the  property of  instantiating the functional  organization of  the 
brain at  a determinate level.  The first  version based on the one proposed by Zuboff in 
(1994), contemplates a level of functional organization that corresponds to the regions of 
the brain associated to certain mental function, and that I will call the regions-of-the-brain 
version  of  the  replacement  thought  experiment.  I  will  then  evaluate  some  objections 
concerning the properties of the entities that are proposed as replacements of these regions 
of the brain. The second version of the replacement thought experiment considers a more 
detailed level of functional organization of the brain: the neural level. This version is based 
on the thought experiments proposed by Cuda (1985), Kirk (1994) and Chalmers (1996). 
The replacement scenario described in this version contemplates the replacement of organic 
neurons by entities that duplicate the input-output relation that these neurons have with 
respect to the rest of the brain. The outcome of this replacement is a system that shares the 
functional organization of the brain precisely at the neural level. The argumentative strategy  
for  claiming  that  the  resulting  system  preserves  the  capacity  of  generating  conscious 
phenomenal experiences will consist, first, in adopting the thesis of absent qualia as a sort 
of  reductio hypothesis. The replacement process described in this version will generate a 
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series of cases in which, according to the  reductio hypothesis, the conscious phenomenal 
properties of the system are eliminated. The strategy will be to argue that, in none of these 
cases, these conscious phenomenal experiences disappear. Since these are exhaustive cases, 
the conclusion will be that the absent qualia hypothesis is false. Finally, the last objective of 
this chapter will  be to evaluate some further objections about the neural  version of the 
replacement thought experiment. 
In the third chapter of this thesis, I will present an objection presented originally by 
Searle in (1980) related to the idea that the implementation of a computational structure 
lacks objective conditions. This claim is known as the thesis of Universal Instantiation: for 
any  computer  program  C and  any  sufficiently  complex  physical  object O,  there  is  a 
description of O under which it is implementing program C. This objection is relevant in 
the context of the replacement thought experiment for the following reason: in this thesis, I 
assume  that  the  functional  organization  of  a  system  –  in  particular,  the  functional 
organization of the brain at a given level – can be abstracted into computational abstract 
devices  known as Combinatorial  State Automata (CSA). This is  originally proposed by 
Chalmers  in  (1995,  1996  and  1996b).  The  thesis  of  Universal  Instantiation  presents  a 
challenge for those who support the claim that phenomenal consciousness supervenes on 
the  functional  organization  implemented  by  a  system.  If  this  thesis  of  Universal 
Instantiation is true, almost any object  can be described as implementing any computer 
program, and in particular, it can be described as implementing any CSA. Consequently, 
almost any object can be interpreted as implementing CSAF, that is, the CSA that abstracts 
the functional organization of Paul´s brain at the neural level. Following Chalmers, I claim 
that, in spite of Searle´s objections, there are objective reasons for implementing a CSA. 
In  the  fourth  chapter  of  the  thesis,  I  will  discuss  a  different  version  of  the 
replacement  thought  experiment  whose  objective  is  to  show that  the  thesis  of  inverted 
qualia is,  at  least,  empirically false. The version of the replacement thought experiment 
presented in the second chapter of this thesis might show that a system that preserves the  
functional  organization  of  the  brain  at  a  neural  level  also  preserves  the  capacity  of 
generating conscious phenomenal experiences. However, the experiences generated by this 
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system might have a different qualitative character compared to the experiences generated 
by a biological brain. This possibility is illustrated by the inverted spectrum hypothesis,  
according to which the visual experiences generated by two isomorphic systems, P and Q, 
may differ in that the qualitative properties of the visual experiences generated by Q are 
phenomenally inverted with respect to the visual experiences generated by P. In this chapter 
I  will  also  present  an  objection  against  this  new  version  of  the  replacement  thought 
experiment originally developed by Van Heuveln et al (1998) and Greenberg (1998). My 
claim in this chapter is that, in spite of these objections, this version of the replacement 
thought  experiment  successfully  shows  that  the  thesis  of  inverted  qualia  is,  at  least, 
naturally false. 
Finally,  in  the fifth chapter  of the thesis,  I  will  discuss a  further version of the 
replacement  thought  experiment  originally  proposed  by  Tye  in  (2006).  Tye´s  thought 
experiment envisages a mutual replacement, or interchange, of the internal states of two 
isomorphic beings. The aim of this thought experiment is to show that the thesis of absent 
qualia is  logically false. More precisely, Tye´s strategy is to adopt a  reductio hypothesis, 
according to which two systems A and B that are functional duplicates can differ in that A is  
capable of having conscious phenomenal experiences, while B is not. But if this is so, then 
the  implementation  of  a  certain  functional  organization  is  not  sufficient  for  generating 
conscious phenomenal experiences. Tye´s strategy is  to show that to assume the absent 
qualia  hypothesis  (understood  in  this  sense)  leads  to  a  contradiction.  Thus,  if  Tye´s 
arguments are sound, the absent qualia hypothesis is not just false: it is necessary false. Tye
´s argument, thus, can be seen as supporting a logical supervenience thesis: there is at least 
a  functional  organization F such that  the  property of  generating conscious  phenomenal 




The basic elements of the replacement scenario 
Introduction 
In this chapter,  my first objective is the presentation and evaluation of two well-known 
thought experiments, presented originally by Block in (2007b) and Searle in (1980). The 
aim of these thought experiments is to show that the duplication of the functional properties 
of the brain is not a sufficient condition for creating a physical system that exhibits mental 
properties – intentionality in Searle's case, and consciousness in general in Block's. The 
first of these thought experiments is originally presented by Searle in the context of a reply 
to  his  famous  Chinese  Room argument:  the  Brain  Simulator  reply.  Searle  describes  a 
system that duplicates the functional structure of the brain at a neural level. In this case, the 
duplication  is  performed  by  the  implementation,  by  a  physical  system,  of  a  computer 
program that simulates the way in which the brain of a native Chinese speaker functions 
when he understands stories written in Chinese and offers answers to questions about them. 
As we will see, Searle's strategy is to show that this program can be implemented by a 
system  whose  physicochemical  composition  seems  to  be  obviously  inadequate  for 
generating intentional states, and in particular, for generating the conscious experience of 
understanding Chinese. The conclusion that Searle obtains from this thought experiment is 
that  the simulation of the formal properties of the brain,  at  least  at  the neural  level,  is 
simply not sufficient for duplicating its causal properties, which are understood by Searle as 
the  properties  by  which  the  brain  generates  intentionality,  and  in  general,  conscious 
phenomenal experiences. The second thought experiment – known as the “Chinese Nation” 
thought experiment – is developed by Block in (2007b). The scenario described by him is 
similar to the one presented by Searle. According to Block, what this thought experiment 
shows is that functionalism is a “liberal theory”, as it wrongly includes systems lacking 
mentality in the set of entities having it. 
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My second objective in this chapter is to explain and clarify the functionalist thesis 
that I claim is supported by a detailed version of the replacement thought experiment. This 
thesis can be initially (and informally) formulated by claiming that the instantiation of a 
certain functional  organization by a physical system P is a sufficient condition for it to 
generate mental  phenomena, and in particular, it  is a sufficient condition for generating 
conscious phenomenal experiences. I want to suggest that the best way for expressing the 
functionalist thesis supported by the replacement thought experiment is to formulate it in 
terms of the notion of supervenience. More precisely, my aim is to show that it can be 
expressed by using the notion of strong supervenience formulated in terms of quantifiers 
over possible worlds. I briefly discuss the aims of some of the most known and discussed 
versions  of  the  replacement  argument,  offered  originally  in  Cuda  (1985),  Kirk  (1994), 
Zuboff (1994), Chalmers (1996, 2006) and Tye (2006).
Finally, the third objective of this chapter is the description of the variable elements 
that compose the scenarios of the thought experiments on which these arguments are based. 
These elements are:  (a) the modal character of the functionalist thesis supported by the 
different versions of the thought experiment; (b) the level of functional organization at play;  
(c) the nature of the replacement entities, and finally, (d) the way in which the replacement 
process is performed. As it has been mentioned in the general introduction of the thesis, a 
main feature of these scenarios is precisely the description of a substitution process that 
leads to the construction of functional duplicates of conscious beings. The details of this 
process,  however,  are  not  always described in  the  same way by the  authors  that  have 
proposed arguments based on thought experiments of this kind. The modifications of the 
elements that constitute these scenarios give rise to several versions of the replacement 
argument. My aim in this section is to describe these elements in order to categorize the  
different  versions  of  the  replacement  thought  experiment  that  will  be  presented  and 
evaluated in this thesis. 
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Section 1 
Searle´s brain simulator and Block´s Chinese Nation 
As it was explained in the introduction of this chapter, Block and Searle offer two well  
known thought experiments that depict  a scenario in which the formal properties of the 
brain are duplicated in such a way that the resulting systems appear completely incapable of 
having any sort of conscious experiences. The objective of these thought experiments is 
precisely to show that this formal duplication is not sufficient for generating mentality. To 
be more precise, the aim is to claim that such duplication cannot generate consciousness, in 
Block's case, or intentionality in Searle's. This contrasts with what I claim is the general 
objective of the several versions of the replacement argument, namely, to show that the 
possession of certain functional properties – that is, the possession of certain functional 
organization – is a sufficient condition for mentality. 
As we will see, Searle seems to justify his conclusion by appealing to the intuition 
that the systems envisaged in his thought experiment – giant networks of metallic pipes, for 
example  –  are  too  bizarre  or  unorthodox  for  having intentionality.  It  seems  extremely 
doubtful that such systems, which in spite of their functional complexity have a very simple 
physicochemical composition, are able to match the causal properties of brains. Brains, in 
contrast, are extremely complex organic systems and the only objects in the universe that 
we have good reason to think are capable of generating intentionality. Meanwhile, Block 
does not rule out completely the suggestive force of this intuition, but also admits that it is 
not enough for justifying his claims, and suggests two further reasons for supporting the 
idea  that  a  formal  duplication of  the brain at  a  neural  level,  by itself,  cannot  generate 
conscious experiences. 
In order to get an adequate grasp of Searle's Brain Simulator, it will be useful to take  
a very brief look at the Chinese Room thought experiment. Remember that Searle's target, 
as he explicitly mentions it, is the thesis of Strong Artificial Intelligence, which can be 
understood as the claim that the implementation of a computational program is a sufficient 
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condition for having conscious understanding, and particularly, intentional states.8 Inside 
the Chinese Room, a person manipulates symbols according to the rules contained in a 
program, rules that consider only the formal properties of these symbols, while excluding 
any semantic properties they may have. This manipulation is done in such a way that when 
external observers feed the room with questions written in Chinese, the person inside the 
room,  after  consulting  the  rules  and  performing  the  adequate  symbolic  manipulations, 
generates  answers  also  written  in  Chinese  that  are  in  turn  received  by  these  external 
observers. Now, although the person inside the room may accurately follow all the rules 
specified by the program and perform all the required symbol manipulations, she is still 
clearly unable to understand a word of Chinese. But this is precisely what computational 
programs are: sets of rules that determine how to manipulate symbols according to their 
formal properties. From this, Searle argues that the implementation of a program is not a 
sufficient condition for having the conscious experience of understanding Chinese.
Now,  contrary  to  some  naive  interpretations  of  the  Chinese  Room  thought 
experiment, its objective is not to argue against the possibility of building artificial systems 
capable  of  generating  mental  phenomena,  nor  that  machines  are  incapable  of  having 
intentionality. For Searle, the thesis that machines can think is true (although trivial), as 
well  as the thesis  that  there are  no logical  impediments  for building an artificial  brain 
capable of generating mentality:  
… the issue about Strong AI is often taken to be the same as the question 'Could a machine think?' But 
of course the whole question is absurd. We are, after all,  machines.  If  'machine'  is defined as any 
physical system capable of performing certain functions, then there is no question that humans and 
animal  brains  are  machines.  They  are  biological  machines,  but  so  what?  There  is  no  logical  or 
philosophical reason why we could not duplicate the operation of a biological machine, using some 
artificial methods.9
So, the possibility of building an artificial machine capable of performing the function of a 
biological system is not something that can be derived from the Chinese Room thought 
8  Searle, (1980, p. 417) 
9  Searle (2002, p. 56) 
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experiment. How then are we to interpret the conclusions that Searle obtains from it? This 
can be explained if we consider Searle's Brain Simulator: note that the program described 
in the original Chinese Room thought experiment was designed for manipulating symbols 
already  interpreted  by  external  observers.  But  imagine  now that  somebody  designed a 
computer program that simulates the neural structure of the brain of a Chinese speaker. The 
set of instructions that constitute the program mirror the way in which each neuron in the 
brain  works,  how  they  react  when  they  receive  an  input  signal,  how they  generate  a 
corresponding output signal, and how they are connected to each other. The program can be 
implemented by an artificial physical system with the right characteristics (for instance, it 
would need to have a corresponding physical part implementing the input-output behaviour 
of each neuron in the original biological brain). External observers may feed the artificial 
system with stories and questions written in Chinese, and the system will produce, in turn,  
answers  in  perfect  Chinese  to  these  questions.  This  resulting  system will  behave  thus 
exactly as the original Chinese Room. But there is of course a notorious internal difference. 
In this new case, the artificial system processes the Chinese stories in the same way as the 
brain of the Chinese speaker. While in the original Chinese Room the internal process was 
carried out by a person manipulating physical tokens of Chinese characters, in this new 
case the system is functionally analogous, at a very fine-grained level, to the brain of a 
genuine Chines speaker. The question raised by this situation, thus, is whether the Brain 
Simulator understands Chinese in the same way as the original speaker. 
Not unexpectedly, Searle's answer is negative. He argues as follows: suppose that the 
person inside the Chinese Room, instead of processing Chinese characters according to 
their formal properties, is implementing a computer program that allows him to control the 
valves of a very complex system of water pipes. Valves connect these pipes, and for each of 
the synapses inside the brain of the Chinese speaker there is a corresponding valve, in such 
a way that this system of water pipes is a precise simulation of the brain of the Chinese  
speaker at the neural level. When this complex system receives certain information as an 
input – which may be constituted, perhaps, by a series of Chinese characters forming a 
question about a story – there is a transducer whose task is transform this information into 
water signals. The system processes these signals according to the rules of the program, 
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rules  that  mirror  the  way  that  the  brain  of  the  Chinese  speaker  processes  this  same 
information. It then produces an output that, after being translated by the transducer, can be 
interpreted  as  an  answer  to  a  question  about  the  Chinese  story.  Nonetheless,  the 
implementation of the program just described does not allow the man to understand the 
Chinese story, and it would be equally mistaken – Searle argues – to claim that the water  
pipes, or the combination of the man and the water pipes, are able to understand the story. 
There are two points concerning Searle´s thought experiment that need to be clarified. 
First, the Chinese Room thought experiment, as Searle originally presents it, is conceived 
as a challenge against the claim that intentionality can be generated by the implementation 
of a computer program. But at least in its original version, Searle´s thought experiment does 
not seem to be directly related to the claim that computation suffices for consciousness. 
However, notice that it  will be easy to build a similar thought experiment that involves 
consciousness instead of intentionality. This thought experiment might describe a program 
such that its implementation by the man inside the room allows it to be conscious of its 
environment, or even to experience conscious phenomenal states. Moreover, Searle argues 
that  there  is  a  conceptual  connection  between  consciousness  and  intentionality.  This 
connection implies that, in order to build a theory of intentionality, it is necessary first to  
give an account concerning the nature of consciousness. Consciousness, thus, is at the core 
of Searle´s perspective. 
Only a being that could have conscious internal states could have intentional states after all, and every 
unconscious intentional state is at least potentially conscious. This thesis has enormous consequences 
for the study of the mind. It implies, for example, that any discussion of intentionality that leaves out 
the question of consciousness will be incomplete.10  
Second,  it  might  not  be  entirely  clear,  at  this  moment,  the  relation  between 
implementing a computer program and having a certain functional organization. However, 
this  relation  will  be  clarified  later  in  this  chapter,  where  I  discuss  the  notion  of  a 
10  Searle (1992, p. 132) 
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Combinatorial State Automaton (proposed originally by Chalmers in (1996 and 1996b)) 
and the conditions that a physical system needs to satisfy in order to implement it. 
Before  evaluating  Searle's  argument,  it  will  be  useful  to  consider  a  very  similar 
thought experiment offered by Block in (2007b). Block's aim is to show that functionalism 
is  guilty  of  what  he  calls  “liberalism”:  systems lacking  mental  properties  are  wrongly 
classified by functionalism as having them. Imagine a physical entity that externally looks 
like a human being capable of having mental experiences like any other normal human 
being. Suppose that from the point of view of an external observer, this entity seems to be 
identical to Paul McCartney: it behaves like Paul, it has his voice and is a very good bass 
player. Nonetheless, from an internal perspective, this entity and Paul McCartney are quite 
different. To start with, it does not have a brain, or at least, it does not have anything that 
can be classified as a biological brain. Instead, there is a cavity inside its head in which 
there are a number of tiny homunculi, one for each of the neurons inside Paul McCartney's 
brain. To each neuron will correspond a machine table composed by a set of quadruples 
describing the current state of the neuron, the input received, the next state of the neuron 
and the corresponding output.  What these homunculi  do is  to implement  each of these 
machine  tables:  they  receive  an  input  signal,  and  by  following  the  instructions  of  the 
machine table, they change the state of the neuron and produce a corresponding output. In 
such a way, this complex of homunculi manages to implement the functional organization 
of Paul McCartney at the neural level.
Although it  does  not  seem obvious  that  the  entity  just  described lacks  mentality, 
Block also suggests a nomologically possible version of this thought experiment in which 
the absence of mental properties seems to be much more evident. This thought experiment 
is known in the philosophical literature as the “Chinese Nation”. Suppose that all Chinese 
citizens  are  equipped  with  a  radio  for  interchanging  linguistic  information  with  other 
Chinese people and with an artificial body kept in a laboratory in Beijing. This network of  
people plays the role of an external brain connected with this body. Each person plays the 
role of one neuron of this artificial brain by interchanging verbal signals, in a similar way 
as  the  homunculi  already  described  implement  a  determinate  task.  Block  claims  that 
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although this system can implement the functional organization of an intelligent individual, 
it  does not have mentality at all. Having certain functional structure, therefore, does not 
suffice for having mentality. If the objection is successful, then functionalism is a liberalist 
theory, and does not give an adequate answer to the question about the nature of mental 
states. 
What  makes  the  homunculi-headed  system  […]  just  described  a  prima  facie  counterexample  to 
(machine) functionalism is that there is prima facie doubt whether it has any mental states at all –  
especially whether it has what philosophers have variously called “qualitative states”, “raw feels” or 
“immediate phenomenological qualities.”11  
What does justify the claim that the systems envisaged by Searle and Block are not 
able to have intentionality or experience conscious mental states? Surely, there seems to be 
an intuitive resistance concerning the idea that a bunch of wet metallic pipes, in spite of the 
complexity of the system they form a part, may have the same capacities as the brain of a  
human being able to understand stories written in Chinese, English or any other language, 
as well as having other sort of conscious states, like experiencing an emotion or feeling 
pain. Equally, a huge crowd of people using radios and speaking among themselves does 
not look to be the right candidate for having genuine mental states, regardless of the fact 
that it  has the same functional properties as the brain of an intelligent being.  There are 
several physical systems that have an enormous number of parts and exhibit a very complex 
functional organization. Electronic computers, highly complicated watches, or even cities, 
planets or galaxies, have a large number of parts that interact in very intricate ways, but as 
complex as these systems might be, we simply do not attribute them the ability of having 
conscious experiences.  
But even if these intuitions are widespread, it is simply not obvious why a system 
made of biological components and not a bunch of metallic pipes and water can support 
mentality. After all, at a microscopic level there is only an extremely complex system of  
brain cells interchanging electrochemical signals. Although it is true that the only systems 
11  Block (2007b, p. 43) 
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we know can support mentality are precisely biological brains, to affirm that systems with 
similar complexity cannot have mentality just because their physical composition seems to 
be very simple – rusty metallic pipes and water – does not appear entirely convincing. In 
fact, Searle himself leaves open the question whether to build a conscious artificial system, 
made  out  from  non-organic  components,  is  a  real  possibility  12,  although  the  current 
empirical knowledge we have does not allow us to give a decisive answer to this question 
yet. Searle's main point, however, is that simulating just the formal structure of the brain is 
not sufficient for creating an artificial thinker.  
The problem with the brain simulator is that it is simulating the wrong things about the brain. As long 
as it simulates only the formal structure of the sequence of neuron firings at the synapses, it won't have 
simulated what matters about the brain, namely its causal properties, its ability to produce intentional 
states.13  
So according to  Searle,  this  simulation  falls  short  of  mimicking what  it  is  really 
important about the brain: its causal properties. But what are these causal properties? As 
Searle explains them, they concern the power of the brain to produce intentional states, and 
a functional simulation of the brain cannot reach this power or capacity. But again, there 
does not seem to be a reason why this simulation cannot have these causal powers, apart 
from the weak intuition that  the  physical  composition  of the system implementing this 
simulation is different from the brain.
Block's objections against  functionalism seem to rely on the intuition that  these 
bizarre simulations of the brain at a neural level are simply not the right kind of entities to 
which mentality can be attributed. Nonetheless, he realizes that without further arguments, 
this intuition is far from being decisive, so he offers two more reasons to reinforce it. First, 
although it is true that there is not a definitive theory that explains how is it that beings with 
12 Cf. Searle, (2002, p. 56): “There is no question that an artificially made machine could, in principle, 
think. Just as we can build an artificial heart, so there is not reason why we could not build an artificial brain. 
The point, however, is that any such artificial machine would have to duplicate, and not merely simulate, the 
causal powers of the original biological machine”. 
13 Searle (1980, p. 421) 
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brains are able to experience conscious qualitative states, we are sure that brain-headed 
entities – and in particular, human beings – are able to experience these states. Thus, it 
seems to be a mistake to affirm that, since it is not clear how the systems described by 
Block and Searle may support mentality and the ability of experience qualitative states, it is 
equally unclear how is that brains are able to do the same. There is good empirical evidence 
that brain-headed beings are capable of being conscious. It might be possible to reinforce 
this idea by noticing that the only systems we currently know are capable of generating 
consciousness are, precisely, biological brains. Until now, we have not found systems able 
to support mentality in environments hostile to organic beings. As far as we know, there are 
no such systems in the Moon, or in the Martian deserts, or even in some terrestrial regions.  
But  if  mentality  depended  on  functional  structure  and  not  on  the  physicochemical  or 
biological properties, why have we not found beings with mentality in these environments? 
Second, both the Brain Simulator and the Chinese Nation described respectively by 
Searle and Block are designed to mimic beings with mental properties. In contrast, human 
beings and their brains are not designed to mimic anything. This fact might show that it is 
not necessary to explain the behaviour of these simulations by appealing to mental entities, 
like  beliefs  or  desires.  As  Block  notes  “The  best  explanation  of  the  homunculi-heads' 
screams and winces is not their pains, but that they were designed to mimic our screams 
and winces”.14 
According to Block, his objection against  functionalism depends on the following 
claim: there is a theory that seems to imply an absurd conclusion (i.e., that the China-Body 
system is capable of generating conscious states). If it cannot be shown that the theory does 
not imply this conclusion, or if there is no way of explaining why the conclusion is not as  
absurd as it seems to be, then we have reasons for not accepting the theory.  
I claim that there is no independent reason to believe in the mentality of the homunculi-head, and I 
know of no way of explaining away the absurdity of the conclusion that it has mentality (though of 
course, my argument is vulnerable to the introduction of such an explanation).15
14  Block, (2007b, p. 77) 
15  Block (2007b, p. 77) 
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I suggest that the replacement thought experiment can be interpreted as offering the 
independent reason requested by Block. But how can then be explained away the perceived 
absurdity  of  claiming that  Searle´s  brain  simulator  or  Block´s  China-Body  system are 
capable of generating conscious phenomenal states? Tye (2006) compares this case with a 
mathematical conjecture that has not been proven. Perhaps most mathematicians suspect 
that  the  conjecture is  false,  and in  absence of  a  proof,  there does  not  seem to  be any 
contradiction in imagining its falsity. But suppose that the conjecture in fact has a proof not 
discovered by any mathematician. In this case, the conjecture would be true in spite of 
these suspicions. Analogously, Tye suggest that “ it may well seem to me that I can imagine 
a homunculus-headed system that duplicates a normal human functionally and yet lacks 
qualia. But in reality this is not conceptually possible.”16
Section 2 
The notion of supervenience  
Remember again the initial version of the thought experiment presented in the introduction 
of the thesis where an imaginary procedure for creating a functional twin B of a physical  
system  A  capable  of  generating  conscious  phenomenal  properties  is  described.  The 
procedure consists in identifying a number of basic elements that belong to system A and 
replacing them by other entities that do not share the same physiochemical composition, but 
that preserve the input-output behaviour of these basic elements. Now, if it is successfully 
argued that the property of system A of generating phenomenal is preserved along all the 
replacement steps of the process – including, of course, the last step, which is precisely 
system B – then what  has  been shown is  that  the  physical  properties of  system A are 
irrelevant  for  the  generation  of  the  property  of  generating  conscious  phenomenal 
experiences. 
This is an important result. However, note that there might be certain non-functional 
properties that were preserved along the replacement process, and there is simply no way 
16  Tye, (2006, p. 161) 
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for saying that they are not involved in the generation of phenomenal consciousness. What 
has  to  be  done  in  order  to  support  the  claim  that  conscious  phenomenal  properties 
supervene on functional properties is to assure that the only properties shared by systems A 
and B are functional properties. More precisely, we need to be sure that the only property 
shared by systems A and B is the property of instantiating the same functional organization. 
I  will  argue  later  that  there  is  a  naive  way  of  conceiving  the  replacement  thought 
experiment that inadvertently preserves other non-functional properties of system A. I am 
not claiming that the authors of published versions of the thought experiment commit this 
mistake.  However,  it  is  easy  to  interpret  the  thought  experiment  in  this  way.  For  the 
moment, imagine that the replacement process preserved just the property of instantiating 
the same functional organization. In this case, if it is shown that the capacity of system A of 
generating conscious phenomenal experiences are preserved along the entire process, then 
we have shown that the implementation of the functional organization of system A at the 
level initially established is a sufficient condition for the generation of these experiences. 
Call this thesis the sufficiency thesis: 
[Sufficiency  thesis]: there  is  a  set  F of  functional  organizations  such  that  the 
implementation of a member of set  F by a physical system is a sufficient condition 
for it to generate conscious phenomenal experiences. 
My claim in this section is that the sufficiency thesis is better expressed in terms of 
the notion of supervenience. To appeal to the notion of supervenience for giving an account 
to the general aims of replacement arguments has several advantages as this notion can be 
understood  as  a  formalization  of  the  claim  that  one  set  of  facts  depends  on,  or  is 
determined, by another set of facts. Take into consideration some initial examples: we know 
that the property of a circle of having an area of such and such dimensions supervenes on 
the length of its radius. In other  words,  it  is  not possible for two circles to differ with 
respect to the size of their areas without differing with respect to the length of their radii. 
Also, the property of a physical body of having a certain weight over the surface of the 
Earth supervenes on its mass. No two physical bodies can have a different weight over the 
surface of the Earth if they have the same mass. Similarly, the property of belonging to the 
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crew of the Apollo 13 supervenes on the property of belonging to the set {James Lovell, 
Ken Mattingly, Fred Haise}. Belonging to this crew depends on being a member of the 
latter set, so it is not possible for two persons to be different with respect to the property of 
belonging to the crew of the Apollo 13 without being different with respect to the property 
of belonging to this set.  
Consider  the  strategy  behind  the  replacement  thought  experiment:  we  imagine  a 
process in which the basic elements of a physical system A capable of generating mentality 
are replaced by other entities in such a way that the functional organization of system A is 
preserved  along  the  process.  The  outcome  of  this  process  is  a  system  B whose 
physicochemical properties may differ from the ones of system A, but that shares the same 
functional organization. In the example described in the introduction, the system at play is 
Paul McCartney´s brain. In this case, the basic elements are its organic neurons, which 
were replaced by artificial neurons capable of duplicating the input-output behaviour of 
these organic neurons. The result is the creation of a non-biological system that only shares  
with  Paul  McCartney's  original  brain  the  property  of  instantiating  the  same  functional 
organization. The crucial step of the argumentative strategy is to show that the conscious 
phenomenal properties of Paul are preserved along the replacement process. But if this true, 
what  has  been  shown  is  the  following  conditional  sentence:  if  there  is  no  difference 
concerning  the  functional  properties  of  these  systems,  then  there  is  no  difference 
concerning  their  conscious  phenomenal  properties.  This  in  turn  means  that  conscious 
phenomenal properties supervene on functional properties. The relation of supervenience 
can be better expressed as follows: 
(S) There is a set F of functional organizations such that the property of a system P of 
generating  conscious  phenomenal  experiences  supervenes  on  P  instantiating  a 
member of set F.  
One of the problems with suggesting that the conclusion of the replacement argument 
can be expressed with the help of the notion of supervenience is that there are, at least, two 
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non-equivalent  notions  of  supervenience  at  play:  weak  supervenience  and  strong 
supervenience, where the latter logically implies the former, but not conversely. Also, both 
weak and strong supervenience can be expressed by using modal operators and quantifiers 
over possible  worlds.  In (1993 and 1990) Kim identified these two formulations of the 
notion  of  supervenience  and  suggested  their  mutual  equivalence,  although McLaughlin 
(1995) showed that  both weak and strong supervenience  formulated in  terms of modal 
operators are stronger than the formulations in terms of quantifiers over possible worlds. 
Lets start with the notion of weak supervenience as formulated by modal operators. We say 
that  a  set  M of  mental  properties supervenes on a  set  F of  functional  properties when 
necessarily,  if  anything has a  mental  property  P that  belongs to set  M,  then there is  a 
functional property that belongs to set  F that it also has, and in fact, if anything has that 
functional property, then it has that mental property. Formally, the modal operator version 
of weak supervenience can be expressed as follows: 
(WSM) □ ∀x ∀M' ∈ M [M∋ x → ∃F ∋ ∈ F (F ∋ x & ∀y (F ∋ y → M ∋ y))]
Weak supervenience can also be formulated in terms of quantifiers over possible words:
(WSQ) ∀w∀x∀y((x is in w and y is in w)→(∀F ' (F ' x↔F ' y)→∀M ' (M ' x ↔ M ' y)))
According to the quantifier version of weak supervenience, we say that M-properties 
weakly supervene on F-properties if for any possible world w and any individuals x and y 
in  w,  if  x and  y are  F-indiscernible  in  w,  then they are  M-indiscernible  in  w.  As Kim 
realizes, to say that a set A of properties weakly supervenes on a set B of properties is not 
sufficient to say that B-properties determine or fix the A-properties17. The only requirement 
for weak supervenience is that there are no two objects with the same  B properties that 
differ in their A-properties within the same possible world. However, weak supervenience is 
compatible with the existence of an object in another possible world that has the same B 
17  Kim (1993, p. 60) 
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properties of an object in this world, but without the same A properties. This is not allowed 
by strong supervenience, which is formally expressed as follows: 
(SSM) □ ∀x ∀P ∈ M [Px → ∃Q ∈ B (Qx & □ ∀y (Qy → Py))]
Strong supervenience can also be formulated in terms of quantifiers over possible worlds: 
(SSQ)∀w1∀w2∀x∀y((x is in w1 and y is in w2)→(∀F' (F' x↔F' y)→∀M' (M'x ↔ M'y)))
The difference between the modal operators and the quantifier formulation of weak 
and strong supervenience will be clearer later. Meanwhile, it  is important to notice that 
most,  if  not  all  versions  of  the  replacement  thought  experiment  are  offered  for  giving 
support to the claim that the functional properties of a system fix or determine its mental  
properties.  It  is  for  this  reason that  the most  adequate  notion  of supervenience  for  our 
purposes is, precisely, strong supervenience. This thesis can be expressed as follows: 
(SS) There is a set F of functional organizations such that the property of a system P 
of  generating  conscious  phenomenal  experiences  strongly supervenes  on  P 
instantiating a member of set F.  
Set  F might  be  a  set  that  includes  only  one  element,  for  instance,  the  functional 
organization of the brain at a neural level. But we will see that other thought experiments 
that depict a replacement scenario consider different levels of functional organization. It 
might  be  argued,  for  instance,  that  the  human  brain  instantiate  a  certain  functional 
organization at the regions-of-the-brain-level. In the next chapter, I will discuss a version of 
the replacement thought experiment that considers this functional level. 
There  is  a  problem  with  the  formulation  of  supervenience  in  terms  of  modal 
operators, which makes it unsuitable for expressing the general form of the conclusion of 
the replacement argument. According to the original sufficiency thesis, if a physical system 
P implements  functional  organization  F,  then  it  will  be  able  to  experience  conscious 
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phenomenal states. Note that the direction of the conditional is important: the Sufficiency 
Thesis  is  consistent  with  the  existence  of  conscious  beings  that  may  lack  any  sort  of 
functional organization – for instance, immaterial beings that may not have any identifiable 
physical parts – but that exhibit mental properties. As an example, we may suppose that this 
is what happens to entities like the ghost of the King of Denmark or the archangel Gabriel.  
If such entities exist, perhaps their mental properties are generated in virtue of unknown 
processes not related to the functional properties they might posses (perhaps there is no way 
for  determining  what  these  functional  properties  are,  if  any)  or  in  the  archangel  case, 
perhaps by some sort of miracle or by divine intervention. Nonetheless, understood in this 
sense, ghosts and archangels are clearly not incompatible with the Sufficiency Thesis. We 
are concerned only with the question whether functional twins – systems that share the 
same functional organization – are also mental twins. For these reasons, both formulations 
of  weak  supervenience  are  inadequate  for  expressing  the  general  conclusion  of  the 
replacement  argument:  they  imply  that  it  is  necessary  that  if  something  has  a  mental 
property, then it has a functional property. Thus, if the formulation of strong supervenience 
in terms of modal operators is adopted as the adequate formulation of the conclusion of the 
replacement argument, we run the risk of unjustifiably ruling out the existence of beings 
like the ones described earlier. Of course, my intention here is not to say that there are good 
reasons for saying that ghosts or archangels really exist. I am just simply saying that the 
replacement argument should be seen as neutral  with respect to this issue,  and for this 
reason, to formulate its general aim by using a notion which rules these entities out is 
inadequate. 
Kirk (1994) mentions an analogous problem involving the formulation of minimal 
physicalism. He argues that minimal physicalism commits us to what he calls the Strict 
Implication Thesis, which can be formulated as follows: assume first that the universe is 
physically closed, that is, the totality of physical events are determined by physical laws. 
Let P be the set of all true statements formulated in an idealized physics. These statements 
describe all physical situations at every place and time. Assume now that Q is another set of 
true statements that ascribe mental states to beings in the universe that is specified by the 
statements of set  P.  With this in  mind,  we can express the Strict  Implication Thesis:  P 
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strictly  implies  Q: it  is  impossible  that  all  the members  of  P should be true and some 
members of Q false. The intuitive idea behind the Strict Implication Thesis is that mental 
facts are determined by physical facts. Now, Kirk suggests that the Strict Implication Thesis 
is  more suitable  for expressing minimal  physicalism than strong supervenience because 
strong supervenience does not allow the possibility of Cartesian worlds in which there are 
non-physical minds. 
[supervenience] is unsuitable for minimal physicalism because it entails that necessarily (that is, in any 
possible world) any given mental property is correlated with some physical property. The idea is that 
there can be no mental difference without a physical difference. And that says too much for minimal  
physicalism because it  rules out worlds where certain kinds of Cartesian dualism reigns. [  … ] In  
contrast, the Strict Implication thesis leaves it open whether there might, logically, be such Cartesian 
worlds.18 
And also: 
… strong supervenience may perhaps be an appropriate relation if you intend to use it to ascribe a  
purely physical 'nature' to the mental. But the Strict Implication thesis doesn't rule out the possibility 
that some minds should have been non-physical. 19
 
Kirk's  worries  are  similar  to  the  ones  I  mentioned  earlier.  In  this  case,  if  the 
functionalist thesis is expressed by using the notion of strong supervenience formulated in 
terms of modal operators, we are at risk of not allowing these Cartesian worlds that may 
contain entities lacking functional properties that are able to experience conscious states, 
for example. However, I think that – at least with respect to the formulation of the general 
aims of the replacement argument – it is possible to use an alternative notion of strong 
supervenience formulated not in terms of modal operators, but in terms of possible worlds. 
18 Kirk (1994, p. 81) 
19 Kirk (1994, pp. 81-82) 
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(SSQ): ∀w1 ∀w2 ∀x ∀y ((x is in w1 and y is in w2) → (∀F' (F'x↔F'y) → ∀M'(M'x ↔ 
M'y)))
What this formulation says is that, for any possible worlds  w1 and  w2, and for any 
objects x and y, if x has in world w1 the same functional properties that y has in w2, then x 
has in w1 the same mental properties that y has in w2. What this formulation says is that if 
two objects are P-indiscernible, that is, if they have the same functional properties, then 
they  are  M-indiscernible,  that  is,  they  have  the  same  mental  properties.  But  note  that 
accepting it does not commit us to accept that the possession of a mental property implies 
the possession of a physical (or functional) property. Thus, this formulation does not rule 
out the possibility that some minds are not physical, like the archangel Gabriel or the ghost 
of the King of Denmark.
Section 3 
The variable elements of the replacement scenario  
In this section, I will enumerate some of the variable elements that define the scenarios of 
some of the most discussed versions of this thought experiment. The variable elements of 
the replacement scenario I will consider in this section are the following:  
(a) The modal character of the functionalist thesis supported by the different versions 
of the thought experiment 
(b) The level of functional organization at play 
(c) The features of the replacement entities 
(d) The features of the replaced entities 
(a) The modal character of the functionalist thesis 
One difficulty of using the notion of supervenience concerns the various versions of 
the replacement thought experiment that have been offered in the literature. As they are 
explicitly formulated, the theses that the authors claim are supported by their respective 
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versions of the thought experiment  show important  variations,  and in some cases these 
authors have very different  positions with respect  to  the nature of mental  states. These 
differences  may  motivate  the  view that  there  is  not  a  unique  way  for  expressing  the 
functional thesis supported by the various versions of the thought experiment, and that the 
best  strategy is  simply  to  identify  some similarities  without  trying to  identify  a  single 
formulation of it. 
Thesis (SS) can be understood in two different ways, which corresponds to a further 
distinction between natural and logical supervenience. As the claim is that the formulation 
of the thesis supported by the replacement thought experiment can be expressed with the 
notion of strong supervenience formulated in terms of quantifiers over possible worlds, I 
will  use  this  formulation  here.  Both natural  and logical  supervenience  can be formally 
expressed as before: 
(SSQ) ∀w1 ∀w2 ∀x ∀y ((x is in w1 and y is in w2) → (∀F(Fx↔Fy) → ∀M(Mx ↔ My)))
The difference consists in that the universe of discourse of the first two quantifiers 
ranges on all possible worlds, in the case of logical supervenience, and on only the natural 
possible  worlds,  in  the  case  of  natural  supervenience.  Lets  consider  first  natural 
supervenience. To say that the property of generating conscious mental states supervenes 
naturally on the instantiation of a certain functional property – that is, on the property of 
implementing the functional organization of the brain at a neural level – means that in no 
naturally possible world are there two systems with the same functional organization but 
differ in that only one of them has the property of generating conscious mental states, while 
the other does not:
(Natural Supervenience) The property of generating conscious mental states naturally 
supervenes on the property of implementing functional organization F. 
In this reading, the universe of discourse of the first two universal quantifiers ranges on all  
naturally possible worlds. 
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(Logical Supervenience) The property of generating conscious mental states logically 
supervenes on the property of implementing functional organization F. 
In this reading, the universe of discourse of the first two universal quantifiers ranges on all  
possible  worlds,  natural  or  not.  More  precisely,  the  theses  of  natural  and  logical 
supervenience will be expressed as follows: 
(NSS) There is a set F of functional organizations such that the property of a system P 
of generating conscious phenomenal experiences naturally strongly supervenes on P 
instantiating a member of set F  
(LSS) There is a set F of functional organizations such that the property of a system P 
of generating conscious phenomenal experiences logically strongly supervenes on P 
instantiating a member of set F.  
The difference between natural and logical supervenience will help us to categorize 
the several versions of the replacement thought experiment. The first category corresponds 
to those versions of the replacement thought experiment that support thesis (NSS). A clear 
example  is  the  version  offered  by  Chalmers  in  (1996,  2006)  This  version  is  explicitly 
formulated as supporting the Principle of Organizational Invariance: 
(Principle  of  Organizational  Invariance): Given  any  system  that  has  conscious 
experiences, then a system that has the same functional organization will also have 
conscious phenomenal states. 
Chalmers  offers  two  different  versions  of  the  replacement  argument.  Their  main 
objective  is  to  argue  against  two  similar  hypotheses  concerning  the  way  in  which 
qualitative  conscious  states  are  generated.  The  first  is  the  absent  qualia  hypothesis. 
According to it, it is possible for two physical systems A and B to share the same functional 
organization  at  a  neural  level,  while  at  the  same  time  differing  in  that  A is  able  to 
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experience conscious phenomenal states, but B is not. Arguments that support  the Principle 
of Organizational Invariance are offered against the claim that isomorphic systems do not 
share the same mental properties. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that systems that have 
the  same  functional  organization  may  not  share  the  same conscious  experiences.  For 
instance,  two  beings  that  are  functionally  equivalent  may  differ  in  that  the  visual 
experiences of one of them are inverted with respect to the visual experiences of the other.  
One member of the pair would have yellow visual experiences when he is looking at a blue 
sky, or green visual experiences when seeing a strawberry, while the other would have the 
visual experiences that these objects normally produce. But of this is so, then having the 
same functional organization as a conscious being may suffice for being conscious, but not 
for having the same conscious states. This is the Inverted Qualia hypothesis: it is possible 
for two physical systems A and B to share the same functional organization at a neural level 
but whose conscious phenomenal experiences – in particular, their qualitative experiences – 
are inverted with respect to each other.
Chalmers  has  a  complex  position:  while  he  clearly  disagrees  with  the  idea  that 
phenomenal consciousness supervenes on the physical,  he distinguishes between natural 
and logical supervenience. He explicitly rejects the claim that phenomenal consciousness 
supervenes logically on the physical: according to him, it is perfectly conceivable a system 
that  is  a  complete  physical  duplicate  of  a  human  being,  but  lacking  phenomenal 
consciousness (or in other words, he accepts that zombies are possible). Nonetheless, he 
also  accepts  the  idea  that  phenomenal  consciousness  supervenes  nomologically  on  the 
physical. 
The  second  category  corresponds  to  the  versions  of  the  replacement  thought 
experiment that can be interpreted as supporting thesis (LSS). Among these are the versions 
proposed  by  Zuboff  (1994)  and Tye  (2006).  Zuboff´s  arguments  can  be  interpreted  as 
arguing against both the absent qualia hypothesis and the inverted qualia hypothesis. With 
regard to the absent qualia hypothesis, Zuboff argues that it is possible to know a priori that 
the replacement of a region of the brain that preserves its original functional role will also 
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preserve the particular nature of the experience formerly controlled by that region of the 
brain. 
So we can know a priori that the preservation of nothing more than that brain chunk's extrinsic causal 
role within the rest of the mental system also perfectly preserved all the nature of any experience to 
which that chunk of brain had made a contribution.20
With regard to the inverted qualia hypothesis, he claims that we can know a priori that the 
replacement of a region of the brain that preserves its functional role also preserves the 
same experiences formerly produced by that region of the brain. 
... honestly speaking about and behaving towards colors as though they looked the same on both sides  
of  the  visual  field  based  on  an  experience  of  them  as  radically  different  is  an  impossibility,  a 
contradiction [...] The sameness of function must logically determine the sameness of experience.21
According  to  Zuboff,  the  claim  that  the  replacement  of  the  visual  cortex  of  a 
conscious being – like Paul McCartney – by a gadget that preserves its same functional 
properties  does  not  preserve  the  same  visual  experiences  is  not  only  false,  but  also 
contradictory. Tye´s position is similar to Zuboff´s. The thought experiment proposed by 
Tye in (2006) and the arguments he develops from it  are explicitly directed to give an 
answer  to  the  absent  qualia  hypothesis.  Tye  formulates  this  hypothesis  as  posing  an 
objection to functionalism, and more precisely, as an objection to a functionalist account of 
phenomenal  consciousness.  Tye´s  strategy  consists  in  showing  that  the  absent  qualia 
hypothesis – understood as the claim that functional twins can differ in that only one of 
them has conscious phenomenal experiences – is contradictory. Therefore, the absent qualia 
hypothesis is not only false: it is conceptually or logically false, and thus, its negation is 
logically true. The thesis supported by Tye can be seen as equivalent to the claim that 
conscious phenomenal experiences logically supervenes on functional organization: 
20 Zuboff (1994, p. 183) 
21 Zuboff (1994, p. 190) 
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Necessarily, any system that functionally duplicates me is phenomenally conscious. The absent qualia 
hypothesis, therefore, is false even on its weakest interpretation.22
Cuda (1985) offers one of the first versions of the replacement argument in a paper 
suggestively titled Against Neural Chauvinism. Cuda's particular aims are, in part, to show 
that Searle's answer to the Brain Simulator reply, which has been discussed in the preceding 
chapter, is mistaken. Cuda interprets Searle as claiming that a necessary condition that a 
physical system needs to satisfy in order to possess mental properties is to be constructed of 
the right materials. Remember that Searle's position with respect to consciousness is that it 
is, first and foremost, a biological process, whose nature is not different from phenomena 
like digestion or photosynthesis, and as such, it seems unlikely that consciousness can be 
generated by entities whose physiochemical  constitution differs greatly from the one of 
organic beings. Cuda, nonetheless, argues that Searle's position is chauvinistic, and presents 
his argument in favour of the claim that a system that is functionally equivalent to a human 
being at a neural level is a sufficient condition for having conscious states: “...  functional 
equivalence to a human at a very fine level, is a sufficient condition for an organism to have  
conscious states.” 23
Thesis (SS) can be associated to the thesis of Multiple Realizability,  which is the 
claim that mentality – and in particular, conscious experiences – can be realized by entities  
made out from very different materials. That a physical system is able to have conscious 
phenomenal states, like feeling pain, perceiving red qualia or experiencing sexual arousal, 
does not depend on it having such and such physical properties, for instance, the property 
of being composed of organic matter. Multiple Realizability can be seen as a consequence 
of thesis (SS): if  a sufficient condition for mentality is  the implementation of the right 
functional organization, then it  seems that the physical nature of the different parts that 
form an entity is irrelevant, as long as these parts work correctly and perform the adequate 
function inside the system to which they belong. In (1994), Kirk offers a version of the 
replacement  argument  which  explicitly  endorses  a  form  of  the  thesis  of  Multiple 
22 Tye (2006, p. 159) 
23 Cuda (1985, p. 124) 
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Realizability, and which is called by Kirk the Swiss Cheese principle (following a well-
known example originally presented by Putnam). Kirk presents this principle as follows: 
… a thing's composition – what materials it is made of – has no essential bearings on (a) whether or 
not it has a mental life; (b) what mental states it has, if any; (c) what, if anything, it is like to be it. This  
is not to say that any materials whatever could be put together to make a mind. It might indeed prove 
impossible to make a mind out of cheese. The point is that the materials don't matter provided they do  
the right things, whatever those things might be. 24
Note that Kirk's main point – in spite of emphasizing the role of the Swiss Cheese 
principle – is not to establish whether entities made out from any possible materials are 
capable of having conscious states. That must be seen as a secondary problem. The main 
issue  is  whether  the  pattern  of  interaction  among  the  several  parts  of  a  system –  its  
functional organization – gives rise to these conscious states. How can we understand, then, 
Kirk's claim that it might be impossible to build conscious beings from certain materials, 
like cheese, or perhaps water, wood or gin? The problem is not that there is something 
intrinsically wrong with some materials, but that they might be incapable, for instance, of 
instantiating  the  right  functional  organization  with  enough reliability,  or  even with  the 
required speed. Consider  the following analogy:  to build a machine  made out  of  soap, 
toothpicks and paper that exhibits the same computational capacities of a modern PC will 
be extremely challenging, maybe technically impossible. Some of the reasons are that, for 
instance, these materials do not have the same physical resistance of the materials from 
which a real PC is made. Also, they are much more prone to suffer undesirable alterations 
when they are exposed, for example, to the same changes of temperature or pressure that 
might affect the components of a PC. All this may impair the way these materials work and 
compromise the general reliability of the entire system. Moreover, and even accepting that 
such a machine could be built, it might not work with the same speed of a PC: since the 
physical resistance of the materials is not the same, they may break when they achieve 
certain velocity inside the system. Consequently, the machine might not interact with the 
24 Kirk, (1994, p. 90) 
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environment in the same way that a PC: some external inputs would be too fast for it to 
process them. 
As  we  have  seen,  Kirk  rejects  the  use  of  the  notion  of  supervenience  in  the 
formulation  of the Strict  Implication thesis.  However,  he argues that  the Swiss Cheese 
principle implies the truth of this thesis. He reasons as follows: suppose that in the actual 
world, there are some non-physical entities that have a crucial causal role in the generation 
of mentality. But if the Swiss Cheese principle is true, then these crucial causal roles can  
also be performed by physical entities.
An immediate consequence of the Swiss Cheese principle is that the Strict Implication thesis might be  
true. For even if it turned out that in the actual world certain non-physical items were involved in  
mental interactions, [...] ... the Swiss Cheese principle assures us that those same causal roles could  
have  been  performed  by  physical  items  instead.  From  the  point  of  view  of  our  interest  in  the 
phenomena of raw feeling, therefore, it doesn’t matter whether mental interactions happen to involve 
non-physical items.25
(b) The level of functional organization 
The notion of functional organization plays a fundamental role in the description of 
the  general  aims of  the replacement  argument,  as well  as  in  the  way that  the different 
replacement scenarios of the thought experiment are constructed. Roughly, the notion of 
functional organization can be understood as the abstract pattern of causal interaction that 
exists between the different parts of a system, and maybe also to the way that these parts 
interact with the inputs and outputs received and produced by it. In general, a functional 
organization  F  can  be  determined  by  specifying  the  following  elements:  (a)  a  certain 
number of abstract elements or parts; (b) for each of these elements, a number of possible 
states,  and (c) a system constituted by dependency relations, which establishes how the 
state of each of these elements is determined by the previous states of all the other elements 
25  Kirk (1994, p. 105) 
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of the system and by the inputs received by it, and also which inputs are produced by the  
system depending on the previous states of its components.26 
It  is  important  to  notice  that  the  notion  of  functional  organization  describes  an 
abstract entity. More precisely, it describes an abstract entity that can be implemented by a 
physical system. Most versions of the replacement thought experiment assume that physical 
systems – and in particular, organic brains of conscious beings – implement a determinate 
functional organization. However, there are some points that need to be clarified. First, it is  
very important to notice that most physical system – and this also applies to organic brains 
– implement more than one functional organization. This depends on how the different 
parts of the physical system are individuated, and how the states of these different parts are 
conceived. Second, authors like Searle (1994) have claimed that most physical systems not 
only implement more than a single functional organization, but that they also implement 
most of them. Also, an important assumption in this thesis is that the conditions that a 
physical system needs to satisfy in order to have a determinate functional organization are 
analogous  to  the  conditions  it  needs  to  implement  a  certain  computation.  The  relation 
between these conditions – not assumed by all versions of the replacement argument – is 
important insofar as one of the most discussed objections against functionalism (according 
to which there are no objective conditions for implementing a determinate computation) 
also affects the idea that physical systems implement a functional organization. Due to the 
fundamental role the notion of functional organization plays in the replacement thought 
experiment,  it  is  essential  to  clarify  the  conditions  under  which  a  physical  system 
implements a determinate functional organization. 
In (1996) Chalmers suggests that the conditions under which a system implements a 
Combinatorial  State  Automaton  are  analogous  to  the  conditions  under  which  a  system 
implements  a  certain functional  organization.  Chalmers  suggestion  is  that  this  informal 
description of a functional organization can be formally described with the help of the 
notion of a CSA. The first step to understand the notion of a CSA is to deal with a simpler  
notion; the notion of a Finite State Automaton (which can be understood as a special case of 
26 Cf. Chalmers, (1996, p. 247) 
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a CSA). A Finite State Automaton (FSA) is a mathematical abstract device, and as such, it 
is not necessarily designed for being implemented by a physical system. Briefly, it can be 
defined by the following structure: 
[Σ, Γ, S, s0, f, ω]
The elements of this structure are defined as follows: Σ is the input alphabet, which is given 
by a finite set of symbols {i1, ... in}. The output alphabet, Γ, is composed by a finite set of 
symbols {o1, ... on}. S is a finite, nonempty set of formal states {s1, ... sn}. There is also an 
element of set S, s0, which is known as the  initial state. A state transition function,  f, is 
defined as f: S x Σ → S. Finally, ω is the output function, and may depend on both a state 
and an input (ω: S x Σ → Γ), or only on a state (ω: S → Γ).
The framework of a FSA will serve as a basis for defining a CSA. In the case of a  
FSA, sets  Σ,  Γ  and S,  which correspond respectively to  the  set  of  inputs,  outputs and 
internal states, are monadic: they are composed by single elements. In contrast, in a CSA 
these sets are structurally complex, and can be formally represented as follows: 
Σ= {[i11,… ikn], … [i11,… ikn]}
S = {[s11,… sin], … [s11,… skn]} 
Γ = {[o11,… oin], … [o11,… okn]} 
Another  difference  is  that  the  transition  rules  of  a  CSA can  be  determined  by 
specifying, for each element of set S, a function that determines how the next state depends 
on the-input vector and the previous state-vector, and also for each element of the output 
vector. These transition rules can be defined with the following notation: 
([i11,… ikn] , [s11,… sin]) → ([s'11,… s'kn] , [o11,… oin])
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This expression can be read as follows: if the CSA is in vector-state [s11, … sin]) receiving 
input-vector [i11, … ikn], it will transit into vector-state [s'11, … s'kn] and will produce output 
[o11, … oin]).  The conditions under which a system implements a CSA can be precisely 
formulated as follows: 
A physical  system implements  a  given CSA if there  is  a  decomposition of  its  internal  states  into 
substates [s1, s2, … sn ]and a mapping f from these substates onto corresponding formal states Sj of the 
CSA, along with similar mappings for inputs and outputs, such that: for every formal state transition 
([I1, … Ik], [S1, … Sn]) → ([S'1, … S'k], [O1, … Ol]) of the CSA, if the system is in internal state [s1, … sn 
] and receiving input [i1, … in] such that the physical states and inputs map to the formal states and 
inputs, this causes it to enter an internal state and produce an output that map appropriately to the 
required formal state and output.27
Let's see how the functional organization of Paul´s brain at  a neural  level can be 
abstracted into a CSA. The way for doing this is to identify a number of basic elements – in  
this  case,  organic  neurons  –  and  to  stipulate  that  to  each  state  vector  of  the  CSA 
corresponds one of these basic elements. Also, it is necessary to stipulate that the causal 
interactions among these organic neurons correspond to the formal transition rules of the 
CSA. This can be better understood if we consider the replacement process that generates 
Paul´s  functional  isomorph  at  a  neural  level,  F-Paul.  Suppose  that  F  is  the  functional 
organization instantiated by Paul McCartney´s brain at the neural level. According to the 
framework provided by a Combinatorial State Automaton, functional organization F can be 
abstracted into a CSAF.  Any system that implements CSAF according to the conditions 
suggested by Chalmers will have F as its functional organization. For each organic neuron 
inside Paul´s brain, there will be a corresponding vector of CSAF that determines how the 
internal  state  of  this  neuron  depends  on  the  state  of  other  neurons.  The  replacement 
procedure starts by extracting one organic neuron from Paul´s brain and then installing in 
its former place an artificial neuron that duplicates the function of the organic neuron by 
implementing the corresponding vector. This implementation consists in following a series 
of  formal  transition  rules  that  determine  the  way  in  which  the  artificial  neuron,  after 
receiving a stimulus from the presynaptic neurons in the neighbourhood, will in turn send a 
27  Chalmers (1996b, p. 325) 
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corresponding  stimulus  to  the  postsynaptic  neurons.  This  replacement  procedure  will 
continue until for each organic neuron in Paul´s brain there is a corresponding artificial 
neuron. In this way, the system composed by these artificial neurons – F-Paul´s artificial 
brain – shares the same functional organization of Paul´s organic brain by implementing 
CSAF. This framework will allow us to formulate a modified version of theses (NSS) and 
(LSS): 
(NSSM) There is a set C of Combinatorial State Automata such that the property of a 
system P of generating conscious phenomenal experiences  naturally supervenes on 
the property of P of instantiating a member of set C. 
(LSSM) There is a set A of Combinatorial State Automata such that the property of a 
system  P of generating conscious phenomenal experiences  logically supervenes on 
the property of P of instantiating a member of set C.  
Most versions of the replacement thought experiment consider a level of functional 
organization in which the organic neurons of the brain of a conscious person are identified 
as  the  basic  elements  of  this  functional  organization.  This  is  the  case  of  the  thought 
experiments proposed by Cuda, Kirk and Chalmers. As we mentioned before, this strategy 
has a very good justification: neurons are the most basic elements of the brain, and as we 
mentioned in the introduction, there is excellent empirical evidence in favour of the claim 
that the brain is the organ directly responsible for the generation of conscious phenomena 
experiences. Of course, the brain of Paul can implement another functional organization if 
we identify  another  set  of  basic  elements  instead  of  organic  neurons.  The replacement 
thought experiment described in Zuboff (1994) is a notorious example: Zuboff considers a 
level of functional organization in which regions or parts of the brain associated to certain 
mental function are the basic elements of replacement. The replacement process imagined 
by Zuboff is similar to the one just described; although in this case these basic elements are 
replaced by devices or gadgets that, according to Zuboff, duplicate the causal effects of the 
original region. 
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(c) The features of the replacement entities 
Another variable element of the replacement thought experiment corresponds to the 
entities that replace the basic elements of the brain (or in Tye´s case, the physical realizers 
of internal states). In the literature, these entities include tiny homunculi inside capsules 
that  follow a set  of instructions  (Cuda),  gadgets  that  duplicate  the causal  relations  that 
organic regions of the brain have with respect to the whole system (Zuboff), or miniature 
computers  that  implement  a  certain  vector  state  of  a  CSA (Chalmers).  Zuboff  even 
considers  the  possibility  of  replacing  regions  of  the  brain  with  an  entity  that,  by pure 
chance, generates the same electrochemical output signals produced by the visual cortex. 
This entity  might be an empty shell  in which these signals are  produced randomly. Of 
course, the way in which these signals are produced might be chaotic, but Zuboff propose 
to imagine that this shell produces the same output signals produced by the visual cortex for  
a certain amount of time, say, sixty seconds. 
What is important is that the replacement preserves the same connections that the 
original organic part has with the rest of the brain. At the neural level, if the organic neuron  
produces  an  output  signal  in  response to  a  certain  stimulus,  the replacement  would be 
sensible to the same stimulus and will produce the same output. If the replacement is a tiny 
computer, it will be equipped with a device that produces the adequate electrical impulses, 
and perhaps with another device that stores and produces the adequate neurotransmitters, 
always following a certain program. If the replacement consists in a homunculus inside a 
capsule, it might follow a set of instructions that indicate the electrical and chemical signals 
that need to be produced when other electrical and chemical signals are received. 
(d) The features of the replaced entities   
In  most  versions  of  the  replacement  argument,  neurons  are  the  entities  that  are 
replaced by functionally equivalent systems. This strategy has a very good justification: 
neurons are the most basic elements of the brain, which is considered the organ responsible 
for  mentality  in  general.  Tye´s  version,  however,  can  be  better  conceived  as  a  mutual 
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replacement,  or  interchange,  of  the  internal  states  of  two  systems  S  and  S∋ that  are 
functional  duplicates.  The  internal  states  of  these  two  beings  are  conceived  also  as 
functionally isomorphic (in a sense that will be explained in the first section of the fourth 
chapter  of  the  thesis),  but  differ  in  that,  while  the  states  of  being  S have  phenomenal 
properties, the states of S∋ are phenomenally inert. Tye´s strategy is to assume, as a reductio 
hypothesis, that the absent qualia hypothesis implies the logical conceivability of a being 
like S∋. This assumption, however, contradicts with a principle that is conceived by Tye as 
necessary, and thus, Tye concludes that a being like S∋ is not logically conceivable, and 
thus, that the absent qualia hypothesis is logically false. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I had three main objectives. The first was to present the thought 
experiments proposed by Block and Searle. The objective of these thought experiments is 
to  show that  the  duplication of  the  functional  organization of  the brain of  a  conscious 
person,  at  least  at  the  neural  level,  is  not  a  sufficient  condition  for  the  generation  of 
mentality,  and  in  particular,  is  not  a  sufficient  condition  for  generating  conscious 
phenomenal experiences. The versions of the replacement thought experiment that will be 
presented in this thesis can be understood as showing that, in spite of the bizarre nature of  
the  systems  described  by  Block  and  Searle,  systems  that  duplicate  the  functional 
organization  of  the  brain  at  the  adequate  level  are  capable  of  generating  conscious 
phenomenal experiences. 
My second objective was to argue that the formulation of the theses supported by 
the several versions of the replacement thought experiment can be expressed with the help 
of  the  notion  of  strong supervenience  formulated  in  terms  of  quantifiers  over  possible 
worlds. The first was thesis (NSS): there is a set F of functional organizations such that the 
property  of  a  system  P  of  generating  conscious  phenomenal  experiences  naturally 
supervenes on P instantiating a member of set F. The argument presented by Chalmers in 
(1996) is explicitly given as supporting thesis (NSS). The second thesis was (LSS): there is 
a  set  F  of  functional  organizations  such that  the  property of  a  system P of  generating 
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conscious phenomenal experiences logically supervenes on P instantiating a member of set 
F. Authors that propose versions of the replacement thought experiment that support thesis 
(LSS) are Zuboff (1994) and Tye (2006). Finally, although the version of the replacement 
argument proposed by Kirk in (1994) does not explicitly support a supervenience claim, it 
can be understood as supporting a thesis with a similar modal character. His version is 
presented explicitly as supporting a version of the thesis of Multiple Realizability, called by 
him the Swiss Cheese Principle. Kirk argues that this principle supports what he calls the 
Strict Implication Thesis, according to which the set of sentences P that correctly describe 
the past, present and future of the whole universe logically imply a set Q of sentences that 
ascribe mental states to the individuals of this universe. 
Finally, in order to provide a more accurate characterization of the several versions 
of the replacement thought experiment, I identified some of the main variable elements of 
the  replacement  scenario  described in  them. These variable  elements are  (a)  the  modal 
character  of  the  functionalist  thesis  supported  by  the  different  versions  of  the  thought 
experiment,  (b)  The  level  of  functional  organization  at  play,  (c)  The  features  of  the 
replacement entities, and finally, (d) The features of the replaced entities. 
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Chapter 2 
Two initial versions of the replacement thought experiment 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will present and evaluate two initial versions of the replacement 
thought experiment, as well as associated arguments derived from it whose objective is to 
show that thesis (NSS) is true: there is a set F of functional organizations such that the 
property  of  a  system P of  generating  conscious  phenomenal  states  supervenes  on  the 
property of P of instantiating a member of set F.  Remember that if thesis (NSS) is true, the 
absent qualia hypothesis is at least empirically false: in a possible world whose physical 
laws are the same ones as in the actual world, it is not the case that functional isomorphs 
differ in that only one of them is capable of generating conscious phenomenal experiences. 
In the first section of this chapter, I will discuss an initial replacement strategy that 
does  not  involve  the  functional  duplication  of  the  brain  of  a  conscious  being,  but  a 
simulation at the microphysical level. As we will see, this strategy preserves the conscious 
phenomenal experiences of the subject. However, this strategy cannot be used for arguing 
in favour of thesis (NSS). The reason is that this strategy is conceived as duplicating the 
microphysical structure of a conscious being, and not its functional properties. 
In the second section of this chapter, I will present a first version of the replacement 
thought experiment based on the strategy proposed by Zuboff in (1994).28 According to the 
framework presented in the last chapter of this thesis, this version describes a replacement 
scenario in which the functional organization of the brain of the subject is relatively less 
fine-grained  than  the  neural  level.  In  this  case,  the  base  properties  are  defined  as  the 
28  Although Zuboff's thought is explicitly presented as supporting the claim that functional organization 
logically determines phenomenal consciousness, my aim in this chapter is to determine whether a similar 
version of the thought experiment that considers the same functional organization (that is, the functional 
organization of the brain at the regions-of-the-brain level) is capable of supporting the claim that  
phenomenal consciousness naturally supervenes on functional organization. 
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property of instantiating the same functional organization of the brain at the regions-of-the-
brain level. 
In  the  third  section  of  this  chapter,  I  will  present  some problems faced  by  the 
regions-of-the-brain version of the replacement thought experiment, mainly related to the 
properties of the replacement entities proposed in this version of the thought experiment. If 
these entities are defined as duplicating all the causal relations that the original region had 
with respect to the rest of the brain, the replacement process might succeed in creating an 
entity capable of experiencing conscious phenomenal states. However, I will argue that it is 
at least doubtful that a gadget that does not share the same physicochemical composition of 
the original brain region can duplicate all the causal relations that this original part had with 
respect to the rest of the brain. In order to duplicate these casual relations, the gadget would 
have to be almost identical to the original organic region. But if this is so, this version of 
the  replacement  thought  experiment  would  not  show  that  the  capacity  of  generating 
conscious phenomenal experiences supervenes on the property of instantiating a certain 
functional organisation. The reason, of course, is that the physicochemical composition of 
the gadget might have a crucial role in the generation of these experiences. 
In the fourth section of this chapter,  I will  present a version of the replacement 
thought experiment that considers the functional organization of the brain at a neural level, 
which is  mainly  based  on the version  presented by Chalmers in  (1996 and 2006).  My 
objective is to determine whether this version supports at least thesis (NSS): there is a set F 
of  functional  organizations  such that  the  property of  a  system of  generating  conscious 
phenomenal experiences naturally supervenes on P instantiating a member of set F. This 
version  of  the  thought  experiment  adopts  a  sort  of  reductio strategy  (although  it  is 
important to notice that it is not a genuine reductio, since its objective is not to show that 
the assumption of the absent qualia hypothesis leads to a logical contradiction). Thus, the 
“reductio” hypothesis will be formulated as follows: it is naturally possible that a system 
that duplicates the functional organization of the brain of a conscious person at a neural  
level lacks the capacity of generating conscious phenomenal experiences. The strategy will 
be  to  consider  a  replacement  process  in  which  the  organic  neurons  of  the  brain  of  a 
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conscious person – Paul McCartney – are replaced by artificial neurons. As the replacement 
process is  done neuron for  neuron, it  generates a  sequence of  beings that  preserve the 
functional organization of Paul´s brain at the neural level. Finally, in the fifth section of this 
chapter, I will discuss some objections related to the claim that a system can duplicate the  
input-output behaviour of an organic neuron. 
Section 1 
The microphysical simulation of the brain of a conscious being 
Before presenting and evaluating the regions-of-the-brain version and the neural version of 
the  replacement  thought  experiment,  I  want  to  briefly  discuss  a  different  replacement 
strategy  proposed  originally  by  Block  in  (2007b).  This  replacement  strategy  depicts  a 
situation in which the most basic components of a conscious being – namely, subatomic 
particles – are replaced by other entities, while the ability of this being of experiencing 
conscious phenomenal experiences is preserved. The aim of the replacement strategy I will 
present  in  this section,  as it  was originally  proposed by Block,  is  not  to show that the 
preservation of the functional properties of a physical system is sufficient for preserving its 
mental capacities. Block designs this strategy in order to argue against what he considers an 
ad hoc approach for objecting to the Chinese Nation thought experiment. According to this 
strategy, one can stipulate that if systems A and B differ in that A contains elements with 
functional organizations that are characteristic of beings capable of experiencing conscious 
phenomenal states, while B does not, then A and B cannot be functionally equivalent. In 
(1967),  Putnam  argues  that  the  claim  that  “being  in  pain  is  a  functional  state  of  an 
organism” can be defined as follows: 
(1) All organisms capable of feeling pain are Probabilistic Automata.
(2) Every organism capable of feeling pain possesses at least one Description of a certain kind (i.e.  
being capable of feeling pain is possessing an appropriate kind of Functional Organization).
(3) No organism capable of feeling pain possesses a decomposition into parts which separately possess 
Descriptions of the kind referred to in (2).
(4) For every Description of the kind referred to in (2), there exists a subset of the sensory inputs such 
that an organism with that Description is in pain when and only when some of its sensory inputs are in 
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that subset.29
According to clause (3), if an organism is able to experience pain, then its constituent parts 
cannot be described as being capable of feeling pain. If we accept this stipulation, then the 
Chinese Nation cannot be functionally equivalent to the brain of a conscious person. The 
reason is that the Chinese Nation includes parts that are composed of Chinese people, able 
to experiencing conscious phenomenal states, while the parts of the brain of that conscious 
person are unable, by themselves, to have these experiences. Now, the problem seems to be 
that,  in  the  case  of  the  Chinese  Nation,  the  system  acquires  the  relevant  functional 
organization in virtue  of the fact  that conscious beings play a certain fundamental  role 
inside  the  system.  Thus,  the  ad  hoc proposal  can  be  formulated  as  follows:  a  system 
capable of having conscious phenomenal experiences in virtue of instantiating a certain 
functional organization cannot possess, among its constituent parts, conscious beings that 
play a certain crucial role in giving the system its functional organization. 
The strategy proposed by Block can be interpreted as describing a system that has a 
certain functional organization in virtue of the role played by this sort of conscious beings, 
and at the same time is capable of having conscious phenomenal experiences. Imagine that 
in some unknown and probably very different region of the universe, there are extremely 
small, intelligent beings that are composed by matter that is infinitely divisible and is also 
very different from the matter we know (for ease of exposition, we can call it  here “h-
matter”). Suppose that these intelligent beings, at some point in their history, travel through 
the universe and discover the existence of our type of matter (call it “r-matter”). For some 
reason known only to them, they decide to construct flying machines that resemble all the 
elementary  particles  that  compose  r-matter.  They  build,  for  instance,  machines  that 
resemble protons and neutrons.  Powerful engines attached to these machines bind them 
together in order to simulate the atomic nucleus. Other machines that move around this 
nucleus simulate the behaviour of electrons. These flying machines are constructed in such 
a way that they mimic the subatomic processes that  generate  the basic  properties of r-
matter. These intelligent beings have at their disposition an extremely large amount of h-
29  Putnam, (1967, p. 434) 
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matter for constructing these flying machines, and soon they construct a huge amount of 
“substances”  made  from h-matter  that  resemble,  at  the  subatomic  level,  the  matter  we 
know. They start by constructing simulations of basic elements, like hydrogen and helium. 
Little by little, the amount of simulated matter increases and, after some millions of years,  
there is a region of the universe in which stars and planets made from this simulated matter  
can be found. 
Imagine now that a group of astronauts travel to that region of the universe, where 
they find a planet that resembles the conditions on Earth. When they arrive, they discover 
that can breathe the “air” in its atmosphere and drink the “water” on its rivers. They also 
discover  things  that  grow in  the  surface  of  the  planet,  very  similar  to  the  plants  and 
vegetables that can be found at Earth, and find that they are edible. Convinced that the 
environment in that planet is adequate for supporting human life, they decide to establish a 
colony. After some years of living there, a very interesting phenomenon occurs: the body of 
the astronauts becomes composed of this artificial matter. The reason, of course, is that the 
molecules  of  their  bodies  are  gradually  interchanged  with  the  “molecules”  of  the 
environment. 
Assume that the astronauts travel back to Earth after living for several years in that 
part of the universe. When they arrive, a group of physicians – perhaps after putting them in 
quarantine – deicide  to  evaluate  them medically.  The physicians,  however,  do not  find 
anything odd. The astronauts still have hearts, livers, kidneys and brains that work in more 
or less the same way as the organs of the people that remained at Earth. Importantly, their 
brains preserved the structures to which a role in the generation of mentality is commonly 
attributed.  Inside  the  heads  of  the  astronauts,  there  are  tiny  structures  that  are 
indistinguishable from real neurons. The physicians notice that these structures form large 
networks in which electrochemical signals are interchanged through connections identical 
to synapses. The generation of these electrochemical signals is also identical to the way in 
which they are generated by the neurons of normal people: there is a sodium-potassium 
pump that regulates the interchange of ions through the membranes of these structures. Of 
course, some people might reject the idea that that these structures could be called “hearts”, 
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“kidneys”, “brains”, “neurons”, or “synapses”. By hypothesis, these internal structures are 
not composed of organic matter as we know it. But at an extremely fine-grained level, they 
work in exactly the same way as the organic, biological internal structures of a normal 
person. All the physical phenomena that might contribute to the generation of mentality and 
of conscious phenomenal experiences has a corresponding correlate in the simulation just 
described.  
The basic electrochemical mechanisms by which the synapse operates are now fairly well understood. 
As far as is known, changes that do not affect these electrochemical mechanisms do not affect the 
operation of the brain, and do not affect mentality. The electrochemical mechanisms in your synapses 
would be unaffected by the change in your matter.30
Is this sufficient for granting that the astronauts still preserve the capacity of having 
conscious phenomenal  experiences? I  can think on two different  objections  against  the 
claim that the astronauts did not preserve their mental capacities after their molecules in 
their brains and bodies were replaced by molecules composed of h-matter. The first is that 
h-matter might introduce an undetectable but detrimental effect in the mental life of the 
astronauts,  in  such  a  way  that  when  their  physical  composition  changes,  h-matter 
progressively destroys their mental properties. After all, h-matter is completely different 
from the  matter  we  know  and  we  are  composed  of,  and  we  simply  cannot  deny  the 
possibility  that  one  of  its  properties  was that  it  makes  impossible  the  presence  of  any 
mental property. But how these detrimental effects would be manifested in the brains of the 
astronauts?  By hypothesis,  this  simulated matter behaves exactly  like real  matter.  If  h-
matter would have this harmful property, it would not be manifested in the way in which 
the simulated particles behave, and particularly, it could not then affect the way in which 
the synapses of the astronauts work. 
The second objection goes as follows: perhaps the level of simulation described is 
not  the most  adequate.  It  might  be argued that  the generation of  mental phenomena is 
related in some way to the effects produced by subatomic particles that were not simulated 
30   Block, (2007b, p. 75) 
56
by the machines created by these tiny beings.  Protons and neutrons belong to a  larger 
family of subatomic particles, the hadrons, which are in turn composed by quarks. There 
are,  perhaps,  quark-related  phenomena  that  the  simulation  described  cannot  represent, 
simply because the level of simulation chosen is not as fine grained as the level of quarks, 
and these phenomena might have an essential role in the generation of mentality. However, 
it is not difficult to imagine a further modification in the simulation process in which the 
tiny beings decide to simulate these more basic subatomic particles. Instead of protons and 
neutrons,  they  can  create  machines  designed  to  simulate  the  behaviour  of  quarks.  By 
hypothesis, the matter used for creating these machines is infinitely divisible, so there does 
not seem to be any problem for simulating r-matter at the level required. 
There is,  of course,  a  difference between the cases presented by Block´s Chinese 
Nation  and  Searle´s  brain  simulator  and  the  simulation  of  subatomic  particles  just 
described. Notice that, in contrast with these former cases, the objective of the tiny beings 
is not to build a system that implements the functional structure of conscious people, but to 
simulate their microphysics. Of course, the progressive replacement of the molecules of the 
bodies of the astronauts does not modify the way in which their brains process information. 
As it has been mentioned, no medical procedure can detect a difference between them and 
the  people that  remained on Earth.  The same neurophysiological  theories  that  apply to 
normal people apply to these astronauts. In contrast, these theories do not apply to systems 
like the ones exemplified by Block´s Chinese Nation and Searle´s brain simulator. 
There is one very noticeable difference between the elementary-particle-people example and the earlier 
homunculus examples. In the former, the change in you as you become homunculus-infested is not one 
that  makes  any  difference  to  your  psychological  processing  (i.e.,  information  processing)  or 
neurological processing but only to your microphysics. No techniques proper to human psychology or 
neurophysiology would reveal any difference in you. However, the homunculi-headed simulations [...]  
are not things to which neurophysiological theories true of us apply [...] This difference suggests that  
our intuitions are in part controlled by the not unreasonable view that our mental states depend on our  
having the psychology and/or neurology we have. 31
31  Block, (2007b, p. 76) 
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Section 2 
The regions-of-the-brain version of the replacement thought experiment
In  (1994),  Zuboff  offers  a  version  of  the  replacement  thought  experiment.  Among the 
several  functional  organizations  instantiated  by  the  brain,  this  version  of  the  thought 
experiment  considers  what  I  will  call  here  the  parts-of-the-brain  level  of  functional 
organization. We have very good empirical information in favour of the claim that some 
regions of the brain are associated to certain mental properties. For instance, we know that 
the  right  and  left  visual  cortices,  which  are  located,  respectively,  in  the  left  and  right 
hemispheres  of  the  brain,  are  the  parts  of  the  cerebral  cortex  that  are  responsible  for 
processing visual information. The left hemisphere visual cortex processes signals from the 
right visual field, while the right hemisphere visual cortex processes signals from the left 
visual field. Both visual cortices receive, in turn, signals generated by the lateral geniculate 
nucleus, which is the part of the brain that receives visual information directly from the 
retina of the eye. 
The  replacement  scenario  depicted  by  this  version  of  the  thought  experiment 
assumes the possibility of building non-organic devices capable of duplicating the input-
output behaviour of sections of the brain associated with a particular mental function. What 
these organic devices do is to replace their organic counterparts by interacting with the rest 
of the brain in exactly the same way. The process continues until none of the organic parts 
of the brain remain and a new system, which shares the same functional organization of the 
brain  at  the  level  just  described  but  that  is  composed  entirely  by  these  artificial 
replacements, is created. The argument built on this replacement scenario is directed to 
show that the preservation of the functional organization of the original system in the new 
system preserves the mental properties (if any) of the former one.
Imagine that a group of highly competent neuroscientists replace Paul McCartney´s 
visual cortex with a gadget or device that, according to Zuboff, “will keep precisely the 
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same relationship with the rest of the brain that the replaced chunk had”. What the precise 
character of this relationship is will be discussed later, but at least, we can be sure that this 
includes  all  electrochemical  signals  that  the  original  visual  cortex  transmits  to  the 
neighbouring parts of the brain. Now, since the rest of the brain and in particular the regions 
concerned with the production of speech are causally affected by the gadget (lets call it  
GV) in the same way they would be affected by Paul McCartney´s original visual cortex, 
his linguistic behaviour (and in fact his entire behaviour) would not be different from the 
behaviour he would have exhibited if the replacement had not been performed. If he were 
in front of a flying lady carrying a bag of diamonds and somebody asked him “Hey, Paul, 
can you see that lady over there?” he would answer “Yes, I can” if he wanted to give a 
sincere response. His behaviour in general would be indistinguishable from a person having 
visual experiences. But – Zuboff argues – it would be absurd to think that he could exhibit 
such behaviour if he did not have these visual experiences. Therefore, such experiences 
must have been preserved after the replacement of Paul´s visual cortex by a functionally 
equivalent system. 
But think about this: it would be absurd for us thus to be assured that you would go on behaving and 
speaking the same after the replacement if it were possible for us to think that your experience might  
have  been  different  from  what  it  would  have  been  with  the  chunk  of  brain  unreplaced.  If  the 
replacement by wires and transistors in that part of brain activity could have made you see or hear or 
feel or think any differently, how could we have the assurance our stipulation must give us that you  
would not do or say anything different? (Anyone who is not startled by this step in the argument is  
probably  not  understanding  it.)  A  gadget  that  saves  the  pattern  of  mental  functioning  must, 
surprisingly, therein have saved the experience too.32
Thus, the moral that Zuboff draws from this argument is that the function performed by the 
original organic region of the brain will be preserved after the replacement. In particular, if  
we replace the visual cortex of Paul McCartney by a device that implements the same 
input-output causal relationships, the phenomenal character of his visual experiences will 
not be modified. The following is a more precise reconstruction of Zuboff's argument: 
32  Zuboff, (1994, p. 183) 
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(Premise 1) There is a gadget GV that duplicates the same causal relationship that Paul McCartney´s 
visual cortex has with respect to the other regions of his brain. 
(Premise 2) Since GV preserves the same causal relationships that the original Visual Cortex had with 
respect  to  the  rest  of  the  brain,  the  regions  responsible  for  the  generation  of  Paul  McCartney's 
linguistic behaviour will be affected exactly in the same way by GV. 
(Premise 3) Since the regions of the brain responsible for the generation of Paul McCartney's linguistic 
behaviour will be affected in the same way by gadget GV, Paul McCartney's linguistic behaviour will 
be exactly the same. 
(Premise 4) It would be absurd to think that Paul McCartney preserved his linguistic behaviour and, at 
the same time, affirming that the replacement eliminated his visual experiences. 
(Conclusion) Paul McCartney's visual experiences were not modified by the replacement of his visual 
cortex by gadget GV. 
As it is indicated in premise (4), there is something that is prima facie problematic in 
saying that a functional isomorph can behave as if it had visual experiences but without 
having them at all. However, this does not seem to be completely absurd. The fact that the 
behaviour of Paul McCartney – and specially, his linguistic behaviour – is exactly the same 
after  the  replacement  does  not  seem to  show, by itself,  that  his  visual  experiences  are 
preserved when his  organic  visual  cortex is  replaced by gadget  GV.  Just  because  Paul 
McCartney's  behaviour  is  consistent  with  him  having  visual  experiences  we  cannot 
conclude that he, in fact, has them. After all, this is precisely what happens with complete 
functional zombies: their behaviour is consistent with the possession of conscious mental 
states, but they completely lack mental life. Cannot we say that after the replacement of the 
Visual Cortex, Paul McCartney is something like a visual zombie that deep inside is just 
like a blind subject but that exhibits the behaviour of a normal human being? 
In spite of these considerations, it is important to remember that at this stage of the 
replacement process, Paul McCartney is by no means a full  zombie.  Even if his visual 
experiences  are  eliminated  after  the  replacement,  nothing  in  the  envisaged  scenario 
prevents him for forming new beliefs about his current behaviour. But if this is possible, it 
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would be odd to think that Paul McCartney can form new beliefs concerning a behaviour 
that is consistent with him having visual experiences, and at the same time not having these 
experiences  at  all.  This  is  an  initial  description  of  the  incompatibility  noticed  by  the 
proponents of these replacement scenarios: the one that exists between the subject's lack of 
conscious phenomenal experiences (visual, auditory, olfactory, etc.) and the fact that the 
subject seems to be able to generate conscious intentional states about these experiences 
and about a behaviour that is consistent with its presence. However, Zuboff´s argument 
seems to rely only in the fact that the linguistic behaviour of the subject will be consistent 
with the presence of visual experiences, a fact that, as I have argued, does not suffice for 
showing that these experiences are preserved after the replacement process. In section (4) 
of this chapter I will present a different version of the replacement thought experiment and 
associate arguments whose objective is to show that there is an incompatibility between the 
fact that the subject preserves not only the same linguistic behaviour after the replacement, 
but also between the fact that his beliefs and other cognitive states related to his conscious 
phenomenal  experiences  are  preserved.  Meanwhile,  I  want  to  discuss  some  further 
objections concerning the parts-of-the-brain version of the replacement thought experiment. 
Section 3 
Objections to the regions-of-the-brain version
A further objection to the parts-of-the-brain version of the replacement scenario can start as 
follows: the proposal that a physical system can duplicate the input-output function of an 
organic region of the brain is extremely unclear. The replacement of the visual cortex, for 
instance, by one of these systems, may be simply to play with the brain, to mess around 
with it in such a way that any result would be completely unpredictable. Most probably, the 
consequence of such replacement would simply be a general malfunction related to the 
properties of processing visual information and of generating conscious visual experiences, 
similar to the destruction of the original organic part. Even if some of the functions usually 
attributed to the visual cortex are preserved after the replacement, we simply could not 
know which ones: the number of variable elements that need to be considered to make an 
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adequate prediction is very high and there is no systematic way of knowing how the brain 
would react to this replacement.
In order to get a better understanding of this objection and the possible responses, it 
will be convenient to examine some of the proposals that explain what a physical system 
needs to do in order to duplicate a certain region of the brain. Let’s start precisely with the 
way that Zuboff describes the details of this duplication. Zuboff imagines a physical system 
or gadget that, as he stipulates, duplicates exactly the same causal relationships that the 
visual cortex has with respect to other regions of the brain. The preservation of these causal 
relationships allows the gadget to preserve the visual experiences of the subject.
Let's imagine that a chunk of your brain was to be replaced by a wire and transistor gadget that, as we  
shall just stipulate, will keep precisely the same causal relationship with the rest of the brain that the 
replaced chunk had. We can know, based merely  on  this stipulation of the sameness of the gadget's 
effects on the rest of the brain, that you will behave and speak exactly as you would have done if the  
circumstances were otherwise the same but no such replacement of a chunk of the brain had been 
made. For the parts of the brain responsible for speech and behavior must, according to the stipulation,  
be affected by the gadget in all ways as they would have been by the normal brain chunk.33
Note that a brain region may have a number of different causal relationships with the 
rest  of  the  brain and the  body.  Some of  its  properties,  like  its  weight  and density,  are 
determined by its physical composition, and these properties may have a particular causal 
effect on the rest of the brain. It is true that these properties may not be related to what is 
commonly understood as the proper function of the visual cortex – that is, the processing of 
visual  information –,  but  as  it  will  be argued,  they may still  be  relevant.  Imagine,  for 
instance,  that the builders of the gadget use in  its  construction components  made from 
stainless steel. If the amount of this material in the gadget is high, its weight might be much 
larger than the weight of the original visual cortex. This may have unintended effects on the 
rest of the brain and affect the way it works. Also, another problem with a visual cortex 
made out from a high percentage of steel components is that it may react to magnetic fields 
in a different way from the original organ. Or perhaps the problem is that the gadget, in 
33  Zuboff, (1994, p. 183) 
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spite of duplicating all the causal effects of the visual cortex, also introduces some other 
unintended effects that impair the way in which the rest of the brain works. This might be 
so if  the  replacement  gadget  includes  components  made out  from, perhaps,  plutonium, 
which is a highly toxic element. Of course, someone may reply that this does not respect  
Zuboff's stipulation that the gadget should keep exactly the same causal relationships with 
the rest of the brain that the original visual cortex had. However, it is not clear then what  
materials can be used for constructing such device. Is it possible to build an artificial visual 
cortex that shares all and only its causal properties? 
The point I want to make here is that these issues show that the materials from which 
the replacements are made are, after all, important. If the aim is to build a device with the 
same causal relationships that the visual cortex has with respect to the rest of the brain, it  
seems that the composition of the replacement device cannot differ excessively from the 
original part. In fact, it is possible to think that the only way for duplicating the function of 
the visual cortex without introducing any unintended effect on the rest of the brain and the 
body is  to  build  a  biologically  equivalent  visual  cortex  that  shares  not  only  the  same 
functional organization but also its physicochemical composition. In other words, it might 
be possible that the only physical system able to duplicate the casual powers of the visual 
cortex is a biologically equivalent visual cortex. 
Now, there does not seem to be any a priori difficulty in building an artificial gadget 
with  these  characteristics.  It  is  true  that  its  construction  may  be  a  serious  technical 
challenge, and moreover, it  may be something that cannot be achieved with our current 
technology. But this is clearly an empirical matter that cannot be settled here. Nonetheless, 
there is a more pressing issue. If the objective of the replacement thought experiment is to 
give support to the supervenience thesis – that is, the thesis that the property of a physical  
system P to have conscious phenomenal experiences supervenes on P implementing the 
right  functional  organization  –  then  it  is  doubtful  that  this  version  of  the  replacement 
argument achieves this goal. The reason is precisely that the physiochemical composition of 
the replacements would need to be very similar, if not identical, to the organic visual cortex.  
Only these systems would implement adequately the right functional organization. But if 
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the only system that can duplicate the causal effects that the visual cortex has with respect 
to  the rest  of the brain is  an organically  equivalent  device,  then it  is  doubtful  that the 
thought  experiment  shows that the functional  organization of the system determines its 
capacity of generating conscious phenomenal experiences. We simply cannot rule out that a 
property  related  to  the  physiochemical  composition  of  the  gadget  is  responsible  of 
generating these experiences.
In spite of these considerations, I think there are good reasons for dismissing these 
worries against the regions-of-the-brain version of the replacement scenario. Note first that 
a gadget like the one proposed for replacing the visual cortex can be seen as a device much 
similar to those designed for replacing damaged bodily organs. Artificial  organs can be 
built for restoring numerous functions previously lost, or even absent from birth. Think for 
instance,  of  artificial  devices  designed for  replacing  amputated limbs or  broken bones, 
which in some circumstances are very effective and allow the patient to recover several of 
his previously lost abilities. In some other cases, artificial organs can also provide artificial 
life  support  for  patients  during  dangerous  surgeries,  for  instance,  when  the  patient  is 
awaiting a heart transplant. Note that, none of these artificial devices need to share all the 
causal  relationships  that  the  replaced  organs  have  with  the  rest  of  the  body  of  the 
individual.  Moreover,  they  do  not  need to  duplicate  all  these  relationships  in  order  to 
perform adequately the function of these original organs. Of course, it can still be argued 
that the physiochemical constitution of the gadget matters. There are some materials that 
are  obviously  inadequate  for  constructing  the  proposed  gadget,  like  those  capable  of 
damaging the brain or the body. Notoriously, this sometimes happens with real, artificial 
organ replacements. For instance, artificial hips made from cobalt may have certain harmful  
effects on patients. When the metallic parts of the artificial joints grind against each other,  
they release microscopic fragments of cobalt in the patient's  body, which are toxic.  On 
occasions, the excess of cobalt is naturally expurgated, but sometimes it can accumulate in 
the body. However, the fact that some artificial organs have unintended, and even harmful 
effects  on  the  body  does  not  show  that  they  do  not  perform their  intended  functions 
adequately. In the same way, a gadget replacing the visual cortex may include among its 
components some made from, say, plutonium, which is also toxic and extremely harmful. 
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Even  though,  and  apart  from having  these  negative  consequences,  the  gadget  may  be 
perfectly capable of duplicating the function of the visual cortex, in the same way that a hip 
made from cobalt may duplicate the function of the biological organ.
How can then a gadget duplicate the relevant function of the visual cortex without 
sharing all the causal relationships that it has with respect to the rest of the brain? What are 
the properties that the gadget needs to have in order to duplicate the function of the visual 
cortex?  The  visual  cortex  also  has  a  set  of  properties  that  have  a  direct  role  in  the 
generation of visual experiences. These are its neural properties. It can be stipulated that the 
device that replaces the visual cortex duplicates only these properties: what the device does 
is to receive electrochemical signals through the connections that the original visual cortex 
had with the rest of the brain, and in turn produces a corresponding output electrochemical 
signal. In fact, this is the way in which Zuboff describes the replacement process:
Among the many properties of the visual cortex, neural, chemical, and computational (and let me also  
mention the imagined property of generating epiphenomena), there is the functional property of the 
visual  cortex,  its purely extrinsic property  of causing a particular  pattern of  effects in the various 
mental functions. But the visual cortex possesses this extrinsic functional character only because its 
intrinsic  neural  and  other  properties  have  combined  to  produce  the  required  pattern  of  external  
effects.34
Most versions of the replacement argument share the assumption that, in biological 
brains,  what  matters  for  the  generation  of  mentality,  and  in  particular,  for  visual 
experiences,  is  the  neural  pattern  of  the  visual  cortex.  The  visual  cortex  has  several 
connections to the rest of the brain. For instance, it receives electrochemical impulses via a 
collection of axons from the Lateral Geniculate Nucleus, which in turn is the region of the 
brain that receives visual information from the retina. A replacing gadget may need to be 
connected to the same axons and to be able to receive and process these electrochemical 
impulses in order to produce the adequate output. But note again that it is not necessary to 
stipulate that the gadget duplicates all the causal relationships that the visual cortex has 
with the rest of the brain, like those related to its weight and physical composition. In this 
34  Zuboff, (1994, p. 185) 
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way, it might be possible to avoid objections concerning the idea that the only physical  
device that shares all the causal relations of the visual cortex is, precisely, the visual cortex.
There is, however, a further worry concerning the regions-of-the-brain version of the 
replacement thought experiment. Notice that, in some cases, the removal of certain parts of 
the brain does not cause the complete loss of the mental functions associated with them. In 
(2012),  Majorek  mentions  the  case  of  a  patient  that  suffered  from  Rasmussen´s 
encephalitis,  which  is  an  infrequent  neurological  disease  that  affects  a  single  cerebral 
hemisphere  and  that  may  generate  the  loss  of  motor  and  speech  abilities,  paralysis, 
encephalitis and dementia. The cerebral hemisphere affected by this illness was surgically 
removed. The physicians considered that the risk of total paralysis of the body and the 
complete loss of linguistic abilities was preferable to the danger of a more acute case of 
encephalitis. However, the patient – a girl that underwent the operation at the age of three 
years – was proficient in English and Dutch at the age of seven, with only minor problems 
related to the movement of her left arm and leg.35 There is no definitive explanation of how 
the  linguistic  abilities  of  the  patient  were  preserved  after  the  removal  of  the  brain 
hemisphere. However, a possible explanation lies in what has been called the plasticity of 
the brain. Plasticity is a property of the brain that consists in the increase or decrease in the 
number of brain cells, as well as the modification of the synapses. In (2005), Pascual-Leone 
et al characterize the plasticity of the brain as follows:  “... changes in the input of any 
neural  system, or  in  the  targets  or  demands of  its  efferent  connections,  lead to  system 
reorganization  that  might  be  demonstrable  at  the  level  of  behavior,  anatomy,  and 
physiology  and  down  to  the  cellular  and  molecular  levels.”36 A consequence  of  the 
plasticity of the brain is that the location of the brain activity linked to a certain mental 
function  can  be  modified.  Now, it  might  be  argued that  the  preservation  of  the  visual  
experiences  of  Paul  after  the  replacement  depended  not  on  the  characteristics  of  the 
replacement  gadget,  but  simply  because  the  brain  processes  that  generated  visual 
experiences and that were located in his visual cortex were relocated to a different place in 
his brain. 
35  Cf. Majorek (2012, pp. 123-125) 
36  Pascual-Leone et al., (2005, pp. 378-379) 
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I  do  not  think  that  this  is  a  definitive  objection  against  the  regions-of-the-brain 
version of the replacement thought experiment, but I will not press this point further. In the 
following  section  of  this  chapter  I  will  present  a  version  of  the  replacement  thought 
experiment that considers a more fine-grained level of functional organization, namely, the 
functional organization of the brain of a conscious person at the neural level. 
Section 3
The neural version of the replacement thought experiment
Remember the replacement scenario already mentioned in the introduction of the thesis. 
After a terrible accident, a group of scientists suggest Paul McCartney an operation that 
might  save him from a neural  disease that  threatens  his  life.  The operation consists  in 
replacing the organic neurons in his brain by artificial neurons that will preserve the same 
input-output behaviour of these organic neurons. 
As the replacement process is done neuron by neuron, we can imagine a very large 
sequence  of  individuals  between  Paul  McCartney  and  F-Paul  that  results  from  the 
replacement of all the neurons in his brain by artificial neurons. Let us say that the first 
member of the sequence is precisely Paul McCartney, since the number of neurons replaced 
in  his  original  brain is  zero,  while  the last  member  is  F-Paul,  whose artificial  brain is 
entirely composed by artificial  neurons. The mentioned sequence can be represented as 
follows: 
< J0, J1, J2, , … , Jn >
Note  first  that  each  Ji  that  belongs  to  this  sequence  is  functionally  identical  to  Paul 
McCartney and to each other, or in other words, that the functional organization of each of 
the members of this sequence is exactly the same, so if there is a feature of Paul McCartney 
that depends on the functional organization of Paul McCartney´s brain, it must have been 
preserved.37  
37  Whether or not this replacement preserves the personal identity of Paul is something that may not be 
ruled out. 
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Most of the arguments that are based on replacements scenarios like the one just 
described  proceed  by  adopting  a  reductio strategy:  we  assume  that  the  absent  qualia 
hypothesis is true. More precisely, we adopt the hypothesis that the last  member of the 
sequence,  F-Paul,  lacks  the  capacity  of  having  conscious  phenomenal  experiences. 
Remember that according to the discussion of the absent qualia hypothesis presented the 
first chapter of this thesis, it can be understood at least in the following two ways: 
(1) Absent qualia are empirically possible.  
(2) Absent qualia are logically possible. 
The strategy I will adopt in this chapter is to argue, by examining a number of cases, that 
the reductio hypothesis is incompatible – or even inconsistent – with previous assumptions 
or with purported empirical knowledge concerning how the brain works. It is important to 
remember that some of these arguments proceed by arguing that the  reductio hypothesis 
generates a genuine contradiction, as in the case of the versions offered by Zuboff and Tye. 
In the version offered by Chalmer's however, it is explicitly said that a being like F-Paul is 
a logical possibility, but that its existence is incompatible with the empirical information we 
have  with  respect  to  how  the  brain  works,  and  in  particular,  with  the  information 
concerning the relation between the conscious experiences of the subject and the beliefs he 
forms about them. This is the strategy that I will follow in this chapter: I will argue that this 
version of the replacement thought experiment shows that the claim that absent qualia are 
empirically possible is false. In the fourth chapter of the thesis, I will present and evaluate a 
different strategy, offered originally by Tye in (2006), whose aim is to show that the claim 
that absent qualia are logically possible is false.  
If  we  accept  the  reductio hypothesis,  then  the  capacity  of  supporting  conscious 
phenomenal mental states will disappear between some point of the sequence that exists 
between  Paul  McCartney  and  F-Paul.  In  the  case  of  this  version  of  the  replacement 
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argument, we can consider two different possibilities, which in turn can be also divided in 
several sub-cases that can be categorized as follows: 
Case  (1) The  ability  to  support  conscious  phenomenal  mental  states  disappears  suddenly  at  a 
determinate point of sequence < J0, J1, J2, , … , Jn >.  
Case (2) The ability to support  conscious phenomenal mental  states fades,  disappearing gradually 
between the two extreme points of sequence < J0, J1, J2, , … , Jn >. 
Case (2.1) The subject is aware of this: he notices that he loses certain conscious phenomenal states. 
Case (2.1.1) Awareness of losing phenomenal consciousness is instantiated in the part of the brain 
composed by artificial neurons
Case (2.1.2) Awareness of losing phenomenal consciousness is instantiated in both parts of the brain  
(the replaced part and the organic part) 
Case (2.1.3) Awareness of losing phenomenal consciousness is instantiated in the part of the brain still 
composed by organic neurons. 
Case (2.2) The subject is not aware of this: he loses conscious phenomenal states and he does not  
know that he is losing them. 
   
Case (1) The ability to support conscious phenomenal mental states disappears suddenly at  
a determinate point of sequence < J0, J1, J2, , … , Jn >.  
From this point, the argument will proceed by showing the impossibility of these cases. 
[Not all  versions consider exactly the same cases.  I’ve followed Chalmers’s and Kirk’s 
version] Lets consider case (1). If the reductio hypothesis is right, perhaps the replacement 
of  organic  neurons  by  artificial  ones  that  implement  the  same  input-output  function 
preserves no mentality at all, but is instead a process very similar to the destruction, one by 
one, of the neurons of the brain. According to this initial case, there will be a point in the 
sequence < J0, J1, J2, , … , Jn > of replacement cases in which Paul McCartney loses his 
phenomenal mental states abruptly when just a single biological neuron is replaced by an 
artificial neuron. Imagine, for instance, that the replacement process has already taken away  
a certain number of his original neurons and that Paul McCartney’s brain is now only 73 
per  cent  organic.  Until  that  point,  Paul  has  enjoyed  a  world  of  amazing  phenomenal 
experiences, but the next time an organic neuron is removed and replaced by an artificial 
neuron, all these experiences disappear.  According to case (1), then, the replacement of 
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only one neuron will mark the boundary between the complete possession of conscious 
phenomenal experiences, on one hand, and absolute mental death on the other. 
In order to see why case (1) is implausible, it will be useful to imagine a situation in  
which the neurons inside Paul McCartney are destroyed one by one, and not replaced by 
artificial neurons. If conscious phenomenal states do not disappear suddenly when neurons 
are destroyed, then it is doubtful that they disappear suddenly when they are replaced by 
entities that preserve their same input-output behaviour. Of course, it can still be argued that  
these cases are different because there is certain unexpected element or property introduced 
by these artificial neurons, which is obviously not present in the case of neural elimination, 
and  that  it  generates  in  some  way  a  sudden  elimination  of  the  conscious  phenomenal 
experiences of Paul. Before we consider this possibility,  however, we need to see what 
happens when neurons are completely destroyed and not replaced by miniature entities that 
duplicate their input-output behaviour. 
I want to consider two cases of neural  destruction.  In the first  one,  the neurons 
inside Paul McCartney’s brain that are being destroyed are contiguous to each other. They 
may be located in any area of the brain, and the only constraint is that there must be a 
connection between these neurons. Imagine that the organic neurons inside the brain stem 
of Paul, which is the part of the brain most directly related to awareness, are removed but  
not replaced by artificial neurons. According to case (1), Paul McCartney would preserve 
his awareness when a certain number n of neurons inside his brain stem are destroyed (or 
extracted), but when one more neuron is taken out from his head, that is, when a number 
n+1  of  neurons  are  destroyed  or  removed,  he  loses  awareness  completely.  Thus,  the 
hypothesis described by case (1) implies that Paul McCartney will transit from a state of 
full awareness to a state of complete unconsciousness when just a single neuron of his brain 
stem is removed. Note that it seems entirely plausible to say that there is a point in the  
replacement process in which awareness disappears completely when a single neuron is 
removed from Paul  McCartney’s brain stem, but  this  should be preceded by a  gradual 
fading in his conscious abilities. Remember that the process of replacement, as it has been 
described, requires a gradual removal of neurons, one by one. Thus, we would expect that 
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Paul  McCartney  experienced  a  progressive  decrease  of  those  mental  abilities  that  are 
related to awareness, and not an abrupt transition between full mental life and the complete 
unconsciousness.  Note  also  that  when  people  experience  a  sudden elimination of  their 
conscious abilities, it is the activity of a significant region of the brain and not that of a  
single neuron what it is involved. It is clear that Paul McCartney may lose consciousness 
suddenly in certain circumstances: for instance, he can commit suicide by shooting himself 
in the head. However, this act would be the cause of a severe modification in his brain 
structure, and surely his losing of consciousness would not be caused by the destruction of 
a single neuron. 
In the second case, the neurons that are removed from Paul McCartney’s  brain do 
not need to be connected among them. We may imagine that we remove organic neurons 
from several  different  regions  of  his  brain in  a  random way.  If  this  is  so,  it  might  be 
possible that the remaining organic neurons inside  Paul McCartney’s  brain implement a 
certain adjustment process that allows him to maintain the same phenomenal conscious 
states in spite of the destruction of a gradually higher number of neurons. But again, case 
(1) still implies that the destruction of just a single neuron marks the boundary between full 
consciousness and a complete lack of it. Even if until a certain point the neural adjustment 
allows Paul McCartney to enjoy all his phenomenal conscious mental states, the cause of 
their elimination would be the destruction of only one neuron. 
Most  of  the  authors  that  offer  versions  of  the  replacement  thought  experiment 
consider this case. The crucial  point  is that  we have sufficient empirical information to 
know that the destruction of a single neuron cannot have the results suggested by case (1). 
In (1994), Kirk evaluates this case and offers his conclusion: 
... we know that awareness involves very many neurones working together. That being so, even total 
destruction of some of the neurones involved in awareness would not inevitably result in the sudden 
total loss of awareness [...] A fortiori, substituting miniature computers for some of the relevant 
neurones would not have that result.38
38  Kirk (1994, p. 99) 
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There is, however, another possible objection that we need to consider. The only thing 
that we know for certain about these artificial neurons is that they implement the input-
output  function  of  an  organic  neuron,  but  we  do  not  know anything  concerning  their 
physicochemical constitution. We simply cannot rule out the possibility that this unknown 
constitution affects the brain as a whole, in such a way that when a determinate number of 
artificial neurons are introduced in the brain, all the conscious abilities of Paul McCartney 
stop abruptly without fading away before this point. Or perhaps this harmful element is not 
located in the physiochemical constitution of the artificial neuron, but it is generated when 
it  processes  the  signals  it  receives  from other  neurons.  Since  we  simply  are  not  sure 
whether the constitution or the processes inside the artificial neuron introduce this harmful 
element, we have no justification to claim that the replacement does not produce a sudden 
elimination  of  Paul  McCartney’s  conscious  abilities.  Thus,  while  we  can  be  sure  that 
gradual neural destruction cannot bring a sudden elimination of consciousness, we cannot 
say the same when strange external elements, like artificial neurons, are introduced in the 
brain.  
It is true that some physical systems that implement the input-output behaviour of an 
organic neuron may have harmful effects on the rest of the brain and even on the body as a 
whole. However, there is no reason to think that all possible implementations have these 
adverse effects. Suppose that artificial neurons were made out from, say, plutonium-239. 
Until  certain  point  they  may  perform  the  input-output  function  adequately  and  Paul 
McCartney would not notice any change in his mental states. However, when critical mass 
is finally achieved Paul McCartney will explode, obliterating his conscious mental states in 
an instant together with the entire  neighbourhood. Or perhaps the artificial  neurons are 
programmed in such a way that when they reach a certain determinate number they release 
a harmful chemical substance that in some way damages the parts of the brain that are still 
organic. Before the artificial neurons reach that point the mental life of Paul McCartney 
might be entirely normal, but when the substance is released he immediately loses all his 
conscious mental states. The point I am making here, however, is that being made out from 
materials  that  have  these  harmful  effects,  or  being  programmed  for  eliminating 
consciousness, is not necessary for implementing the adequate input-output function of the 
organic neuron. 
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These are the reasons to think that gradual neural destruction does not bring a sudden 
elimination of the conscious abilities of Paul. Instead, we might expect that these abilities 
fade as a greater number of neurons are removed from his brain. There is good empirical 
support  for  the  thesis  that  losing  consciousness  abruptly  requires  the  modification  or 
destruction of a large number of neurons at once, and not the removal of a single neuron. 
But if this happens in the case of neural destruction,  there does not seem to be a good 
reason to think that it happens in the case of neural replacement. Even if we argue that 
artificial  neurons  may  be  made  out  from materials  that  have  the  effect  of  eliminating 
conscious  abilities  when  a  determinate  number  of  them  have  been  inserted  in  Paul 
McCartney’s  brain, there is no justification to think that all the possible materials from 
which artificial neurons are made have this harmful effect. This, for now, exhausts case (1). 
Case (2): The ability to support conscious phenomenal mental states fades, disappearing  
gradually between the two extreme points of sequence < J0, J1, J2, , … , Jn >. 
So far, we have seen that there is no good reason to think that conscious mental states 
disappear when only one neuron is destroyed, so we have no reason to think that these 
states  disappear  when  a  single  neuron  is  replaced  by  a  different  physical  entity  that 
implements  its  same  input-output  behaviour.  This  leaves  us  with  case  (2),  where  the 
conscious  phenomenal  states  of  Paul  fade  away  as  the  replacement  process  is  being 
performed.  As  we  have  mentioned  before,  this  case  can  be  divided  into  another  two 
exhaustive  sub  cases:  in  case  (2.1),  Paul  McCartney  is  aware  of  losing  his  conscious 
phenomenal states, while in case (2.2), he is not aware of losing anything. Thus, our new 
reductio assumption can be expressed as follows: 
Case (2.1): Paul McCartney is losing his conscious phenomenal states, and he is aware of  
this loss. 
 
Part of the protocol of the replacement operation consists in that the scientists, with the help  
of a microphone installed inside the machine, ask Paul questions concerning his physical 
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state  and his current  perceptions: “Are you feeling all  right?”,  “Do you hear your own 
voice?”, “Can you see the little microphone in front of you?”. The scientists do this in order 
to check if the replacement process is performed adequately. If Paul noticed something odd 
with his visual or auditory perceptions, he would be able to inform this to the group of 
scientists. The scientists could then check if there is something wrong with the procedure. 
Perhaps some artificial neurons do not work as they are supposed to, or maybe the scientists 
inserted  by  mistake  some artificial  neurons  in  the  piriform cortex  that  were  originally 
conceived as replacements of the organic neurons inside the visual cortex. (Notice that such 
procedures  are  frequent  in  neurosurgery:  in  some cases,  the  patient  remains  conscious 
during the operation, in order to know whether there is something wrong). 
But imagine that,  at  some point, the patient notices that his  current phenomenal 
experiences gradually disappear. It might not be clear, however, the precise way in which 
Paul´s phenomenal experiences fade. A first option is to imagine that scientists decided to 
start the replacement process by extracting the organic neurons from some region of the 
brain  associated to  a  certain  perceptual  ability.  For  instance,  assume that  the  scientists 
started by replacing the neurons located inside Paul´s primary auditory cortex, which is the 
region associated with the perception of sounds. If the reduction hypothesis were true, then 
Paul  would  notice  that,  as  the  replacement  process  goes  on,  his  auditory  perceptions 
become gradually weaker. Another option would be to imagine that the machine replaces 
the neurons in a random way. In any case, Paul´s phenomenal experiences would gradually 
become weaker  as  the replacement  process  goes  on.  Imagine now that  Paul  is  singing 
Eleanor Rigby inside the replacement machine, and in the middle of the song he notices 
that his voice, together with the sound of his bass, becomes fainter. At that moment, one of 
the scientists asks him: “Is everything all right, Paul?” Evidently, Paul wants to tell him that 
there is something wrong and that the replacement process resulted in a modification in his 
auditory perceptions. He might have an attack of panic, screaming ad telling the scientists 
that they did something terribly wrong and that he is now unable to hear his own voice, the 
voices of the scientists or the sound of his bass. 
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Another option it is worth to consider is the possibility that some of the cognitive 
capacities of Paul fade during the replacement process. Consider, for instance, the case of 
memory. While Paul is sitting inside the replacement machine, he may become ignorant of 
what he is doing there, surrounded by several unknown men in white robes. Depending 
perhaps on the number of organic neurons that have already been replaced, he might also 
forget some details concerning important events in his past: he might have lost the memory 
that he was part of a band with some friends several years ago, that he was married once to 
a  woman  named  Linda,  or  even  that  his  own  name  is  Paul.  Like  the  previous  case 
concerning his auditory perceptions, he might stand up, looking around confusingly and 
asking to himself “Who am I?”, “What is this strange place?”, or “Why are these men in 
white robes speaking to me?”. 
The reaction exhibited by Paul after noticing that there is something wrong with his 
auditory perceptions would probably be telling the scientists that he thinks they are doing 
something wrong and that the replacement process is not working as planned. Also, if the 
memories  of  Paul  were  gradually lost  –  for  instance,  if  as  a  result  of  the  replacement  
process he forgot that he is inside of the replacement machine, that he is surrounded by 
scientists in white robes, or even that he forgot his own name – he might cry for help, 
asking things like “What I am doing here?”, “Who are you, people?”, or “Who am I?”. In 
any case, the assumption is that his mental capacities are fading would be reflected in his 
behaviour. 
Note again that Paul´s behaviour after the replacement of the organic neurons of this 
region of his brain is going to be identical to the one he would have exhibited in case that  
the replacement had not been performed. The reason is that the motor neurons in his brain 
are going to send exactly  the same signals to the muscles in his body that  the organic 
neurons  would  have  sent.  In  the  same  way,  his  speech,  which  also  depends  on  the 
movements of his body, would be exactly the same. Thus, Paul would not be able to tell the 
scientists that there is something wrong with the replacement process. 
Of course, the fact that the members of the sequence will exhibit the same behaviour  
as Paul after the replacement does not imply, by any means, that his mental capacities, and 
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in particular the capacity of experiencing conscious phenomenal states, are preserved after 
the process of replacement. The closer we get to the other extreme of the sequence, that is, 
to  the  point  where  F-Paul  is  situated,  the  more  difficult  is  to  accept  that  these  mental 
capacities are the same. While Paul is a person who enjoys all kind of phenomenal mental 
states and is able to experience pain, sexual arousal, or the colour of a blue parrot, a being 
like F-Paul – which instead of a brain has something whose only resemblance to Paul´s 
brain is that it shares its functional organization at a neural level – is no more than a zombie 
(or better, a functional zombie). This being looks like Paul, moves like him, says the same 
things and it may even be as fun as he is, but lacks any sort of mental life. 
In (1992), Searle examines the outcome of a very similar scenario in which a patient 
loses his visual abilities as a result of the replacement of his organic neurons by entities that 
implement the same input-output behaviour but that are made out from silicon. This is how 
Searle evaluates this scenario: 
… as the silicon is progressively implanted into your dwindling brain, you find that the area of your  
conscious experience is shrinking, but that this shows no effect on your external behaviour. You find,  
to your total amazement, that you are indeed losing control of your external behaviour. You find, for 
example, that when doctors test your vision, you heard them say, “We are holding up a red object in  
front of you; please tell us what you see.” You want to cry out, “I can't see anything I'm going totally  
blind.” But you hear your voice saying in a way that is completely out of control, “I see a red object in  
front of me.39
Is this an acceptable picture? Note also that, under such circumstances described in 
the last paragraph, Paul would surely start to experience an emotion of fear, even close to 
extreme horror as he realizes that he is unable to control his answers to the questions the 
scientists ask concerning his auditory perceptions. Furthermore, his entry to the scenario 
would  have  been  entirely  involuntary,  because  he  didn’t  perceive  the  sound  and  he 
obviously does not want to appear out of time, so he would realize that he is not able to 
control the movements of his body. The question is, how can this awareness of losing his 
auditory abilities and the feelings of terror that such awareness may trigger be instantiated 
39  Searle (1992, pp. 66-67) 
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by Paul's brain? It seems that we have here three different options. Either (2.1.1) awareness 
is instantiated by the artificial neurons that have replaced the organic ones; (2.1.2) they are 
instantiated  both  by  artificial  neurons and organic  neurons,  or  (2.1.3)  they are  entirely 
instantiated by the organic neurons that are still inside Paul´s brain. 
Options (2.1.1) and (2.1.2) can be easily ruled out.  The reason is  that this would 
imply that artificial neurons are, after all, capable of supporting conscious mental states. 
The only option left is, thus, (2.1.3): awareness and related emotions are instantiated by the 
organic neurons that have still not been replaced. 
But  this is  not possible  for the following reasons.  One of the assumptions of the 
replacement  picture  is  that  the  part  of  Paul´s  brain  that  remains  composed  of  organic 
neurons is in the same state it would have been in case that the replacement had not been 
performed. In order for new beliefs to be formed, in order to be aware of losing the ability 
of perceiving auditory stimuli and to experience feelings and emotions related to it, Paul 
McCartney’s brain needs to be in a certain state. But by the assumptions of the thought 
experiment, his brain is in the same state that it would have been if the rest of his neurons  
had not been replaced. It is for this reason that Paul McCartney cannot experience these 
new mental states. There does not seem to be any place for these states to be instantiated.  
Chalmers's evaluation of the outcome proposed by Searle is clear in this point: 
There is simply no room in the system for any new beliefs to be formed. Unless one is a dualist of a 
very strong variety, this sort of difference in belief must be reflected in the functioning of a system—
perhaps not in behavior, but at least in some process. But this system is identical to the original system 
(me) at a fine grain. There is simply no room for new beliefs such as "I can't see  anything," new 
desires such as the desire to cry out, and other new cognitive states such as amazement. Nothing in the 
physical system can correspond to that amazement. There is no room for it in the neurons, which after  
all  are identical to a subset  of  the neurons supporting the usual  beliefs […] Failing a remarkable,  
magical  interaction  effect  between  neurons  and  silicon—and  one  that  does  not  manifest  itself 
anywhere in processing, as organization is preserved throughout—such new beliefs will not arise. 40
40  Chalmers, (1996a, p. 258) 
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Thus,  Paul McCartney  cannot experience these new mental states, and therefore, we can 
rule out case (2.1). At this point, however, one may be tempted to argue as follows: “You 
argument is fallacious because you assume, without proof, that the electrochemical signals 
transmitted among neurons exhaust mentality. This is precisely what the functionalist needs 
to say in order for the replacement argument to be successful, but you have not ruled out 
the  possibility  that  some  other  physicochemical  event  in  the  brain  is  supporting  Paul 
McCartney’s awareness of losing his ability of hearing the sound, as well as the emotions 
of  terror  that  he  may  experience  when  he  realizes  that  he  is  unable  to  control  his 
movements. Such an event may even be instantiated inside the neural body, and not related 
to the signals that neurons are interchanging among themselves. You have not ruled out this 
possibility,  and  thus,  you  are  simply  begging  the  question  when  you  assume  that  the 
electrochemical signals exhaust mentality.” 
It is true that the argument,  as it has been presented here, does not rule out the 
possibility  of  such  event,  but  we do  not  need  to  do  it  at  this  stage  of  the  argument.  
However, we do not need to commit to the idea that the electrochemical signals exhaust 
mentality.  The  reason  is  that  the  part  of  the  brain  that  has  not  been  affected  by  the 
replacement, that is, the set of organic neurons that is still left, is exactly in the same state it  
would have been in case that the replacement was not performed. So any event, including 
all the physicochemical events that may happen inside the organic neurons, are essentially 
the same. There is no difference at the functional level, but it should be clear that there is no  
difference at the biochemical level either. The part of the brain that is still organic has not 
been changed, and this is the reason it cannot instantiate Paul McCartney’s awareness or his 
emotion of fear. 
For these reasons, I think we can rule out case (2.1.3), which in turn exhaust case 
(2.1). Lets examine now the last case proposed at the beginning of this section. 
(2.2) The conscious experiences of Paul fade along the replacement sequence, but he is  
unaware of this. 
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Consider again the scenario illustrated by Paul´s operation, and imagine that a large 
number of the organic neurons located in his primary auditory cortex have been replaced by 
artificial neurons. Assuming the truth of the hypothesis that his conscious experiences fade 
along  the  replacement  sequence,  this  percentage  is  probably  sufficient  for  a  notorious 
decrease  in  the  intensity  of  his  auditory  experiences.  Note  that  the  human capacity  of 
hearing  high-frequency  sounds  diminishes  with  age  (this  phenomenon  is  known  as 
presbycucis). The causes of this phenomenon are not entirely clear, but it might be related, 
precisely,  to the progressive loss of neurons.  Imagine now that one of the scientists  in 
charge of monitoring the replacement process evaluates Paul´s reaction to a high-pitched 
sound over 12kH, and assume that the replacement process is at a point where Paul can still 
hear the high-pitched sound, but since his auditory experiences are fading, the sound he in 
fact hears is comparatively weaker that the one he would hear in normal circumstances. 
Before the sound is produced, the scientist asks Paul the following: “Paul, the sound you 
are going to hear is very loud. Please tell me if you can hear it clearly.” After the sound is  
produced,  and  no  matter  the  intensity  of  his  auditory  experience,  Paul  would  say  the 
scientists that he heard the sound with clarity. The reason, again, is that the replacement 
process  does  not  modify  his  behavioural  dispositions.  But  since  the  sound he  hears  is 
extremely weak, this answer would be mistaken. Of course, if Paul noticed that he gave a  
wrong answer to  the question of  the  scientist,  he would notice that there is  something 
wrong with his auditory experiences. But the examination of the last case showed that this  
is not possible. Paul cannot notice that his auditory experiences disappeared or that they are 
comparatively  weaker  compared  with  the  experiences  he  had  before  the  replacement 
process started. 
Cuda argues against the claim that the experiences of the subject are not eliminated 
by  the  replacement  process  in  this  way:  if  it  makes  sense  to  say  that  Paul  can  be  so 
mistaken about his current experiences, then it makes sense to say that we can also be so 
mistaken. Consider the following example: the Mosquito alarm is a device that emits a 
powerful high-frequency sound that can be heard only by people under certain age (mostly 
people under 25 years old). The alarm is advertised as a method to stop loitering by youths: 
the sound it produces is so powerful and annoying that, according to its designers, deters 
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people from congregating in the areas where that sound can be heard. Imagine now that a  
normal teenager whose brain is not damaged hears the alarm. When he hears that sound, he 
forms the belief that there is a Mosquito alarm in the vicinity and that the sound it produces 
is  extremely  annoying.  He  also  forms  a  strong  desire  of  not  hearing  that  sound,  and 
consequently,  he  runs  away  from  that  place.  Both  the  teenager´s  behaviour  and  the 
cognitive  states  he  forms  are  consistent  with  him  hearing  the  annoying  sound  of  the 
Mosquito alarm. Now, the question is whether the teenager can behave and form beliefs and 
desires in a way that is consistent with hearing the annoying sound emitted by the alarm, 
but without hearing it at all. Remember: the teenager´s brain is completely normal, and he 
is a completely rational person. According to Cuda, it does not make sense to say that a 
rational person can be so mistaken about his own experiences.  He exemplifies this case 
with a functional isomorph able to form beliefs and desires concerning red qualia without 
being able to experience them: 
If it makes sense to think that [a functional isomorph] could be mistaken in such a way, then it makes 
sense to think that we could be mistaken in such a way also. Hence we would have no reason to think 
that things made of neurons (i.e., ourselves) have red qualia. But clearly it makes no sense to think that 
we act like we have red qualia, believe that we have them, etc., but that we are all mistaken and really  
never have any red qualia. Therefore, it makes no sense to think that [a functional isomorph] could be 
mistaken in this way either.41
However,  it  can  still  be  argued  that  Paul´s  case  is  different  from the  one  just 
described. Why not to say that when the replacement process is performed Paul loses not 
only the capacity of hearing this sound, but also the capacity of forming beliefs and other 
cognitive states about it? Perhaps one of the effects of the replacement process is that Paul 
simply becomes more and more stupid. When artificial neurons take the place of organic 
ones  he  gradually  becomes  incapable  of  understanding  his  own  behaviour  and  the 
perceptual experiences he still might have. In particular, he might be unable to form beliefs 
concerning the capacity of hearing sounds over 12kHz. In such a case, he could not form 
the belief that he answered affirmatively to the question “Paul, did you hear the signal?” 
41  Cuda, (1985, p. 117) 
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The argument proposed by Chalmers shows that the situation envisaged in the last 
paragraph is extremely implausible. In (1996 and 2010), Chalmers argues in favour of what 
he  calls  the  principles  of  Structural  Coherence.  According  to  these  principles,  the 
phenomenal aspect of the mind and the psychological aspect are systematically related. In 
particular,  Chalmers proposes what he calls  the  Reliability Principle:  our second order-
judgements concerning our conscious experiences are by and large correct. For instance, 
when a normal subject that is paying attention to his experiences and that does not suffer 
from a neurophysiological illness judges that he had a visual sensation, he usually has a 
visual  sensation.  Also,  when this  subject  forms the  belief  that  he has  a  strong,  painful 
experience in his right toe, he usually has a painful experience in his right toe. Conversely, 
the  Detectability  Principle suggests  that  when  a  being  has  a  conscious  experience,  in 
general he has the capacity of forming a second-order judgement about this experience. 
... our second-order judgments about consciousness are by and large correct. We can call this the reli-
ability principle. When I judge that I am having an auditory sensation, I am usually having an auditory 
sensation. When I think I have just experienced a pain, I have usually just experienced a pain. There is  
also a converse principle, which we might call the detectability principle: where there is an experience, 
we generally have the capacity to form a second-order judgment about it.42
These  principles  are  not  conceived  by  Chalmers  as  logically  or  conceptually 
necessary:  our  second-order  judgements  can  be  sometimes  mistaken.  For  instance,  the 
subject can be inattentive to his conscious phenomenal experiences: a distracted subject 
may  confuse  an orange experience  with  a  yellow one.  He may suffer  from congenital 
analgesia, a rare condition that prevents a patient from feeling physical pain. In this case, 
some subjects can judge, mistakenly, that they are in pain. But this may be explained by 
suggesting that the individual is unaware of his condition. 
That Paul does not notice that his auditory experiences fade along the replacement 
and, at the same time, he does not form the belief that there is something wrong about these 
experiences clashes with the principles proposed by Chalmers. When Paul reflects on his 
42  Chalmers (1996, pp. 218-219) 
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experiences, he would form the belief that he heard a clear sound, in spite of having only a 
very weak auditory experience. If the absent qualia hypothesis were right, the extreme point  
of the replacement sequence (that is, F-Paul) might perhaps have lost not only the ability of 
having any sort of auditory experiences, but also the capacity of forming beliefs about his 
own behaviour. But remember that in the case that we are evaluating, when only a certain 
percentage  of  the  neurons  inside  his  primary  auditory  cortex  have  been  replaced  by 
artificial neurons, Paul is still  not a complete zombie. Although his capacity of hearing 
sounds has been seriously diminished, he is still capable of hearing the sound produced by 
the scientists, and moreover, he is still capable of reflecting about his own behaviour. He 
would believe that he understood the instructions the scientists gave him, and that he heard 
a  clear  sound  instead  a  weak  one.  Also,  he  would  believe  that  and  that  he  answered 
affirmatively to the question of the scientists. But if he was unable to hear the high-pitched 
sound, there is no way of explaining how these beliefs have been generated. 
Here we have a being whose rational processes are functioning and who is in fact conscious, but who 
is utterly wrong about his own conscious experiences. Perhaps in the extreme case, when all is dark 
inside,  it  might  be  reasonable  to  suppose  that  a  system could  be  so misguided  in  its  claims  and  
judgments—after all, in a sense there is nobody in there to be wrong. But in the intermediate case, this  
is  much less  plausible.  In  every case  with which  we are familiar,  conscious beings are  generally 
capable  of  forming  accurate  judgments  about  their  experience,  in  the  absence  of  distraction  and 
irrationality.  For a  sentient,  rational  being that  is  suffering from no functional  pathology to be so 
systematically  out  of  touch  with  its  experiences  would  imply  a  strong  dissociation  between 
consciousness and cognition. We have little reason to believe that consciousness is such an ill-behaved 
phenomenon, and good reason to believe otherwise.43
But why not say that the judgements made by Paul about his conscious experiences 
are extremely wrong? Consider, for instance, the case of patients that suffer from blindness 
denial (also called the Anton-Babinsky syndrome). This syndrome is a particular case of a 
disease known with the name of “anosognosia”, which is the denial of illness that, in some 
cases, can be seen in patients exhibiting brain injuries. In the case of the Anton-Babinsky 
syndrome, the eyes of the patients are perfectly capable of responding to light. However, 
43  Chalmers (1996, p. 257) 
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injuries to the visual cortex prevent these patients to visually discriminate objects, shapes 
and colours. In spite of this, patients usually do not accept having any visual difficulties. It 
can  be  argued  that  Paul´s  case  is  very  similar  to  the  one  of  a  patient  suffering  from 
blindness  denial.  Perhaps  it  is  true  that  Paul´s  experiences  are  diminishing  along  the 
replacement process, but he simply cannot realize that there is something wrong with these 
experiences. 
Now, a possible explanation for the Anton-Babisnky syndrome is that the damage to 
the visual cortex, apart from causing blindness in the patient, also prevents an adequate 
communication with the parts of the brain that control the verbal behaviour of the subject.  
By hypothesis, this could not happen to Paul. To begin with, the explanation of the Anton-
Babinsky syndrome involves the fact that the communication between a damaged visual 
cortex and the parts of the brain in charge of the verbal behaviour of the subject is impaired.  
But the only way in which this is possible is through a difference in the way that the neural 
replacements  affected  the  regions  of  the  brain  that  control  this  verbal  behaviour.  By 
hypothesis  of  the  replacement  process,  this  is  not  possible:  at  the  synaptic  level,  the 
artificial neurons affect these areas in exactly the same way as organic neurons. For these 
reasons, we can conclude that the case of Paul is different from the case of a patient that 
exhibits blindness denial. 
If we accept that awareness is a form of conscious experience, then it is possible to 
claim that Paul's awareness of his conscious phenomenal experiences fades in parallel with 
respect to the fading of his object-level conscious experiences. But note that an individual 
can be in a conscious state despite the removal of all the neurons in their primary visual  
cortex. Thus, the replacement of the neurons in the visual cortex would not modify the 
global conscious state of the subject. 
Lets  recapitulate  the  argumentative  strategy  of  this  section.  To  assume  that  the 
conscious experiences of the subject disappear along the sequence of replacement cases 
generates two different  possibilities:  the  first  is  that  the ability of generating conscious 
phenomenal states disappears at a determinate point of the sequence. The second is that this 
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ability  fades between the two extreme points of the sequence. The first  possibility was 
dismissed on the basis that we have good empirical reasons to think that consciousness 
does not suddenly disappear when a single neuron is eliminated, so it is also extremely 
implausible that the replacement of a single organic neuron by an artificial one brings with 
it the elimination of the conscious experiences of the subject. The second possibility was 
divided into  two subcases:  in  the  first  subcase,  the  subject  is  aware that  his  conscious 
experiences fade along the sequence of cases. In the second subcase,  the subject is not 
aware that his conscious experiences fade. The subject cannot be aware that his experiences 
are fading because this awareness needs to be instantiated in some part  of his  brain. It  
cannot be instantiated in the part that remains organic: by hypothesis, this part is receiving 
the same signals from the part of the brain composed by artificial neurons, so it is in the 
same state it would have been in case that the replacement had not been performed. But this 
awareness cannot be instantiated by the parts of the brain composed by artificial neurons, 
because this would mean that they are, after all, capable of generating conscious states. 
This brings us to the final subcase: the conscious experiences of the subject fade along the 
replacement sequence, but he is unaware of this. The reason we have presented against this 
possibility is  that it  would imply that the beliefs that the subject  forms concerning his 
conscious  experiences  are  systematically  wrong.  However,  the  principles  suggested  by 
Chalmers show that this is extremely implausible: according to the Reliability Principle, the 
second-order judgements of the subject are usually correct. But in the case illustrated by 
Paul, he would form the belief that he heard a clear sound, while in fact the sound heard by 
him is  very weak. If we accept the claim that the experiences of the subject cannot be 
dissociated in this way from the beliefs he forms about them, then we can reject the claim 
that the subject ignores that his experiences fade along the replacement sequence. The cases 
evaluated exhaust all the possible ways in which the experiences of the subject disappear 
along the replacement sequence. Thus, the absent qualia hypothesis is, at least, naturally 
false: it is not the case that a system that duplicates the functional organization of the brain 
of  a  conscious  being  at  a  neural  level  lacks  the  capacity  of  generating  conscious 
phenomenal experiences. But if this is true, thesis (NSS) is also true: then there is at least 
one functional organization – namely, the functional organization of the brain at a neural 
level  –  such  that  the  property  of  a  system  P  of  generating  conscious  phenomenal 
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experiences naturally strongly supervenes on the property of implementing this functional 
organization. 
Why this version of the replacement thought experiment does not show, instead, that 
the preservation of the functional organization of the subject´s brain preserves the property 
of generating conscious phenomenal experiences with logical necessity? Note, first, that the 
argument presented in this chapter assumed the truth of certain empirical facts about the 
brain in order to dismiss the idea that phenomenal consciousness was not preserved along 
the replacement process. In order to argue against the claim that the conscious experiences 
of  Paul  do  not  disappear  suddenly  when  a  single  neuron  is  replaced,  we  considered 
empirical  information  concerning the  fact  that  the  generation  of  conscious  experiences 
involves a large number of neurons. Note that we cannot rule out  a priori the possibility 
that a single neuron, in some strange and undiscovered way, played a crucial role in the 
generation of consciousness, in such a way that its removal generates an immediate and 
complete destruction of the conscious experiences of the subject. Of course, the empirical 
information we possess rules out the presence of such a neuron. Second, the assumption 
that Paul could not form the judgement that there is something wrong with his auditory 
experiences clashes with the principles of Structural Coherence proposed by Chalmers: In 
particular, this clashes with the Reliability Principle, according to which his second-order 
judgements about his conscious experiences are usually correct. Paul would believe that he 
heard a clear sound, and that he gave an affirmative answer to the question “Did you hear  
the sound clearly?” But if his auditory experiences are fading, the sound he heard was very 
weak, and thus,  that he formed the belief  that  he heard a  clear  sound clashes with the 
Reliability Principle. But neither the Reliability Principle nor the Detectability Principle are 
logically necessary. As it has been mentioned, the second-order judgements of a subject can 
sometimes be erroneous. 
The principles I have outlined are not absolute. Our second-order judgments can sometimes go wrong, 
providing  exceptions  to  the  reliability  principle.  [...]  In  the  reverse  direction,  it  is  arguable  that  
experiences can be unnoticeable if they occur while one is asleep, for example, or if they flicker by too 
fast  for  one  to  attend  to  them.  But  all  the  same,  these  principles  at  least  encapsulate  significant  
regularities. In a typical case, a second-order judgment will usually be correct, and an experience will 
85
usually be noticeable. These regularities are not exceptionless laws, but they hold far too often to be a 
mere coincidence. Something systematic is going on.44
In  the  fourth  chapter  of  this  thesis,  I  will  present  a  different  version  of  the 
replacement  thought  experiment  that  is  explicitly  conceived as  showing that  the  absent 
qualia hypothesis leads to a logical or conceptual contradiction.  If this is true, then the 
hypothesis of absent qualia would be logically false, and not only empirically false. 
Section 4 
Objections to the neural version
Remember  that  one  of  the  worries  concerning  the  regions-of-the-brain replacement 
scenario was that it is difficult to conceive a device that shares all the causal relationships  
that the visual cortex has with respect to the rest of the brain but whose physiochemical 
composition  is  radically  different  from it.  Nonetheless,  the  scenario  can  be  adequately 
described by considering a device that duplicates only the input-output neural pattern of the 
visual cortex and not all its properties. But how feasible is this duplication? In order to give 
an answer to this question, it will be useful to remember, briefly, how a neuron produces 
and  transmits  signals  to  the  neighbouring  neurons  in  the  brain.  A possible  source  of 
scepticism concerning  the  replacement  argument  in  general  may  be  due  the  perceived 
omission of scientific data concerning the way a real neuron works by the proponents of 
replacement arguments.
The authors postulate the existence of physical  entities capable  of duplicating the 
input-output behaviour of a neuron, but in general they simply do not give an account of 
how can this be accomplished, and this leaves the impression that the description of the 
replacement scenario leaves some essential points unexplained. One of the objectives of 
this section is to show, in a very general way, how a neuron functions and how it produces  
the electrochemical signals used for communicating with other parts of the brain and the 
body. Of course, it is far from the objectives of this thesis to explain how a neuron works 
44  Chalmers (1996, p. 219) 
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with the level of precision achieved by contemporary neuroscience. However, it is possible 
to have an adequate general picture of this process and to imagine how it can be, perhaps, 
implemented by a fictional (although potentially real) non-biological physical system. This 
is how a contemporary, scholarly text in neurophysiology defines, in very general terms, 
what a neuron does:
Neurons are remarkable among the cells of the body in their ability to propagate signals rapidly over 
large distances. They do this by generating characteristic electrical pulses called action potentials or, 
more simply, spikes that can travel down nerve ﬁbers. Neurons represent and transmit information by 
ﬁring sequences of spikes in various temporal patterns. 45
All cells in the body maintain a certain voltage potential, but in the case of neurons, 
this plays a basic role in the way that they generate the signals that communicate them with 
other neurons and cells of the body. When a neuron is in its resting state, there is an average 
of  -70 millivolts  of  voltage  difference  between the  interior  part  of  the  neuron and the 
external medium. This voltage difference is regulated by ion channels, which are protein-
like structures located in the neural membrane that function like valves, and are sensitive to 
the electrical properties of the electrically charged particles that float inside and outside the 
neuron. For instance, sodium ions (Na+) are in higher concentrations outside a neuron than 
inside it,  and conversely,  the concentration of potassium ions (K+) is  higher  inside the 
neuron and lower in the outside.
It  is  precisely  the  interchange  of  these  electrically  charged  particles  through  ion 
channels  that  create  this  voltage  difference  between  the  inside  and  the  outside  of  the 
neuron. Neurons are stimulated at several points of stimulation at the dendrites. When this 
stimulation meets a particular threshold, the neurone generates electrical pulses known as 
“action potentials” (sometimes also called “spikes”), which are signals that travel across the 
axon and that stimulate other neurons in the brain or muscle cells in the whole body.  When 
electrical current in the form of positively charged ions flows out of the neuron, or when 
negatively  charged  ions  flow  into  the  neuron,  the  electric  potential  of  the  neuron's 
45  Dayan & Abbott (2001, p. 3) 
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membrane becomes more negative. Conversely, when negatively charged ions flow out of 
the neuron, or when positively charged ions flow into the neuron, the electrical potential of 
the  neuron  becomes  more  positive.  These  processes  are  known,  respectively,  as 
hyperpolarization  and  depolarization.  When  a  neuron  is  depolarized  above  a  certain 
threshold level, the neuron generates an action potential.  Action potentials  are temporal 
fluctuations in electrical potential across the membrane of the neuron (of about 100 mV and 
whose duration is one milisecond) and can be transmitted over large distances through the 
axon. When the action potential reaches the synaptic connections at the end of the axon, 
this produces a new opening of ion channels that lead to the release of a signal through the 
electrical or the chemical synapses of the neuron.
This is, in a very general way, how a neuron transmits electrochemical signals to 
other neurons and cells in the brain and the body. With this in mind, we can now try to give 
a sense of the idea of building artificial devices able to implement the input-output causal 
behaviour of a neuron. As we have seen, the input-output causal behaviour of a neuron is a 
very complex process that involves the generation and transmission not only signals of an 
electrical character – the action potential. It also interchanges sodium and potassium ions 
with the medium that surrounds the neuron, together with neurotransmitters at the synapses. 
When the replacement scenario is described as including artificial neurons that implement 
this same input-output behaviour, we need to suppose that all that the neuron produces is 
also  produced  by  the  artificial  neuron,  and  that  it  is  adequately  transmitted  to  the 
neighbouring neurons at the right time. 
The details of this process might suggest that creating artificial  neurons from any 
imaginable  materials  is  extremely  unlikely.  Artificial  neurons  composed  entirely  of 
Putnam's Swiss cheese, for instance, are obviously ruled out. Again, we are at risk of saying 
that the only replacements capable of duplicating the input-output behaviour of a neuron – 
their synaptic behaviour – are gadgets with an identical physicochemical composition of 
organic  neurons.  And  we  have  the  same  problem  as  before:  even  if  consciousness  is 
preserved  after  the  replacement,  it  is  not  possible  to  rule  out  the  possibility  that  the 
chemical composition of the replacements is essential for generating consciousness.  
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The second problem is similar to the one we have discussed in the last section. How 
different  can be the physiochemical constitution of an artificial  neuron from an organic 
one? If we stipulate that the replacements need to duplicate all the causal relations that 
organic neurons have with respect to the rest of the brain, it might be that only gadgets 
whose physiochemical constitution is very similar to organic neurons can perform the task 
adequately. Again, we can mention properties like weight and temperature. Organic neurons  
and artificial  ones  that  include components  made from stainless steel  will  interact  in a 
different way when exposed to magnetic fields, for instance. 
If the replacements are defined as duplicating all  the causal  relations that organic 
neurons have with respect to the rest of the brain, the strategy may succeed in showing that 
the resulting physical system – the one composed entirely by artificial neurons – is able to  
generate  phenomenal  consciousness.  Nonetheless,  we  have  argued  that  a  device  that 
duplicates  all  these  causal  relations  without  having,  at  the  same  time,  a  very  similar 
physiochemical composition of organic neurons is extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
Moreover,  remember  that  organic  neurons  interact  with  their  surrounding  medium  in 
several ways. As we have mentioned, neurons are surrounded by a “bath” of electrically 
charged ions. These ions flow through the membrane of the cell in a process known as the 
“sodium-potassium pump”,  which  contributes  to  the  generation  of  the  action  potential 
produced by the neuron. 
In spite of these observations, notice that we may describe the replacement scenario 
by stipulating that the only causal interaction that needs to be considered is the one related 
to  synaptic  transmission.  Organic  neurons  are  able  to  communicate  among themselves 
through chemical and electrical synapses, and this process is regulated by mechanisms that 
are located in the interior of the neuron. However, a neural replacement does not need to 
generate the adequate signals in the same way. 
Remember the case of organs like artificial  hearts  or hips:  they perform the right 
function without sharing all the causal properties of the original organs. Similarly, we can 
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imagine physical devices able to perform the essential function of organic neurons, without 
sharing, at the same time, all their causal relationships with the rest of the brain. As we have 
seen earlier, the sodium-potassium pump is essential for generating the action potential in 
organic neurons. But the process under which neural artificial replacements generate the 
adequate signals does not need to be identical. Artificial neurons may be equipped with tiny 
devices that generate electrical signals according to the instructions of a program, and may 
also possess a miniature factory that is in charge of producing chemical neurotransmitters. 
Perhaps  these  artificial  neurons  include  devices  that  allow  them  to  interact  with  the 
surrounding neural medium by interchanging charged ions, in such a way that the whole 
process does not inadvertently affect other regions of the brain. In this way, we can argue as 
before:  it  is  possible  to  build  artificial  neural  replacements  that  duplicate  the  synaptic 
behaviour  of  organic  neurons  without  assuming  that  these  replacements  share  all  the 
physical properties of organic neurons. 
Like the case discussed in the second section of this chapter concerning a gadget that 
replaces the visual cortex of the subject, there does not seem to be any a priori difficulty for 
building artificial neurons that duplicate the signals transmitted by organic neurons. But the 
problem, again, is that this approach can lead to a naive understanding of the replacement 
strategy. Note that the replacement of all the organic neurons inside the brain by artificial 
ones will generate a system that is functionally isomorphic to the brain at the neural level. 
But it is clear that not only the functional organization of the brain was preserved by the 
replacement process. The electrochemical character of the signals interchanged by organic 
neurons was preserved as well. The problem, of course, is that in this case it is not possible 
to  assure  that  the  generation  of  conscious  phenomenal  experiences  depended  on  the 
functional organization of the system and not on the particular physical character of the 
transmitted signals. I do not mean, however, that the authors that have offered versions of 
the replacement thought experiment understand it in this way. In this section I will show 
how  Chalmers  and  Cuda  explain  the  replacement  process  without  appealing  to  the 
preservation of the electrochemical character of the signals transmitted by organic neurons. 
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The  replacement  scenario  can  be  described  without  stipulating  that  the  signals 
interchanged by artificial neurons have the same physiochemical composition of the signals 
transmitted by organic neurons. In fact, the versions of the replacement scenario described 
by  Cuda  and  Chalmers  envisage  a  situation  in  which  the  electrochemical  signals 
interchanged by neurons are replaced by other signals. Note that in the initial stages of the 
replacement process – for instance, when only one neuron has been replaced by an artificial 
neuron – these electrochemical signals need to be preserved simply because there is no 
other  way in  which  the  replacement  device  can  causally  affect  the  rest  of  the  organic 
neurons. Consider, for instance, the second member of the sequence, that is, a being that is 
almost  identically  to  Paul  except  that  it  has  only  one  organic  neuron  replaced  by  an 
artificial neuron. After the artificial neuron takes the place of the organic one, it restores all 
the original connections and transmits the adequate signals to its neighbouring neurons. At 
this  stage  of  the  replacement  process,  these  signals  need  to  have  the  same  physical 
constitution of the ones interchanged by biological neurons, since there is no other way for 
communicating  with  the  rest  of  the  organic  brain.  However,  in  later  stages  of  the 
replacement  process,  when  two  neighbouring  neurons  are  replaced  by  corresponding 
artificial neurons, it may not be necessary to preserve these electrochemical signals. In fact, 
when all the neurons in the brain are replaced by artificial neurons it is not necessary to 
preserve  any  of  these  electrochemical  signals  in  order  for  the  system to  duplicate  the 
functional organization of the brain. If the artificial neurons are tiny computers, they might 
communicate by receiving and transmitting luminous impulses, or perhaps by a mutual 
manipulation  of  cogs  and  levers  in  the  surface  of  the  artificial  neuron,  or  by  any 
conceivable process. Cuda describes the final result of the replacement process as follows:
Finally, after a trillion or so operations, there is nothing left of the original matter of [the] brain. At this  
point, most of the homunculi don't do anything with neurons anymore and have put away their neuron  
manipulators. Instead, they operate only between themselves, calling out what would have been the 
state of the neuron that they replaced. 46
46   Cuda (1985, p. 112) 
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Note that when the replacement  process is  described in Cuda's  way,  not only the 
physicochemical composition of the replacements – and consequently, of the whole system 
– has been dispensed with. The signals formerly interchanged by organic neurons, and that 
were also transmitted by the homunculi during the initial stages of the replacement process, 
also have disappeared. What we have now is a collection of homunculi that “call out” the 
states of the neuron that have been replaced. Perhaps these homunculi developed a process 
by which each of the possible physical states of the neuron receive a name, and when one 
of these homunculi have been received the information of the “states” of all its neighbours, 
it would process this information in such a way that the resulting message transmitted by it 
is  precisely  the  name  of  the  corresponding  neural  state.  Chalmers  proposes  a  similar 
strategy:
… once both [neurons] are replaced we can dispense with the awkward transducers and effectors that 
mediate the connection between the two chips. We can replace these by any kind of connection we 
like, as long as it is sensitive to the internal state of the first chip and affects the internal state of the 
second chip appropriately (there may be a connection in each direction, of course). Here we  ensure that 
the connection is a copy of the corresponding connection in Robot; perhaps this will be an electronic 
signal of some kind.47
Conclusions 
The first version of the replacement argument that was evaluated in this chapter was the 
regions-of-the-brain version.  A gadget  that  preserves  the  same causal  relations  that  an 
organic region of the brain associated to certain mental function has with the rest of the 
brain (in this case, the visual cortex) will affect the rest of the brain in exactly the same way 
as this organic region. In particular, the regions responsible of the linguistic behaviour of 
the subject will be affected in the same way by this gadget. Thus, the linguistic behaviour 
of the subject will be identical to the behaviour he would exhibit in case that the original 
visual cortex had not been replaced. But it is absurd to think that  the behaviour of the 
subject  was preserved and, at  the same time,  the replacement  eliminated  the  conscious 
phenomenal experiences formerly generated by the replaced region. While it is true that 
47   Chalmers (1996, p. 254) 
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Zuboff noticed something problematic in the fact that a functional isomorph at the level 
considered  can  behave  in  a  way  that  is  consistent  with  the  presence  of  conscious 
phenomenal experiences but without having them at all, this does not seem sufficient to 
show that the absent qualia hypothesis is false. 
In the second section of this chapter, I claimed that if we define the gadget that 
replaces a region of the brain as duplicating all the causal relationships that this region had 
with the rest of the brain, then it is possible that only a biologically identical gadget can 
duplicate these relationships without  introducing any unintended effect on the rest of the 
brain.  But  if  the  objective  of  the  replacement  thought  experiment  is  to  support  the 
supervenience thesis,  it  is  doubtful  that  the  thought  experiment  achieves this  goal.  The 
reason is that we cannot rule out that a property related to the physiochemical composition 
of the gadget is responsible for generating the conscious phenomenal experiences of the 
subject. I argued that the replacement scenario could be defined without stipulating that 
these artificial replacements share all the causal relationships of the organic brain regions. It 
can be stipulated that these devices duplicate only these neural properties of these organic 
regions. 
The regions-of-the-brain version of the replacement thought experiment might be 
objected  to  on  the  basis  that  the  damage  of  a  particular  region of  the  brain  does  not  
necessarily bring with it the elimination of the mental function associated to this particular 
region. The phenomenon known as the plasticity of the brain shows that, in some cases, the 
location of the neural activity linked to some mental function can be relocated in other 
regions  of  the  brain.  In  particular,  it  can  be  argued  that  Paul  preserves  his  visual 
experiences after the replacement not in virtue of the replacement of his visual cortex by a 
gadget that preserves the functional organization of his brain, but simply because the neural 
processes related to vision were relocated to a different place in his brain. Although this is 
not  conceived  as  a  definitive  objection  against  the  regions-of-the-brain version  of  the 
replacement thought experiment, it motivates the consideration of a different replacement 
scenario that contemplates a more detailed level of functional organization. 
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The second version of the replacement thought experiment presented in this chapter 
was the neural version. We have seen that, if it is assumed that the absent qualia hypothesis 
is  true,  the way in which the conscious  experiences  of the subject  disappear  along the 
replacement sequence < J0, J1, J2, , … , Jn > can be divided into two main cases. The first 
was that the conscious phenomenal  states of the subject  are completely eliminated at  a 
determinate point of the sequence. However, there are good empirical reasons that show 
that consciousness is not completely eliminated when a single neuron is destroyed, so it is  
extremely unlikely that the replacement of a single neuron had this effect. The second case 
was divided into two subcases: either the individual is aware that his experiences fade, or 
he does not notice it. We argued that this awareness cannot be instantiated in the organic 
part of the brain of the subject, nor in the part of the brain already composed by artificial  
neurons. Finally, the last possibility was that the conscious experiences of the subject fade, 
but he is not aware of this. In this case, his judgements concerning these experiences would 
be systematically wrong. But if we accept that the experiences of the subject cannot be 
disconnected in this way from the beliefs and judgements he forms about them, then we can 
reject the claim that the subject ignores that his experiences fade along the replacement 
sequence.
My final claim in this chapter is that the neural version of the replacement thought 
experiment  adequately  supports  thesis  (NSS).  The  objections  I  presented  against  this 
version of the replacement thought experiment are the following: perhaps the judgements 
that the subject forms with respect to his phenomenal experiences during the replacement 
are extremely wrong, similar to the judgements made by patients affected by blindness 
denial.  However,  any difference  in  the  verbal  behaviour  of  the  subject  would  imply  a 
difference in the way that the neural replacements affect the parts of the brain in charge of 
this  verbal  behaviour.  By  hypothesis  of  the  replacement  scenario,  this  is  not  possible. 
Finally,  in  the  last  section of  this  chapter,  I  briefly  described the  process  in  which an 
organic neuron generates and transmits electrochemical signals to other parts of the brain. I 
argued, first, that an artificial neuron does not need to generate these signals in the same 
way  as  an  organic  neuron.  Second,  I  have  shown  that  the  electrochemical  signals 
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transmitted by organic neurons do not need to be preserved in order for generating a system 
that preserves the functional organization of the brain of the subject. 
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Chapter 3
The  replacement  thought  experiment  and  the  problem  of  universal 
instantiation 
Introduction 
As the replacement process has been described in the last chapter of this thesis, the devices 
that  replace whole  regions  of  the brain or  organic  neurons may be constructed from a 
number of different materials. Of course, we have seen that there are certain constraints. 
For instance, the materials cannot introduce unintended effects on the rest of the brain that 
might impair the way in which the whole system works. Also, they need to be more or less 
resistant,  in such a way that the gadgets may transmit signals with the adequate speed. 
However, as I also mentioned in the previous chapter, there is a problem related to the 
nature of the inputs and outputs that are processed and produced by the system. As the 
replacement process has been described here, the input and output signals interchanged by 
artificial neurons preserve the same physical nature of the signals interchanged by organic 
neurons.  As we have seen,  these inputs and outputs have an electrochemical  character. 
Neurons generate electrochemical impulses that are generated by the flow of electrically 
charged ions through the membrane and the axon of the neuron. Also, neurons transmit 
chemical  signals  known  as  neurotransmitters  to  other  neurons,  which  have  different 
functions depending on its physical composition. 
Remember  now  the  neural  version  of  the  replacement  thought  experiment.  The 
replacement process is performed in such a way that all the members of the sequence <j1, 
… jn> are functionally equivalent to the original being (in this case, Paul´s brain). If it is  
shown that the last member of the sequence is effectively conscious, then what it is shown 
is that the properties that have been preserved by the replacement process are sufficient for 
generating  conscious  phenomenal  states.  However,  it  is  not  only  the  property  of 
instantiating a certain functional organization that was preserved through the replacement 
process. Electrical and chemical signals are also transmitted by artificial neurons. Since this 
element is still present, we cannot conclude that consciousness is preserved in virtue of the 
96
functional organization of the system: it might be still there because the signals transmitted 
by artificial neurons are the same ones that are transmitted by organic neurons.
At the end of the last chapter, we have seen that there is a way for describing the 
neural version of the replacement thought experiment without stipulating that the artificial 
neurons preserve the electrochemical signals generated by organic neurons. The problem is 
that, if there is no restriction concerning the materials on which the artificial neurons are 
made, and if the physiochemical constitution of the signals transmitted by organic neurons 
can be dispensed with, the functional organization that is implemented by the system may 
be shared by a very large number of entities. Note that there might be a huge number of 
physical systems in the universe whose number of parts is comparable to the number of 
neurons located inside a person's brain. These parts may also exhibit a number of physical 
states that can be put into correspondence to the physical states of a neuron, and they may 
show a certain level of causal interactions that can be described as the interchange of inputs 
and outputs, analogously as the interchange of electrochemical signals by neurons inside 
the brain. Among these systems there might be some ones whose functional organization at 
some level matches the functional organization that the brain of a person has at the neural 
level. If this is true, then it does not make sense to say that the human brain implements a  
certain functional organization, since we can take almost any physical system and interpret 
them  as  instantiating  any  functional  organization,  including,  of  course,  the  functional 
organization of the brain at a neural level.
In the first  section of this chapter,  I will  present a similar problem mentioned by 
Block  in  (2007b).  I  also  explain  how this  problem is  a  challenge  for  the  replacement 
strategy. In the second section of this chapter, I will present an argument offered by Searle 
in (1980) in favour of what he calls the thesis of Universal Implementation. According to 
the reconstruction I will propose, the crucial premise in this argument is that computation is 
observer-relative: whether a system implements a computation or not depends on how an 
external observer interprets this system. In the third section of this chapter, I will discuss 
the  conditions  of  implementation  of  a  Combinatorial  State  Automaton (CSA) given by 
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Chalmers. We will see that, in spite of Searle´s objections, these conditions show that it is  
extremely unlikely that an arbitrary object implements a CSA. 
Section 1 
Chauvinism, liberalism and the replacement thought experiment 
In (2007b), Block perceives a similar problem with respect to the specification of the inputs 
and outputs inside a functional theory of mental states. According to him, no matter how 
these inputs and outputs are physically described, the theory will be either chauvinistic – 
that  is,  it  will  deny  mentality  to  other  systems  simply  because  they  do  not  share  the 
physicochemical  composition  of  organic  neurons  –  or  too  liberal  –  it  would  wrongly 
attribute mentality and the capacity of experiencing mental states to systems clearly unable 
to have it. The replacement thought experiment faces then the following dilemma. Either 
the input and output signals transmitted by artificial neurons are the same ones transmitted 
by  organic  ones,  or  they  are  simply  described  as  inputs  and  outputs,  without  any 
specification concerning their physicochemical constitution. In the first case, the conclusion 
would be too chauvinistic,  since “precludes organisms without neurons (e.g.,  machines) 
from having functional descriptions.” In the second case, the risk is that, due to the liberal 
way  in  which  the  inputs  and  outputs  are  specified,  a  huge  number  of  systems  may 
implement the functional organization of the brain. 
Block illustrates this risk by mentioning the possibility of manipulating the economic 
system of a country in such a way that it duplicates the functional organization of the brain  
at the neural level. To begin with, we may think of the inhabitants of this country as the  
constituent parts of the system, and the whole value of their assets as their relevant internal 
state.  We may also  take  the  money  earned by these  inhabitants  as  the  input  and their 
expenditures as the output. 
Economic systems  have  inputs  and  outputs,  e.g.,  inﬂux  and  outﬂux  of  credits  and  debits.  And 
economic systems also have a rich variety of internal states, e.g., having a rate of  increase of GNP 
equal to double the Prime Rate. It does not seem impossible that a wealthy sheik could gain control of 
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the  economy  of  a  small  country,  e.g.,  Bolivia,  and manipulate  its  financial  system  to  make  it 
functionally equivalent to a person, e.g., himself. 
Those who want to use the replacement thought experiment for arguing in favour of 
the thesis that implementing the right functional organization is sufficient for generating 
consciousness  face  a  dilemma  analogous  to  the  one  described  by  Block.  Either  the 
physicochemical  composition  of  the  input  and output  signals  transmitted by the  neural 
replacements is the same as the one of organic neurons, or the signals are described only as 
inputs and outputs, without any reference to their composition. If we adopt the first option, 
the replacement thought experiment and the arguments associated to it might succeed in 
showing that the ability to experience conscious phenomenal states is preserved, but it will 
be useless for arguing in favour of the thesis in question. The reason, of course, is that it is  
not  only  the  functional  organization  of  the  brain  what  is  preserved,  but  also  the 
physiochemical character of the inputs and outputs interchanged by organic neurons. Thus, 
even if conscious experiences are preserved after the replacement process it is not possible 
to assure that this is in virtue of the system implementing the functional organization of the 
brain at a neural level. If we adopt the second option, the risk consists in that the number of  
systems that share the functional organization of the brain might be too large. It may be 
argued that there are millions of physical entities – rocks, heaps of sand, galaxies, bars of 
soap – that can be divided into the same number of parts as neurons inside the brain of a 
person. These parts maintain certain causal interactions that can be interpreted as signals. 
Some of these causal interactions might be isomorphic to the way in which neurons are 
causally affected among themselves. Stars inside galaxies, for instance, have certain causal 
effects on other celestial bodies. The same can also be said of molecules of a rock made of 
granite, or of grains of sand in a heap. 
Section 2 
The thesis of Universal Instantiation 
Objections like the one presented by Block have been widely discussed in the philosophical 
literature during the last forty years. In particular, some philosophers have developed what 
are known as “triviality arguments” against computational approaches to mentality. Perhaps 
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one of the most well known arguments is the one presented by Searle in (1992), where this 
author  offers  an argument  whose conclusion is  the thesis  of  Universal  Implementation, 
which can be initially understood as follows: there is always a way of interpreting an object 
in such a way that it  implements any computer program. Remember that in the second 
chapter  of  the  thesis  we  mentioned  that  any  given  functional  organization  could  be 
abstracted into an abstract computational device: a Combinatorial State Automaton. But if 
the thesis of Universal Implementation is true, then there is always a way of interpreting an 
object  as  implementing  a  CSA,  and  thus,  there  is  always  a  way  of  interpreting  it  as  
implementing any functional organization.  In this section, I  will  present and evaluate a 
reconstruction of Searle´s argument, which includes a key premise: computation is observer 
relative.  Searle  argues  that  the  question  whether  an  object  (which  may  be  a  digital 
computer, a rock, a wall or an organic brain) implements a certain program does not have 
an objective answer: this depends on the way an external observer interprets this object. 
The Thesis of Universal Implementation can be formulated as follows: 
(Universal  Implementation)  For  any  computer  program  C  and  any  sufficiently 
complex physical object O, there is a description of O under which it is implementing 
program C. 
Now, if the argument offered by Searle is successful, the consequence is that almost 
every  physical  object  we  choose  (provided  its  structure  is  complex  enough)  can  be 
interpreted  as  implementing  any  program.  Remember  the  modified  versions  of  the 
supervenience thesis (NSSM) that was presented in page (47) of this thesis: 
(NSSM) There is a set C of Combinatorial State Automata such that the property of a 
system P of generating conscious phenomenal experiences  naturally supervenes on 
the property of P of instantiating a member of set C. 
If thesis (NSSM) is accepted and the thesis of Universal Instantiation is true, then 
almost any object can be described as implementing any CSA, and in particular, a CSA that  
corresponds  to  the  functional  organization  of  the  brain  at  a  neural  level.  Thus,  the 
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unwelcomed  consequence  is  that  almost  any object  is  capable  of  generating  conscious 
phenomenal experiences. The claim that we can assign a computational interpretation to 
any object is understood by Searle as follows: 
There is  no way you could discover that  something is intrinsically a digital computer because the 
characterization of it as a digital computer is always relative to an observer who assigns a syntactical 
interpretation to the purely physical features of the system. […] As applied to the computational model  
generally,  [this  has  the  consequence  that]  the  characterization  of  a  process  as  computational  is  a  
characterization  of  a  physical  system  from  outside;  and  the  identification  of  the  process  as 
computational does not identify an intrinsic feature of the physics; it is essentially an observer-relative 
characterization. 48
From this, Searle obtains the following two theses: (1) for any object there is some 
description of that object such that under that description the object is a digital computer, 
and (2) For any program and any sufficiently complex object, there is some description of 
the object under which it is implementing the program. 
Searle also mentions a famous example involving the molecular structure of a wall:  
according  to  him,  there  is  a  pattern  of  molecule  movements  inside  this  wall  that  is 
isomorphic with the formal structure of Wordstar (a word processor widely used in the 
1980s). Now, provided that is a big enough wall, there will be a way of interpreting another  
pattern of molecule movements inside it as isomorphic to the formal structure of a different 
program, including,  for instance,  the formal  pattern of neurons firing inside an organic 
brain. 
In this section, I want to concentrate on the thesis of Universal Implementation. The 
reason  is  that,  if  true,  this  thesis  is  the  one  that  presents  a  serious  challenge  to  the 
reformulation of the supervenience thesis:  there is a computer program C such that the 
generation of conscious phenomenal experiences by a system supervenes on the property of 
instantiating program C. If, on the one hand, we accept this thesis and on the other the 
thesis of Universal Implementation is true, then the obvious consequence is that any system 
48 Searle (1992, p. 211)
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implements  program  C  and  therefore,  any  system  is  capable  of  generating  conscious 
phenomenal experiences. This, however, is against our basic intuitions: things like walls or 
rocks are not the sort of things that can generate these experiences. 
The following is the reconstruction of the argument proposed by Searle in favour of 
the thesis of Universal Instantiation:
(Premise 1) Computer programs can be defined entirely as syntactic manipulations of symbols. 
(Premise 2) Syntactical manipulations are not defined in physical terms. 
(Conclusion 1) Computer programs are not defined in physical terms.  
(Premise  3)  Whether  a  physical  system  implements  a  computer  program  or  not  depends  on  an 
observer. 
(Conclusion  2)  For  any  computer  program  and  any  sufficiently  complex  object,  there  is  some 
description under which such object is implementing the program. 
In order to evaluate this argument, I want to start first with the truth of its premises. 
Consider  first  premise  (1):  a  computer  program  is  defined  entirely  as  a  syntactic 
manipulation of symbols. This can be understood with the help of the notion of a Turing 
Machine. A Turing Machine is an abstract device composed of a reading-writing head and 
an infinite tape divided into cells. The head is capable of scanning (one at a time) these 
cells and deleting and writing symbols on them. Also, the machine is, at any time, in one of 
a finite number of states. The way in which the machine operates is completely determined 
by (a) the current state of the machine, (b) the symbol currently scanned by the head, and 
(c) a set  of transition rules, known as the program of the machine.  The following is  a 
program that defines a very simple Turing Machine, whose task is adding the symbol “1” to 
any chain of 1´s written on the tape: 
1. [S0, 1, S0, right]
2. [S0, 0, S1, wrt1]
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3. [S1, 1, S1, left]
4. [S1, 0, S2, right]
This Turing Machine can be understood as computing the function that assigns to 
any natural number its immediate successor (the successor function). This requires adopting 
a certain interpretation of the symbols that appear in the tape cells. In this case, we can 
represent any arbitrary natural number n as a series of n+1 instances of the symbol “1” 
written on the machine tape. The symbol “0” can be used for separating blocks composed 
by 1´s. For all blocks of length n, the machine will always end with a block of length n+1.  
For instance, if the symbols on the tape are seven 1´s (representing the number 6 in this 
particular interpretation) the tape of the machine will end with a block of eight 1´s (that  
represent  the  number  7).  Under  this  interpretation,  the  machine  can  be  understood  as 
computing the successor function. Of course, it might have been possible to choose another 
way of representing natural numbers: in binary notation, for example, the number 2 can be 
represented with the block “10”, instead of “11”.  In this case,  we would need to build 
another program for calculating the same function. But although binary notation would 
provide  some  important  practical  advantages  concerning  computational  advantages 
(computational speed and economy of space, to mention only a few) this would not imply a 
difference in the computational capability of the machine. With this in mind, it is easy to 
understand why computation is entirely defined as a syntactic manipulation of symbols. 
Any particular computation can be defined entirely by a machine table (like the Turing 
Machine  that computes the successor function).  The machine table determines how the 
symbols on the table are manipulated, and these rules do not consider any properties apart  
from the syntactic properties of these symbols.  
According to the second premise of Searle´s argument, syntactical manipulations are 
not defined in physical terms. Consider again the successor function: we can construct a 
physical  machine  that  computes  this  function  for  a  finite  number  of  arguments  in  the 
domain (since it is a physical machine, it cannot perform the computation for all possible 
elements  of  the  domain).  Notice  that  while  a  particular  physical  machine  can perform 
calculations by writing symbols on a tape. An example could be a physical simulation of a 
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Turing  Machine  built  for  educational  purposes.  Other  physical  machines  used  for 
computing functions, however, do not need to perform the calculations in this same fashion.  
A physical simulation of a Turing Machine might include a real head that scans symbols on 
a small paper tape, and can use a little pencil for writing the necessary symbols. Abacuses 
and digital  electronic calculators, however, will use beads sliding on wires or electronic 
signals. But in all these cases, the fact that these machines are computers is independent of 
the particular physical ways in which they perform the calculations. In this sense, hardware 
is irrelevant for defining how a computer works. This contrasts with the way in which we 
understood and define mechanical  and organic devices:  a carburettor,  for example,  is  a 
device  that  mixes  air  and fuel.  Hearts  are  muscles that  pump blood through the  blood 
vessels  by  repeated  contractions.  The  definition  of  a  computer,  however,  takes  in 
consideration only the syntactical properties of symbols, which according to Searle, are not 
intrinsic to physics, insofar as they have no physical effects. This is the way in which Searle  
justifies the claim that syntactic manipulations are not defined in physical terms. 
The multiple realizability of computational equivalent processes in different physical media is not just 
a signt that the process are abstract, but that they are not intrinsic to the system at all. They depend on 
an interpretation from outside. (Searle, 1992, p. 209) 
Consider again the reconstruction of Searle´s argument: the step from premises (1) 
and  (2)  to  the  first  conclusion  seems  to  be  valid:  since  computer  programs  can  be 
completely defined as syntactic manipulations of symbols and that syntactic manipulations 
of symbols are not defined in physical terms, we have to accept that computer programs are 
not defined in physical terms. The step to conclusion (2), however, is problematic: that the 
objects of a certain field or theory cannot be physically defined does not mean that only an 
external observer can define them. The solution might be to include an additional premise: 
(P3) If something is not defined in terms of physical features, then it is observer-relative. 
In the following paragraphs, I want to argue that the truth of this thesis is at least  
doubtful: that some features of the world could not be defined by appealing to physical 
properties does not entail that the usual definitions of such features depend on an observer. 
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Section 3 
The conditions for implementing a computation 
Notice, first, that there seems to be certain clear constraints concerning the way in which 
we can we interpret a physical device. Consider the following argument given by Block49: 
imagine  a  physical  realization of  a  Turing  Machine  whose  tape  only includes  symbols 
composed of 1´s and 0´s. When the symbols in the machine tape are (1,1), the machine will 
produce the symbol “1”, and when the symbols in the tape are (1,0), (0,1) or (0,0), the 
machine will produce the symbol “0”. The relation between inputs and outputs can be given  
by table 1: 
Table 1





The machine can be interpreted as instantiating the truth function “and” when the symbol 
“1” is interpreted as “T” or “True”, and the symbol “0” is interpreted as “F” or “false”, as it  
is shown in table 2. 
Table 2 





49 Block (2002, pp. 77-78) 
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Note that it can also be interpreted as instantiating the truth-function “or” if we interpret the 
symbols “0” and “1” in an opposite way, as it is shown in table 3. 
Table 3





This particular Turing Machine can be interpreted in more than one way. However, consider 
now exclusive disjunction (table  4):  no matter  the  meaning attributed to  the  input  and 
output signals, the machine cannot be interpreted as instantiating this truth-function.
Table 4





Also, it is evident that certain features of the world are observer-relative: that London 
springs are terrible for a picnic, that the taste of a Vesper cocktail is superior when you use 
Kina Lillet instead of Cocchi Americano, or that the sound of a Stradivarius violin is deeper 
than the sound of a Guarneri, depend on the point of view of an observer. But notice that 
although some features of the world cannot be definable in a physical theory does not mean 
that they are observer-relative. In (2002), Rey argues that some categories that belong to the  
empirical sciences are clearly objective, in spite of not being defined exclusively in terms to 
their  physical  features50.  Consider,  for  instance,  a  basic  category  used  in  biological 
classification:  the  notion  of  species.  An adequate  definition  of  this  notion  is  based  on 
50 Rey (2002, p. 215) 
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certain relational properties such interbreeding or the capability of produce new offspring, 
and not only on physical properties. This notion is not reducible to physics, but from this 
we cannot conclude that  it  is  observer-relative.In some other cases,  however,  there is  a 
debate concerning the nature of certain features. In (2008) Buechner mentions the case of 
numbers. He reminds us that their metaphysical nature is a debatable case, and it is not 
evident that they are not intrinsic to the world. Under a realist perspective, numbers are 
intrinsic features or some world. From a constructivist view, they can be seen as observer-
relative. 
The point  is  that  with respect  to  numbers,  it  is  an open question whether  numbers are or  are not  
intrinsic features of the world or of some abstract world. If Searle thinks something is not an intrinsic 
feature of the physical world or an abstract world, it is a claim for which he must provide an argument.  
51 
In spite of these initial considerations, I think that the most promising way for arguing 
against the thesis of Universal Instantiation is to show that the conditions under which a 
system implements a determinate CSA are sufficiently constrained for assuring that only a 
very limited number of systems implement it.  The conditions of implementation are very 
important in fields like cognitive science, artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind, 
where  we deal  with  the  concrete  implementation  of  abstract  computations  by  concrete 
physical systems. Objects that implement a computation are concrete entities that follow 
physical laws and have certain particular constraints and limitations. For these reasons, it is 
necessary  to  explain  how  a  determinate  physical  system  implements  or  realizes  a 
computation and to clarify the idea that a certain computation describes the operation of a 
particular  physical  system.  Consider  again  the  conditions  proposed  by  Chalmers  for 
implementing a CSA: 
A physical  system implements  a  given CSA if there  is  a  decomposition of  its  internal  states  into 
substates [s1, s2, … sn ]and a mapping f from these substates onto corresponding formal states Sj of the 
CSA, along with similar mappings for inputs and outputs, such that: for every formal state transition 
([I1, … Ik], [S1, … Sn]) → ([S'1, … S'k], [O1, … Ol]) of the CSA, if the system is in internal state [s1, … sn 
51  Buechnner,  (2008, p. 160)
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] and receiving input [i1, … in] such that the physical states and inputs map to the formal states and 
inputs, this causes it to enter an internal state and produce an output that map appropriately to the 
required formal state and oputut.52 
The conditions established by Chalmers require that, for each formal state transition 
of a CSA, system P needs to satisfy a corresponding conditional that has the following 
form:   
If system P were to be in vector-state s and receives input i such that f (s) = S and f (i) 
= I, then it would transit into a vector-state s' such that f (s') = S' and would produce 
output o, such that f (o) = O.
Notice that conditionals that have this form possess a modal strength that is sufficient 
for supporting counterfactual conditionals: they establish what would be the case if their 
antecedent were true. This contrasts with simple material conditionals. The importance of 
these  counterfactual  conditionals  is  that  their  satisfaction  by  a  system  guarantees  the 
reliability  of  its  state  transitions,  and  they  assure  that  they  are  not  produced  by  pure 
coincidence. Naturally, physical systems like brains or their artificial simulations might fail, 
but in order for implementing a CSA, it is not required that they transit adequately in all  
possible circumstances. 
The strategy for showing that an arbitrary physical system, like Searle´s wall, cannot 
reliably implement any given CSA can be understood as follows: consider first a CSAN 
whose  vector-states  have  10  elements  that  can  be  in  10  different  states  (for  ease  of 
exposition, assume that the sets Σ and Γ that correspond to the sets of inputs and outputs are 
empty). The number of possible state vectors of CSAN will be 1010 (that is, 10,000,000,000 
state-vectors).  Now, if  it  were  true  that  Searle´s  wall  can implement  CSAN,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  find  first  an  adequate  mapping  from the  components  of  this  wall  to  the 
corresponding vector-states of CSAN. To each of these vector-states can be assigned, for 
instance, a small region of the wall. We can also identify a certain physical state-transition 
52  Chalmers, (1996b, p. 325)
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in these small regions that correspond to the state-transitions of the CSA: they can change, 
for example, their colour or temperature. 
However, this procedure will radically reduce the number of systems that mirror the 
vector-states of CSAN. The reason is that these small regions of the wall need to satisfy the 
strong conditionals that describe the transition rules of CSAN (in this case, remember that 
the sets of inputs and outputs are empty): if a physical system B is in vector-state [si1,… 
si10], it will transit into vector-state [s'i1,… s'k10]. Notice that for each vector state we can 
have 1010 different consequents, and thus, the number of the transition rules of CSAN can be 
as high as 1010 x 1010. Now, if the transition between the states of the regions of Searle´s 
wall mirrored the corresponding vector-states of CSAN, it is necessary for it to satisfy the 
corresponding transition rules. However, it is extremely unlikely that the regions of the wall 
transit in a way that mirrors these vector states. The wall would need to satisfy 1010 x 1010 
counterfactual conditionals,  one for each transition rule.  It  is  for these reasons that the 
possibilities that an arbitrary physical system implements CSAN are minimal.53 
Conclusions 
According to the thesis of Universal Implementation, for any computer program C and any 
sufficiently  complex  physical  object  O,  there  is  a  description  of  O under  which  it  is 
implementing  program  C.  The  conclusion  of  the  replacement  argument  is  that 
implementing the right functional organization is a sufficient condition for consciousness. 
But  if  any  sufficiently  complex  object  (say,  an  object  with  an  adequate  number  of 
identifiable physical states, like a wall) implements any program, it would also implement 
the right program, and therefore any sufficient complex object would be conscious. We 
have seen in this chapter that, to be valid, Searle's argument needs to adopt an additional 
premise:  if  something is  not  defined in  terms of  physical  features,  then it  is  observer-
relative. However, there are scientific notions that do not depend on an observer but are not 
reducible  to  physical  features,  like  the  notion  of  species.  Moreover,  there  are  clear 
53  The situation may be even worse: remember that the sets Σ and Γ that correspond to the sets of inputs and 
outputs of CSAN are empty. The number of the transition rules for implementing a CSA with inputs and 
outputs will add more constraints to the conditions of implementation.
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constraints on the way that we can interpret a physical system: Block's argument shows that 
a system that instantiates conjunction or disjunction cannot be interpreted as instantiating 
material equivalence or exclusive disjunction. 
But  the  main  problem  with  the  thesis  of  Universal  Instantiation  is  that  the 
implementation conditions of an abstract computational device, like a Combinatorial State 
Automaton, do not allow the trivial implementations suggested by Searle. Remember that 
the vector-states of a Combinatorial State Automaton are complex structures. In order to 
implement a CSA, it would be necessary for a physical system, like Searle´s wall, to satisfy 
the transition rules of the CSA that are expressed as counterfactual conditionals. But as we 
have seen, the possibilities that an arbitrary physical system satisfied these transition rules 
are  minimal  in  the  case  of  an inputless  CSA with  10 elements  and 10 states  for  each 
element. A simple mapping from the components of this wall to the vector-states of the 
CSA would not be sufficient. Moreover, there will be more constraints if we consider a 
CSA capable of dealing with inputs and outputs. 
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Chapter 4
The replacement thought experiment and the thesis of inverted qualia 
Introduction 
Although  the  version  of  the  replacement  thought  experiment  presented  in  the  second 
chapter  of  this  thesis  could  be  adequate  for  showing  that  a  replacement  process  that 
preserves the functional organization of the brain also preserves its capacity of generating 
conscious phenomenal experiences, there is still a further problem that needs to be faced. In 
the case examined in the last section, we have seen that there are very good reasons to think 
that a being that possesses an artificial brain that shares the functional organization of the 
brain of a conscious person will also be able to have conscious phenomenal experiences, no 
matter  the  particular  physiochemical  makeup  of  this  artificial  brain  (leaving  aside,  of 
course, chemical substances that may be harmful to the rest of the brain or to the body).  
More precisely, the arguments presented in the last section of this chapter support thesis 
(NSS): 
(NSS) There is a set of functional organizations F such that the capacity of a physical 
system  of  generating  conscious  phenomenal  experiences  naturally  strongly 
supervenes on the property of P of instantiating a member of set F. 
However,  it  still  can  be  argued  that  the  experiences  that  this  physical  system 
generates have a different character than the experiences generated by a biological brain. 
According to this, it is possible that a being that possess an artificial brain made from non-
biological basic elements but that instantiates the same functional organization of the brain 
of a conscious person might experience pain, smells or sounds in a different way in which a 
being possessing an organic brain experiences pain, smells or sounds. The artificial brain of 
Paul's functional twin, F-Paul, may have the capacity of generating conscious experiences, 
but they still may be different if they are compared with the experiences generated by Paul's  
organic  brain.  Thus,  it  is  still  necessary to  determine  whether  the  replacement  thought 
experiment presented in the preceding section of this chapter supports thesis (NSS2): 
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(NSS2) There is a set F of functional organizations such that the qualitative character 
of the conscious phenomenal experiences of a physical system supervenes naturally 
on the property of P of instantiating a member of set F. 
A widely  suggested  way of  explaining  this  possibility  is  to  accept  that  the  mere 
presence of conscious phenomenal experiences is generated by the functional organization 
of  the  brain,  while  the  particular  character  of  these  experiences  depends  not  on  this 
functional  organization,  but  on  the  particular  physicochemical  makeup  of  the  system. 
Systems  that  share  the  same  functional  organization  but  whose  physicochemical 
composition is  different  will  generate  conscious  phenomenal  experiences  with different 
qualitative  character.  Assuming  this  claim,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  why the  conscious 
phenomenal experiences of Paul and F-Paul might be different. Their respective brains (a 
biological brain and an artificial brain) share the same functional organization at a very 
fine-grained level, and it is for this reason that these brains generate conscious states. But 
Paul´s brain is composed of organic matter, and this particular composition determines the 
qualitative character of his  conscious experiences,  a  character that is  not  shared by the 
conscious experiences generated by F-Paul´s artificial brain, which is not composed not of 
organic matter. In a hypothetic case in which a being could have the conscious experiences 
generated both by Paul´s brain and by F-Paul´s brain, the qualitative differences between 
them could be noticed. 
In the first section of this chapter, I will present the hypothesis of inverted qualia and 
the challenges it presents to a functionalist account of phenomenal consciousness. In the 
second section, I will present a further variation of the replacement scenario that supports 
thesis  (NSS2).  According  to  this  thesis,  the  phenomenal  character  of  the  experiences 
generated  by  a  system  naturally  supervenes  on  the  property  of  instantiating  a  certain 
functional organization. In this case, the functional organization at play is the functional 
organization  of the brain at  a neural  level.  If  thesis  (NSS2)  is  true,  the inverted qualia 
hypothesis is naturally false: it is not the case that a system that is a functional duplicate of 
the  brain  of  a  conscious  person  at  a  neural  level  generates  conscious  phenomenal 
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experiences with a different qualitative character. In the third section of this chapter, I will  
present  an  objection  against  this  new  version  of  the  replacement  thought  experiment 
originally developed by Van Heuveln  et al (1998) and Greenberg (1998). Finally, in the 
fourth section of this chapter, I will present a response against the objections raised by Van 
Heuveln et al. 
Section 1 
The hypothesis of inverted qualia 
How can be  understood the  claim that  functionally  identical  states  may  have  different 
qualitative  characters?  There  are  surely  several  ways  of  imagining  the  nature  of  this 
difference. Consider the case of pain. From a functionalist point of view, pain is an internal 
state that can be characterized by its relations to other internal states, perceptual inputs and 
behavioural outputs. A subject is in pain when he is experiencing a state that is normally 
caused by an injury to the body, that produced the belief that the body has been damaged 
and the desire to be out that state, and that in general produces screams, moaning and other 
expressions  of  discomfort.  Imagine  now  that  Paul  and  F-Paul  find  themselves  in  an 
identical situation: they are in a scenario rehearsing a song for a concert. While they are 
busy preparing the audio equipment and tuning the instruments, they grab a wire lying in 
the floor and try to connect a guitar to one of the amplifiers. At this precise moment, they 
receive  a  painful  (but  harmless)  electrical  discharge.  Both  of  them  experience  an 
uncomfortable sensation. They close their eyes, scream, and let the wire fall on the floor. 
This experience generates in both of them the distant memory of having received a similar 
electrical discharge long time ago (perhaps during the initial rehearsals of the Beatles in 
Liverpool), and the belief that there must be something wrong with the wire. The incident 
also causes them to angrily order the staff to replace it as soon as possible in order to avoid 
a more severe accident. Now, in spite of the fact that these experiences are caused by the 
same electrical discharge, that they cause the same beliefs and memories, and produce the 
same behavioural effects, the possibility just discussed implies that Paul and F-Paul painful 
experiences might have had a very different qualitative character, a difference that could be 
perceived by a single individual in case that he had these experiences. 
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However, I think it is difficult to coherently imagine a case in which the conscious 
phenomenal  experience  of  pain  can  be  different  between  two  isomorphic  systems. 
Assuming  that  both  Paul  and  F-Paul  experience  something  uncomfortable  when  they 
receive  an  electrical  discharge,  and  that  their  cognitive  and  behavioural  reactions  are 
identical,  it  is  not clear how these experiences  could be dissimilar. Perhaps the painful 
experience  of  F-Paul  is  comparatively  weaker  than  the  experience  of  Paul,  but  their 
reactions to the electrical discharge are the same because, after all, their motor neurons send  
the same signals to the muscles of their bodies. However, it would not be clear then why 
their cognitive reactions to these experiences are identical. Perhaps F-Paul experiences a 
radically  different  sensation,  and that  any  being possessing  an  organic  brain  would  be 
amazed if he could feel the painful experiences of F-Paul. 
Leaving aside the case of pain, there is  a way of conceiving a difference in the 
qualitative character of the experiences generated by isomorphic systems: the hypothesis of 
the inverted spectrum. According to this hypothesis, the visual experiences generated by 
two isomorphic systems, P and Q, may differ in that the qualitative properties of the visual 
experiences  generated  by  Q  are  phenomenally  inverted  with  respect  to  the  visual 
experiences generated by P. For example, Paul might be driving a car along Oxford Street, 
and noticing that the traffic signal turns to red at the intersection with Regent´s Street, he 
stops his car. The experience of seeing the change in the traffic light might also cause in 
Paul the belief that he must stop his car in case he does not want to be involved in an  
accident. Also, this experience might produce an uncomfortable sensation of anxiety, since 
he is late for a meeting and knows that he must wait at least four minutes in that busy 
intersection. When the four minutes have passed, Paul sees that the traffic  light  is now 
green and he continues driving. In an identical situation, Paul´s functional isomorph, F-
Paul, would react in exactly the same way. He would stop his car when the traffic light 
changes its colour. He would also form the belief that, in order to avoid an accident, he 
must stop his car. He would also experience the same feeling of anxiety. But if the visual 
experiences of  F-Paul  were inverted  with  respect  to  the  visual  experiences  of  Paul,  he 
would not notice that the traffic signal changes from green to red when he is driving along 
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Oxford Street. For him, the signal transits from red to green, and it is precisely when he 
sees the colour green that he stops his car. Of course, he does not call that colour “green”. 
He is functionally identical to Paul, so his behaviour – including his verbal behaviour – is 
identical to the one exhibited by Paul. 
In  the  rest  of  this  chapter,  I  will  present  a  version  of  the  replacement  thought 
experiment  whose objective is  to  show that  the inverted  qualia  hypothesis is  false:  the 
conscious phenomenal experiences generated by two isomorphic systems – like the organic 
brain of Paul and the artificial brain of F-Paul – cannot differ in their qualitative character. 
If the thought experiment is sound, then we have very good reasons to accept thesis (NSS2): 
there  is  a  set  F  of  functional  organizations  such  that  the  qualitative  character  of  the 
conscious  phenomenal  experiences  of  a  physical  system  supervenes  naturally  on  the 
property of P of instantiating a member of set F.
 Section 2 
Against the thesis of inverted qualia 
If the inverted qualia hypothesis is true, then there can be two isomorphic physical systems 
– like the organic brain of Paul and the artificial brain of F-Paul – that generate visual  
experiences whose qualitative character is mutually inverted. Paul sees the traffic signal red 
and a blue sky, while F-Paul sees the signal green and a yellow sky. Assuming that Paul and 
F-Paul are the extreme members of a sequence < J0, J1, J2, , … , Jn > of replacement cases, 
the qualitative character of the visual experiences of these isomorphic systems will change 
gradually between the red experiences of Paul and the green experiences of F-Paul. Notice 
that the hypothesis of a sudden change in the qualitative character of these experiences (a 
change caused by the replacement of a single organic neuron) can be ruled out by appealing 
to the same reasons presented in the previous chapter.  It  is  extremely unlikely that the 
replacement of only one neuron can have this effect in the experiences of the subject. 
In this new version of the thought experiment, the hypothesis is that the qualitative 
character of these experiences gradually changes as the organic neurons of the brain are 
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being replaced by artificial neurons that preserve the same input-output relations with the 
rest of the brain, while the functional organization of the whole system remains constant. If 
the inverted qualia hypothesis is accepted, perhaps these experiences transit  from red to 
green and from blue to yellow, or maybe the way in which these experiences change is so 
radically different that they would be amazed if they could interchange these experiences 
(maybe expressing this amazement by saying things like “It´s surprising! I´ve never seen 
this colour before!”).  This qualitative difference would not be manifested in the behaviour 
of the subject because the envisaged scenario preserves all the relations existing among 
colours. 
Now, assuming the truth of the inverted qualia hypothesis, there will be two points Ji 
and Jn in the sequence such that they are not the extreme points and that the qualitative 
character  of their  visual experiences is  so different  that  an independent  observer would 
notice it. It is evident that, as the extremes of the replacement sequence, there would be a 
noticeable difference between the red experiences of Paul and the green experiences of F-
Paul. Nonetheless, there will surely be another pair of elements of the sequence that are 
closer between them, and whose visual experiences are also noticeably distinct. For ease of 
exposition, we will call this elements Zero-Paul and Ten-Paul. The difference between them 
consists in that Ten-Paul has ten per cent more artificial neurons in his brain.  But how can 
we be sure that  the  visual  experiences  between Zero-Paul  and Ten-Paul  are  noticeably 
different? Certainly, if there is a difference, it  would not be as strong as the difference 
between  the  visual  experiences  of  Paul  and  F-Paul,  since  the  places  in  the  sequence 
occupied by Zero-Paul and Ten-Paul are relatively closer. It even might be suggested that 
the differences in his visual experiences are so faint that an external observer would not  
notice any difference between them. Notice, however, that it is not possible to transit from 
red to blue with ten imperceptible changes, so we can expect that the pairs whose difference 
is ten per cent of artificial neurons have noticeable different visual experiences. If this is so, 
the difference concerning the qualitative character of the experiences of Zero-Paul and Ten-
Paul will be noticeable, although this difference would not be as radical as the difference 
between the experiences of Paul and F-Paul. The importance of this point will be evident in  
the last section of this chapter, when we consider a response to an objection (presented by 
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Greenberg (1998) and Van Heuveln et al (1998) against this new version of the replacement 
thought experiment. 
Now, Zero-Paul and Ten-Paul are members of the sequence < J0, J1, J2, , … , Jn >  of 
replacement  cases,  and  thus,  they  are  functionally  identical  (and  almost  physically 
identical). The only difference between them is that there is a section of the brain of Ten-
Paul that has been replaced by artificial neurons, while that section remains organic in the 
case  of  Zero-Paul.  Call  the  section  inside  the  brain  of  Ten-Paul  that  is  composed  by 
artificial neurons the section A, and the corresponding organic section inside Zero-Paul the 
section O. Assume now that section A is removed from the brain of Ten-Paul and implanted 
inside the brain of Zero-Paul in such a way that, when a switch is in position a, section A is 
connected to the brain of Zero-Paul, and when the switch is in position  o, section  O is. 
Now, if the Inverted Qualia hypothesis were right, then there would be a noticeable change 
in the qualitative character of the visual experiences of Zero-Paul when the switch is moved 
from position o to position a. The visual experiences of Zero-Paul would change, in front of 
his  eyes,  from a  reddish experience  to  a  greenish one.  At  this  point,  we can form the 
following two hypotheses: either Zero-Paul notices that his visual experiences are changing 
in front of him, or he does not. 
Does Zero-Paul notice that his visual experiences are changing in front of his eyes? 
Note  first  that,  like  in  the  case  presented  in  the  preceding  chapter  of  the  thesis,  the 
behavioural dispositions of Zero-Paul will be the same before and after the switch is moved 
from position a to position o.  The reason is that the causal effects of section A – composed 
entirely by artificial neurons – are the same causal effects of region O. Both regions will 
send the same signals to the rest of the brain, and in particular, they will affect the motor 
neurons in exactly the same way. Thus, the behaviour of Zero-Paul will be consistent with 
the preservation of the qualitative character of his visual experiences. If somebody asked 
him  “Did  you  noticed  any  difference  in  your  visual  experiences  after  the  switch  was 
moved?” he would answer negatively. 
... there is no way for the system to notice the changes. Its causal organization stays constant, so that 
all of its functional states and behavioral dispositions stay fixed. As far as the system is concerned, 
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nothing unusual  has  happened.  There is  no room for  the  thought  “Hmm! Something strange just 
happened!”  In general,  the structure of  any such thought  must be  reflected in  processing,  but  the 
structure of processing remains constant here. If there were to be such a thought, it must float entirely  
free  of  the  system and  would  be  utterly  impotent  to  affect  later  processing.  (If  it  affected  later  
processing, the systems would be functionally distinct, contrary to the hypothesis). 54
Notice also that the functional organization of Zero-Paul is exactly the same before 
and after the switch is moved, and thus, the way in which his brain processes information 
will not be modified. This makes extremely unlikely that he can form the belief that there is 
something different about his visual experiences when the switch is moved from position o 
to position a. 
It seems entirely implausible to suppose that my experiences could change in such a significant way, 
with my paying full attention to them, without my being able to notice the change. It would suggest 
once again a radical dissociation between consciousness and cognition. If this kind of thing could hap -
pen, then psychology and phenomenology would be radically out of step; much further out of step than 
even the fading qualia scenario would imply.55
Thus, Zero-Paul cannot form the belief that there is something different or strange 
about these experiences. But to assume this implies that there is a serious incompatibility 
between his conscious experiences and the beliefs he forms about them. Zero-Paul is a 
rational being that pays attention to his experiences, but he is simply not able to notice the 
change produced by the movement of the switch. To assume that he judges that nothing 
strange is happening to his visual experiences while they are changing in front of his eyes 
clashes  with  the  Coherence  Principles  proposed  by  Chalmers.  In  particular,  there  is  a 
conflict with this assumption and the Reliability Principle. According to this assumption, 
the second-order judgements made by the subject are normally correct. So, if Zero-Paul 
judges that he experiences pain in his right toe, or that he hears the sound of a bass guitar, 
he usually has the experience of pain in his right toe and the experience of hearing a bass 
guitar. Similarly, if he forms the judgement that his visual experiences are not changing in 
54  Chalmers (2010, p. 24) 
55  Chalmers (1996, p. 269) 
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front of his eyes, we would expect that this judgement is accurate. But as we have seen, this 
is not the case. His experiences are changing in front of his eyes, and he is simply unable to 
form the judgement  that  something strange is  happening. Again,  the clash  between the 
Coherence Principles and the fact that Paul cannot form the belief that something wrong is 
happening with his conscious experiences cannot be interpreted as a genuine reductio. The 
Coherence Principles are not logically necessary, and there is no contradiction in assuming 
that they can be false in some circumstances. This version of the replacement argument, 
thus, does not show that the qualitative character of the conscious phenomenal experiences 
logically  supervenes  on  the  property  of  instantiating  a  certain  functional  organization. 
However, it supports thesis (SN2): There is a set F of functional organizations such that the 
qualitative  character  of  the  conscious  phenomenal  experiences  of  a  physical  system 
supervenes naturally on the property of P of instantiating a member of set F. In this case,  
the relevant functional organization will be, again, the one instantiated by the brain at a 
neural level. 
Section 3 
Change of experience and the replacement thought experiment 
Van Heuveln  et al (1998) and Greenberg (1998) raise similar objections against this new 
version of the replacement scenario. The problem detected by them is that there seems to be 
an unjustified assumption concerning the identity of the subject whose brain suffers the 
replacement. According to their criticism, it is not possible to guarantee that there is one 
and the same individual before and after such replacement. It is perfectly possible to argue 
that the replacement process generates two different beings, each of them having its own 
phenomenal world. In such a case, it does not make sense to say that a single individual  
could have noticed a change in the qualitative character of the visual experiences, since the 
experiences before and after the replacement are owned by two different beings.  
The criticism made by Van Heuveln et al has two different parts: the first consists in 
showing that the dancing qualia argument is invalid: there is a gap in the argument that 
consists in that to say that a single physical system is able to experience and to report a 
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change in the qualitative properties of his visual experiences is not justified. As far as the 
argument is presented, it is perfectly possible to say that there are two different physical  
systems and that, even if they have different qualitative experiences, it does not mean that 
there is a single system able to experience this change. This gap makes the dancing qualia 
argument invalid. The second part consists in showing that this gap cannot be repaired. 
According to  Van Heuveln  et  al,  the  change in  the  qualitative  properties  of  the  visual 
experiences of the physical system cannot itself be experienced. Van Heuveln et al present 
two further arguments whose objective is to show that the argument cannot be fixed. As 
Chalmers presents the dancing qualia argument, there is an incompatibility between the 
claim  that  the  subject  –  in  our  case,  Zero-Paul–  is  able  to  notice  the  change  in  the 
qualitative character of his visual experiences, and the fact that his behaviour and all his 
cognitive states are preserved – by hypothesis – after the replacement. What Van Heuveln 
et al try to show is that it is perfectly possible to imagine a situation like the one envisaged 
by the replacement scenario of the dancing qualia argument in which there is a qualitative 
change but there is no clash or incompatibility with the behaviour and the cognitive states 
of the subject.
The claim made by Van Heuveln et al is that the replacement scenario on which this 
version of the thought experiment is based leaves an open gap that makes the argumentative 
strategy invalid. Remember that part of the strategy of the argument is to show that there is 
a clash between the Coherence Principle and the assumption that the qualitative character 
of the visual experiences of the subject change when the switch is moved from position o to 
position  a,  and  as  a  result,  there  is  a  change in  the  visual  experiences  of  the  subject. 
However, Van Heuveln et al claim there is no justified reason to think that the movement of 
the switch preserves a single individual able to perceive this change. When the switch is 
moved, there are two possible outcomes. The first consists is that when the switch is moved 
from position  o to position  a,  one and only one individual experiences a change in the 
qualitative character of his visual perceptions. The second is that flipping the switch marks 
a boundary between two different individuals whose conscious phenomenal experiences are 
distinct. Thus, it is perfectly possible to imagine that changing the position of the switch 
generates  different,  independent  individuals  having  their  own  conscious  phenomenal 
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experiences.  Furthermore,  the  fact  that  there are  in  fact  two different  physical  systems 
involved (they are not identical: one of them has ten per cent more artificial neurons than 
the  other)  seems to  justify  the  second outcome.  But  if  this  is  true,  there  would  be no 
problem in thinking that the qualitative character of the visual experiences is modified by 
moving the switch: since there is not a single individual, no one would notice a change in 
the  qualitative  character  of  the  visual  experiences,  and  thus,  there  will  not  be  any 
incompatibility between the Inverted Qualia hypothesis and the Coherence Principle. 
This same problem is also mentioned in Greenberg (1998). According to him, the 
assumption consists in that the system can meaningfully remember and compare qualitative 
conscious experiences, like the state of perceiving a red traffic signal when the switch is in 
position o and the subsequent state of perceiving a green traffic signal when the switch is in 
position a. The problem is the assumption that there is a unique physical system involved: 
when the position of the switch changes, we have a different physical brain.  Greenberg 
admits that the sense of personal identity may not change when the switch is moved. By the 
assumptions of the thought experiment, we know that the subject would not say that he 
perceived something that makes us think that his personal identity was modified. He would 
still report that he has a continuous temporal perception of a green field. Nonetheless, this 
does not assure us that these two brains – the one that works when the switch is in position 
o, and the one that works when the switch is in position a – could meaningfully compare 
their qualitative visual experiences. 
...  no  matter  what  the  size  of  the  switched  module,  there  are  still  two different  instantiations  of  
brain/minds in this thought experiment. It is certainly possible that the experienced sense of personal 
identity may not change: there might be a report of a continuous sense of self experienced between the 
two alternating instantiations, an interesting state of affairs in its own right (it should be noted that a 
continuous  experienced sense  of  self  associated  with  even  one  physically  instantiated  brain  is  an  
elaborated construct). However, it does not follow that the two brains would experience colour in the 
same way, or could meaningfully compare the qualitative experiences of one with the other (unless one 
already assumed the principle of organizational invariance).56
56   Greenberg, 1998, p. 55
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What Greenberg says is that that there is an unjustified assumption behind this version of 
the replacement scenario. The idea is that there is something like an “inner eye”, which 
binds  visual  experiences  together  and  can  make  sense  to  the  claim  that  these  visual 
experiences are perceived by a single self. 
The strategy adopted by Van Heuveln et al consists in arguing in favour of the idea 
that the replacement scenario can be viewed differently. Consider now how they reconstruct 
this scenario: if we remember the dancing qualia thought experiment that was examined in 
the second chapter of this thesis, there are two elements Ji and Jn that belong to the sequence 
of cases < J0, J1, J2, , … , Jn > such that the qualitative character of their visual experiences is 
different. These two elements are Zero-Paul and Ten-Paul. We also identified the region of 
the brain that makes Zero-Paul and Ten-Paul different physical systems, which is precisely 
the region that is composed by ten per cent more artificial neurons: the A region. The next 
step was to  imagine  that the  A region was installed in  Zero-Paul´s brain alongside the 
equivalent biological region, and that there was a switch that connects, alternatively, these 
two different regions to the rest of Zero-Paul's brain. 
The  point  of  Van  Heuveln  et  al is  that  there  are  two  clearly  different  physical 
systems when the switch is moved: again, they cannot be identical since one of them has 
ten  per  cent  more  artificial  neurons  than  the  other.  Lets  understand  the  expression 
“connected system” as denoting the physical system that is connected to the rest  of the 
brain. In this way, we will say that when the switch is in position O, the connected system 
is Zero-Paul, and when the switch is in position A the connected system is Ten-Paul. When 
Zero-Paul  is  the  connected  system,  the  reports  concerning  conscious  phenomenal 
experiences are sent by Zero-Paul, while the reports are being sent by Ten-Paul when it is  
the connected system. Once the scenario is described in this way, we might ask whether the 
new connected  system  experiences  a  change  of  experience  or  not  when  the  switch  is 
flipped. 
Imagine now that Zero-Paul is looking to the blue eyes of Linda McCartney in an 
old photograph. According to the reconstruction of the scenario proposed by Van Heuveln 
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et al, all the reports of conscious experiences are produced, at this moment, by Zero-Paul. 
Suppose now that the switch is moved: section O is disconnected and its place is taken by 
section A. From this moment, the reports of the experiences are sent by the new connected 
system, that is, by Ten-Paul. Assume now that the visual experiences of the new system, 
Ten-Paul,  which  is  situated  in  the  same  perceptual  circumstances  as  Zero-Paul,  are 
different. Thus, the new connected system is experiencing the colour of Linda´s eyes as 
yellowish. 
At this point, Van Heuveln et al formulate what they call the Crucial Question: when 
the switch is flipped, does the newly connected system experience any change? Remember 
that we have two different physical systems with the same functional organization: Zero-
Paul and Ten-Paul. The question is whether one of these systems will experience a change 
when the position of the switch is modified. Since Van Heuveln et al understand Chalmer's 
argument as a reductio, they claim that, in order to formulate the reductio hypothesis, the 
answer to the Crucial Question should be positive. 
The  Crucial  Question  provides  us  with  an  objective,  safe,  non-suggestive,  and  neutral  question, 
because it is phrased in a way we can all agree on: It asks whether any of the two involved systems, 
having an identical functional organization but a different physical realization, will experience any 
change when the switch  is  flipped.  […] In  order  for  the  dancing qualia  argument to  go through. 
Chalmers must answer the Crucial Question 'Yes'. 57
What Van Heuveln et al are claiming is that there is no guarantee that this experience 
of  change happened.  When the  switch  is  moved and Ten-Paul  becomes  the  connected 
system, we can perfectly imagine that this new connected system has visual experiences 
completely different from the ones had by Zero-Paul without assuming that this change of 
visual experiences was itself experienced as a change.
The step from the change of experience to the experience of change is a non-trivial one and needs to be  
argued for. The gap in Chalmers’ argument is that no such argument is being made. Instead, Chalmers 
do not notice the step, and simply equates the two. He thus makes an equivocation fallacy between a 
57   Van Heuveln et al, (1998, p. 243) 
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change in experience between two systems and  a system’s experience of change,  or between  some 
experiencing changing between two systems and some system experiencing change.58
That there is a change in experience is, for Van Heuvelnt et al, uncontroversial. When 
the switch is flipped, there is a new connected system, Ten-Paul, whose visual experiences 
are inverted with respect to those of the former connected system, Zero-Paul. But a change 
in experience does not imply that any of these two systems had an experience of change. 
… in the thought experiment, the two systems alternate interacting with the same envoronment and  
share a lot of physical material. Thus one is being lured in to thinking that the change of experience  
equals an experience of change. However, just because some system's experiences differs from that of 
some other system does not mean that that system (or any system) experiences this difference. 59
These are, in general terms, the reasons that Van Heuveln et al offer in favour of the claim 
that the dancing qualia argument is invalid. 
Of course, that there are two physical systems does not need to be in conflict with 
the claim that there is only one individual. Paul is the same individual he was when he was 
five years old. Nonetheless, it is clear that Paul at five and Paul at sixty-four are different 
physical  systems:  the matter that constitutes his  body is  continuously renovated.  In the 
same way, Zero-Paul is physically different from the being that results from flipping the 
switch to the E position.
A first problem with Van Heuveln et al objections consists in that it is doubtful that 
the replacement of a single module in the brain suffices for destroying the personal identity 
of the subject. It is true that Van Heuveln et al refuse to board the problem in terms of the 
notion of an individual. Nonetheless, we may perfectly ask whether such replacement has 
such catastrophic effect in the personal identity of the subject. After all, we can perfectly 
imagine the existence of an artificial device performing the function of some brain regions 
58   Van Heuveln et al, (1998, p. 244)
59   Van Heuveln et al, (1998, p. 244) 
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without altering the personal identity of the subject. Greenberg also mentions that there are 
two different “brain preparations” involved in the replacement scenario. When the switch is 
moved, the perceived sense of psychological continuity may not be disturbed: Zero-Paul 
did not notice anything wrong with respect to his memories. Van Heuveln et al warn against 
evaluating their objections to the dancing qualia argument in terms of the criteria that make 
an individual an individual, and suggest that this might not be the wisest strategy. Although 
they do not make this point explicit, the argument of Van Heuveln et al against the dancing 
qualia argument can be perfectly understood without the claim that there are two different 
individuals involved. 
Before presenting the first argument offered by Van Heuveln et al, it is important to 
mention that they adopt the following assumption: according to them, “It is plausible to 
assume that a system can only experience a change in his visual experiences through some 
recollection of previous visual experiences”60. As we will see, at least concerning visual 
experiences, this assumption is false. In the next section, I will present a version of the 
replacement  thought  experiment  (presented originally  by Zuboff  in  (1994))  that  clearly 
illustrates a situation in which a change of the visual experiences of the subject does not 
involve any previous memories of such experiences. But leaving aside this assumption for a 
moment,  Van  Heuvlen  et  al suggest  that  there  are  at  least  two  ways  in  which  the 
recollection of visual experiences can be conceived. The first way is to imagine that the 
memories of past visual experiences had by Zero-Paul and Ten-Paul, together with their 
qualitative character, are stored in some part of the brain that functions like a databank. 
Recollection can be understood as a process in which memories of these visual experiences 
are picked up from this databank and then used for comparing the qualitative character of 
current visual experiences. In this way, it may be possible to notice the difference required 
by the dancing qualia argument and to answer “Yes” to the crucial question. 
The second option proposed by Van Heuveln  et  al consists in that the process of 
recollecting  past  experiences  uses  the  same  psychological  mechanisms  required  for 
generating the original visual experience. Furthermore, these mechanisms are part of the 
60  Van Heuveln et al (1998, p. 245) 
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region of the brain that is replaced in the dancing qualia thought experiment (that is, the 
neurons located in the visual cortex), since it is precisely because this part is replaced that 
the qualitative experiences of Zero-Paul and Ten-Paul are supposed to be different. Note 
that, if this were true, not only the qualitative character of the current visual experiences 
would be dependent on the physical nature of this region: this dependence would also affect 
the qualitative character of the past visual experiences recollected by the subject. 
On our view, recollecting visual experiences involves the use of some of the same mechanisms that are 
also involved when having current visual experiences. Moreover, these mechanisms with which the 
visual experiences are associated are, by the thought experiment,  assumed to be part of the visual  
cortex. Therefore, the qualitative nature of these recollected visual experiences are just as dependent on  
the physical nature of the visual cortex in use as the qualitative nature of current visual experiences.61
Thus, it is perfectly possible to imagine that the qualitative character of Zero-Paul and  
Ten-Paul  visual  experiences  is  different:  Zero-Paul  may  perfectly  have  green  visual 
experiences  when  he  is  looking  Granny  Smith  apples,  or  blue  experiences  of  a  deep 
summer sky, while Ten-Paul, who shares the same functional organization, has red visual 
experiences under the same circumstances. Nonetheless, neither of them would be aware of 
any change concerning the qualitative character of these experiences. The reason is  not 
because there is a clash with the Coherence Principle, but simply because their recollections 
are generated by the same mechanisms that generate their current visual experiences. Zero-
Paul  would  not  only  experience  green  Granny  Smith  apples  and  red  strawberries:  his 
recollections of past visual experiences would also be of green apples and red strawberries. 
In contrast, Ten-Paul recollections of past visual experiences would be of red Granny smith 
apples and green strawberries,  which have the same qualitative character as his  current 
visual experiences. Consequently, Zero-Paul will not notice any change when the switch is 
flipped. The argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
(Premise 1) Recollecting visual experiences involves the use of some of the same mechanisms that are 
also involved when having current visual experiences. 
61  Vah Heuveln et al, (1998, p. 246) 
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(Premise 2) These mechanisms are assumed to be part of the visual cortex. 
(Conclusion 1) The qualitative nature of these recollected visual experiences is just as dependent on 
the physical nature of the visual cortex in use as the qualitative nature of current visual experiences. 
(Premise  3)  Although the qualitative  nature  of  the experiences  may be different between the  two 
systems, the qualitative nature of the experiences that Zero-Paul remembers is similar to the qualitative  
nature of the experiences that Zero-Paul is having now. 
(Conclusion 2) Zero-Paul will not experience any change in his visual experiences, and the fact that he 
reports no change in his visual experiences will not be surprising. 62
The  second  argument  presented  by  Van  Heuveln  et  al is  based  on  a  further 
modification of the replacement scenario of the original thought experiment presented by 
Chalmers. Van Heuveln et al make the two following claims about this scenario: the first is 
that it is similar enough to the one presented in the dancing qualia argument for validating 
the same responses to all the relevant questions. The second is that it is different enough for 
allowing  the  reader  to  avoid  the  mistaken  conclusions  motivated  by  the  way  that  the 
replacement  scenario  of  the  original  argument  was  described.  The  modification  of  the 
replacement scenario proposed by Van Heuveln et al has two features: 
(1) The first  is  that  it  is  not  only a  small  percentage  of the brain that  is  replaced (for 
instance, the replacement part is made not only in the part of the brain responsible for the 
processing of visual experiences and the memories we have of them). Instead, the whole 
brain is substituted by a physical system with the same functional organization but made 
entirely of artificial neurons. 
(2)  The  second  feature  is  that  the  original  biological  brain  is  not  preserved  after  the 
replacement. In contrast to the original replacement on which the dancing qualia argument 
is based, when a button is pressed the original brain gets destroyed and the artificial brain 
now occupies its place. 
62  Cf. Van Heuveln et al, (1998, p. 246) 
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Suppose now – as in the original replacement scenario – that the biological brain 
and the artificial brain differ in that they give rise to different qualitative visual experiences:  
a being with the biological brain would have a green experience when he looks the field in 
the park, while a being with the artificial brain would have a red experience in the same 
circumstances. When the switch is flipped, we will have a being that is almost identical to 
Paul. It has his same functional organization and behaves like him. The question is, does he 
notices a change in experience? According to Van Heuven et al, the answer is no. We can 
even imagine that each time the button is pressed  a new brain functionally equivalent to the 
former one  is  created.  This  makes  the  existence  of  the  new artificial  brain completely 
independent of the previous existence of the biological brain. Thus, just because there was a 
biological brain before the button was pressed does not mean that the individual that has the  
new artificial brain notices a change in the qualitative character of his visual experiences. 
The  replacement  scenario  envisaged  by  Van  Heuveln  et  al can  have  a  further 
modification: we may assume that it is not only the biological brain that gets destroyed 
when the button is  pressed, but Paul´s entire body. After the button is  pressed, a being 
almost identical to Paul – with the only difference that it possesses an artificial brain – is 
created in the same place formerly occupied by him. As before, the functional organization 
of this new being is identical to Paul´s. They would also behave identically under the same 
circumstances. 
Section 4 
Visual memories and the replacement of the visual cortex 
It  is  evident  that  the  replacement  of  the  whole  brain  of  the  subject  by  a  functionally 
isomorphic artificial one does not warrant the preservation of the same individual. This is 
precisely what the modification of the thought experiment proposed by Van Heuveln et al 
shows. But the thought experiment offered by Chalmers clearly involves the replacement of 
a relatively smaller area of the brain. Remember that  the justification for considering a 
replacement involving only ten per cent of the organic brain was that a change between the 
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visual experiences of Paul and the qualitatively inverted experiences of F-Paul could not be 
reached by ten unnoticeable changes. Thus, if the inverted qualia hypothesis were true, two 
members  of  the  replacement  sequence  like  Zero-Paul  and  Ten-Paul  (whose  respective 
brains differ in that one of them is composed by ten per cent more artificial neurons) would 
exhibit a noticeable difference in the qualitative character of their visual experiences. Since 
the replaced part of the brain is relatively small, it seems very dubious that a replacement 
like the one described marks the boundary between two different individuals. Of course, 
Van Heuveln et al insist that their argument does not rely on the fact that the replacement 
brings with it the generation of a new individual. Instead, they argue that recollecting visual 
experiences involves the use of some of the same mechanisms that are also involved in the 
production  of  these  visual  experiences.  Thus,  if  these  mechanisms were  replaced  by a 
system  with  different  physical  properties  (like  an  artificial  visual  cortex)  there  is  no 
guarantee that this system preserves these memories. So, that the subject does not notice 
any change in the quality of his visual experiences is perfectly explained by the fact that he 
does not perceive any difference between his current visual experiences and his memories. 
Nonetheless, there is an empirical fact that challenges the idea that the destruction 
or  replacement  of  the  mechanisms  that  generate  visual  experiences  brings  with  it  the 
destruction of the visual memories of the subject. Cortical blindness is the total or partial 
elimination  of  vision  generated  by  damage  to  the  visual  cortex.  If  the  generation  of 
memories concerning the qualitative character of visual experiences were so dependent on 
the visual cortex, we would expect that patients that exhibit cortical blindness reported the 
loss of some of their  visual memories. However, this is not normally the case.  Patients 
suffering from cortical blindness may report a loss of their visual abilities, but they simply 
do not say that they forgot the colour of a red apple, or the blue colour of the summer sky. It  
might be true that the visual cortex plays a certain role in the ability of recollecting past  
visual experiences, but it is clear that the elimination of this region of the brain does not 
necessarily brings with it the loss of this ability.  
Second, the assumption that a system can only experience a change in his visual 
experiences through some recollection of previous visual experiences is not justified. It is 
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perfectly  possible  to  compare  a  change  concerning  our  visual  experiences  without 
comparing  them  with  previous  memories  of  these  experiences.  The  version  of  the 
replacement argument that is presented by Zuboff in (1994) clearly illustrates this point. 
This version shares some elements of the one presented in the preceding section, but there 
is a difference whose importance will be clear at the moment of evaluating the objections 
against  the  replacement  strategy.  The  version  of  the  replacement  thought  experiment 
presented by Zuboff is also similar to the version he offers against the hypothesis of absent 
qualia. In particular, Zuboff adopts a coarser level of functional organization compared to 
the neural level adopted by the version that has been presented in this chapter. This level 
can be identified with the functional organization instantiated by the brain at the level of 
those parts of the brain associated to a determinate mental function. 
As it is known, the visual cortex has two separate regions located in each of the two 
hemispheres of the brain. The left visual cortex processes visual signals that proceed from 
the right visual field, while the signals that have their origin in the left visual field are 
processed by the right visual cortex. Imagine now that during the replacement process the 
left side of Paul McCartney's visual cortex is removed and in its place is installed a gadget 
that has the same causal relationships that this side had with respect to the rest of Paul 
McCartney's brain. It is important to remember that the way the gadget works and produces 
electrochemical signals might be completely different from the way that the original side of 
the visual cortex works. Perhaps the easiest way for imagining the replacing gadget might 
be to conceiving it as composed by artificial neurons, in such a way that it is functionally 
equivalent,  at  the neural  level,  to  the left  side of  Paul  McCartney's  visual  cortex.  This 
option may coincide with the way that the replacement process has been imagined along 
this chapter. This, however, is not necessary: although the gadget still needs to preserve all 
the relevant causal relationships that the original part had with respect to the rest of the 
brain and to produce the adequate electrochemical signals, it might do it in a completely 
different  way. It  may be,  for instance,  an artificial  organ made out of plastic parts and 
silicon  chips,  and  that  has  an  internal  “factory”  for  producing  the  adequate  chemical 
neurotransmitters, which will be sent to those biological neurons connected to the gadget. It 
can also be imagined as a small space in the brain in which a number of homunculi perform 
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several calculations that allow them to generate signals that, after being transformed into 
appropriate  chemical  impulses,  duplicate  the  way  in  which  the  left  side  of  Paul 
McCartney's visual cortex works. 
The key for arguing against the scenario depicted by the reductio hypothesis is that 
only the left side of Paul McCartney's brain was replaced by an artificial gadget, while the 
right organic side was left in its original place. If the inverted qualia hypothesis were true, 
Paul  would  find  himself  in  a  very  odd  situation:  since  his  left  visual  cortex  was  not 
modified by the replacement process, all the experiences situated in his right visual field – 
controlled by the organic left side of his visual cortex – would be exactly as before: he will 
notice nothing strange or different. In contrast, the visual experiences in his left visual field, 
controlled now by the artificial right side of his visual cortex, will appear inverted with 
respect to his normal colour experiences. 
Suppose that the scientists decided to stop the replacement operation at this point. 
They send Paul home and ask him to return the next day for resuming the process. When 
Paul leaves the hospital, he notices that the colour of most London buses appears red in his 
right visual field, that the colour of the sky is blue, and the foliage of most trees in the street 
is green. But the world would appear very different in his left visual field: the buses would 
appear green, the sky yellow and the leaves of an oak tree red. 
… our  gadget  replacement  was of  only  the  left  half  of  the  visual  cortex.  So  if  this  replacement 
somehow resulted in an inversion or absence of qualia in the vision processed by the gadget, this 
inversion or absence on the right side of vision would clash with the necessarily unchanged qualia of  
visual memories and associations, as well as with the unchanged qualia of the other side of the visual  
field.  Such  a  clash  would  make  it  absurd,  in  the  now  familiar  way,  that  the  pattern  of  mental 
functioning could not be reflecting a clash. So qualia inversion or absence cannot be what is happening 
in the gadget replacement. The experience must simply be the same.63 
The argument can be presented as follows: if the qualitative character of the visual 
experiences of Paul McCartney were inverted after the replacement process, then only the 
63  Zuboff (1994, pp. 187-188)
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experiences concerning the left side of the visual field would have been modified (since GV 
replaced only the right side of the Visual Cortex). But if the experiences in the left side of 
the visual field were modified, then there would be a clash with respect to the unchanged 
experiences of the right side of the visual field (since the replacement process did not touch 
the left Visual Cortex). Now, if there is a clash between the experiences of the left and right 
visual fields, then this has to be reflected in the behaviour, and in general, in the beliefs,  
desires and other mental states concerning these visual experiences. By assumption of the 
replacement scenario, the subject's behaviour would not have been different from the one 
he would have exhibited in case that his visual cortex had not been replaced by gadget GV, 
so his behaviour could not have reflected the clash. Therefore, the qualitative character of 
the visual experiences of Paul McCartney cannot have been inverted after the replacement 
process. 
What is precisely the nature of the clash mentioned by Zuboff? If the replacement of 
the  right  side  of  his  visual  cortex  had  produced  an  inversion  of  his  qualitative  visual 
experiences, such inversion would have affected only the experiences  of his  left  visual 
field. Now, by assumption of the replacement process, the left side of his visual cortex did 
not suffer any alteration,  so the visual experiences in his right visual field – which are 
processed  by  the  left  visual  cortex-  are  not  modified  either.  If  we  assume  that  the 
replacement produced such inversion of qualia, then Paul McCartney would indeed be in a 
very  odd  situation:  he  would  notice  an  obvious  discordance  concerning  his  visual 
experiences, and this would have left him extremely amazed. 
But of course, we know that such change would not have affected Paul McCartney's 
behaviour. If we asked him “Hey, Paul, do you notice something odd with your sight?” he 
would answer negatively (if he wanted to give a sincere answer, of course). We know the 
reason:  the gadget  preserved the same causal  relations to  the rest  of  his  brain that  the 
original half of the visual cortex had, and thus, his behaviour could not have been modified 
by the replacement. This contradicts the idea that the clash between the visual experiences 
of Paul McCartney's left and right visual field had to be reflected in his behaviour, and thus, 
it is not possible that the gadget produced an inversion of his visual qualitative experiences. 
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 Notice that there is a difference with the replacement process described in the last 
section. In the version of the thought experiment examined before, the visual experiences of  
Paul  change  when  the  switch  is  moved  from position  a to  position o and  vice  versa 
(assuming, of course, that the inverted qualia hypothesis is true). In this case, the change in 
the visual experiences would be experienced temporally. Paul could not perceive that there 
is something odd with his visual perceptions at the same moment. However, in the case of 
the thought experiment proposed by Zuboff, the change in the visual experiences of Paul 
would be experienced spatially: if the hypothesis of inverted qualia were true, Paul would 
notice a contrast between the visual experiences of his right and his left visual field. 
Conclusions 
In the  last  section of this  chapter,  I  presented three main reasons for showing that  the  
objections  presented  by  Van  Heuveln  et  al against  the  dancing  qualia  version  of  the 
replacement thought experiment ultimately fail. Remember that according to the objection 
raised by Van Heuveln  et al, it is not possible to be sure that there is one and the same 
individual before and after the switch is moved from position o to position a. It is perfectly 
possible to argue that the movement of the switch generates two different beings, each of 
them having its own phenomenal world. In such a case, it does not make sense to say that a 
single individual  could have noticed a change in the qualitative character  of the visual 
experiences,  since  the  experiences  before  and after  the  replacement  are  owned  by two 
different beings.  
Against  this  claim,  it  was  argued  that  the  dancing  qualia  thought  experiment 
presented  by  Chalmers  involves  a  relatively  small  area  of  the  brain.  It  is  true  that  a 
replacement process like the one imagined by Van Heuvlen  et al would not preserve the 
identity  of the subject,  but remember that this process involved the whole brain of the 
individual  and  not  a  small  part.  As  we  have  seen,  in  order  to  assume  that  there  is  a  
noticeable difference between the qualitative experiences of two isomorphic beings, it is 
not necessary to conceive a difference that involves the replacement of more than ten per 
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cent of the brain. Thus, if the dancing qualia argument adopts this assumption, it is unlikely 
that the replacement of this part generates two different individuals. 
Van Heuveln et al also argue that the process by which a subject recollects previous 
visual experiences involves the same mechanisms that generate these experiences. But if 
this were true, it would be possible to imagine that both the qualitative character of the 
current  visual  experiences  of  the  subject  and  the  qualitative  character  of  his  visual 
experiences depended on the physical nature of the visual cortex. So, it would be perfectly 
possible to imagine that the qualitative character of the visual experiences of Zero-Paul and 
Ten-Paul are different,  and thus, that Zero-Paul would not notice any change when the 
switch is moved. 
Against this claim, I have argued that if the visual memories of an individual were 
so dependent on the visual cortex, patients that exhibit cortical blindness would lose most 
of their visual memories. But as we have seen, this is not normally the case. Patients whose 
visual cortex is damaged may lose their visual abilities. However, they do not normally 
forget the qualitative character of their previous visual experiences. 
Finally, I have argued against the assumption that a system can only experience a 
change  in  his  current  visual  experiences  by  recollecting  previous  visual  experiences. 
Remember that Zuboff conceives a replacement of only the right side of the visual cortex. 
If we assume that the replacement does not preserve exactly the same visual experiences 
than the ones generated by the organic visual cortex, then the subject will notice a contrast 
in his visual field. The left visual field will be as always, while the right visual field (which 
is controlled by the right visual cortex) will exhibit a colour inversion with respect to the 
other field. Nonetheless, and due to the fact that the gadget that replaces the right visual 
cortex is sending exactly the same signals to the rest of the brain, the behaviour of the 
subject, together with his beliefs, memories and other cognitive states, will not exhibit a 
change.  Notice  again  that  in  this  case  the  change  of  visual  experiences  would  be 
experienced spatially and not temporally. 
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CHAPTER 5
The interchange version of the replacement thought experiment  
Introduction 
Remember again the objectives of the two different versions of the replacement thought 
experiment that were presented in the first chapters of this thesis. 
(NSS) There is a set of functional organizations F such that the capacity of a physical system P of  
generating conscious phenomenal experiences naturally strongly supervenes on the property of P of 
instantiating a member of set F. 
(NSS2) There is a set F of functional organizations such that the qualitative character of the conscious  
phenomenal experiences of a physical system naturally strongly supervenes on the property of P of 
instantiating a member of set F. 
Now, if thesis (NSS) is true, then the absent qualia hypothesis is naturally false. What 
the version of the replacement thought experiment presented in the second chapter of the 
thesis  shows  is  the  following:  there  is  at  least  one  functional  organization  (i.e.,  the 
functional organization of the brain of a conscious person at a neural level) such that its 
implementation by a  physical  system is  a  sufficient  condition for  generating conscious 
phenomenal experiences. Similarly, if thesis (NSS2) is true, the inverted qualia hypothesis is 
naturally false. The version of the thought experiment presented in the third chapter of the 
thesis  shows  that  the  implementation  of  the  functional  organization  of  the  brain  of  a 
conscious person at the neural level is a sufficient condition for the generation of the same 
qualitative experiences generated by the brain of this person. 
The  objective  of  the  thought  experiment  that  I  will  discuss  and  evaluate  in  this 
chapter, which is originally presented by Tye in (2006), is more ambitious. Its goal is to 
show  that  the  absent  qualia  hypothesis  is  not  only  nomically  (or  empirically)  false: 
according to  Tye,  it  is  conceptually  impossible  for a  being who is  a complete  psycho-
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functional isomorph of a normal human to lack phenomenal consciousness. As such, I will 
present it as supporting thesis (LSS): 
(LSS) There is a set of functional organizations F such that the capacity of a physical system P of  
generating  conscious  phenomenal  experiences  supervenes  logically  on  the  property  of  P  of 
instantiating a member of set F. 
Tye formulates the absent qualia hypothesis as posing an objection to functionalism, 
and more precisely, as an objection to a functionalist account of phenomenal consciousness. 
Tye states the absent qualia hypothesis as follows: “... it could be the case that a system that 
functionally  duplicates  the  mental  states  of  a  normal  human being has  no  phenomenal 
consciousness (no qualia).”64 Tye suggests that the current orthodox position in philosophy 
of mind is to accept the claim that absent qualia are conceptually possible. In the actual 
world,  the  laws  of  nature  simply  do  not  allow  mental  differences  between  functional 
duplicates. However, there might be possible worlds where the laws of nature are different, 
and it might be the case that in some of them functional duplication does not suffice for  
mental  duplication.  Thus,  from the  fact  that  two individuals  share  the  same functional 
organization does not logically follow that both of them share the capacity of experiencing 
conscious phenomenal states. 
Current orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind has it that absent qualia are at least conceptually possible.  
This is the view of all dualists about phenomenal consciousness and many materialists. I have come to  
think that orthodoxy is wrong. Proper and full a priori reflection upon the putative case of absent 
qualia demonstrates that they are impossible.65
An important characteristic of this version of the thought experiment that it is aimed 
to  show that  the  claim  that  functional  isomorphs  do  not  share  the  capacity  of  having 
conscious phenomenal states is contradictory, and thus, that the negation of this claim is a 
necessary thesis. This contrasts with the version of the replacement thought experiment 
proposed in the second chapter of this thesis. The arguments derived from this version of 
64  Tye (2006, p. 140) 
65  Tye (2006, p. 140) 
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the thought experiment explicitly support the thesis that functional twins share the capacity 
of experiencing conscious phenomenal states in all worlds that  share the same physical 
laws.  In  contrast,  Tye  thinks  that  functional  duplication  guarantees  the  presence  of 
phenomenal consciousness in all logical possible worlds 
... if absent qualia are conceptually impossible, then there cannot be a world that is physically just like 
the actual world in all respects and thus that contains creatures who are microphysical duplicates of  
normal human beings, where these creatures lack phenomenal consciousness. 66
In the first section of this chapter I will  define a being that is a psychofunctional 
duplicate of Paul McCartney, in the sense that the internal states of this being have the same  
causal roles that the internal states of Paul have with respect to other internal states and to 
inputs and outputs. The internal states of this being (which I call “A-Paul”) will contrast 
with the internal states of Paul in that they are phenomenally inert. That a being like A-Paul 
is conceivable will constitute the reductio hypothesis adopted by this new variation of the 
replacement thought experiment. 
In the second section of this chapter, I will present principle (P), as well as Tye´s 
assumption that a being that shares the same psychofucntional organization of a conscious 
being is  capable of  having beliefs,  desires and other  cognitive  states.  In this  section,  I 
discuss a thought experiment that shows that a system can behave in an intelligent fashion, 
but whose internal configuration indicates that it does not have intelligence at all. I argue, 
however, that the system described by Block is different from a functional duplicate of a 
conscious being. In contrast with the internal states of the system described by Block, a 
system  like  A-Paul  exhibits  the  same  causal  relations  with  inputs,  outputs  and 
corresponding internal states of the internal states of Paul. 
In  the  third section  of  this  chapter,  I  will  present  the  interchange  version  of  the 
replacement  thought  experiment.  Tye´s  strategy  begins  by  assuming,  as  a  reductio 
hypothesis, that the thesis of absent qualia is conceivable. Thus, it would be possible to 
66  Tye (2006, p. 163) 
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conceive the existence of a system S' that is the functional duplicate of a conscious being S 
but whose internal states are phenomenally inert.  Tye´s thought experiment consists in a 
partial interchange of the phenomenal states of being S with the non-phenomenal states of 
an isomorphic being S'. This interchange, however, will preserve the memories of each of 
these  beings.  The  outcome  of  the  process  will  be  that  the  cognitive  reaction  to  this 
interchange exhibited by S and S' will  be different: S will  think that he lost something 
valuable, namely, his conscious phenomenal states. In contrast, S' will think that he gained 
something of value. This difference concerning the cognitive reaction to the interchange 
contradicts a principle conceived by Tye as necessary: 
(P) Necessarily, if family F of mental states in being S has members that are one-to-one functionally 
isomorphic with the members of family F' of mental states in being S', where S and S' are themselves 
psycho-functional  duplicates,  then  exchanging  the  two  families  preserves  psycho-functional 
duplication
Now,  if  the  cognitive  reactions  of  S  and  S'  are  different,  then  they  cannot  be 
functionally  isomorphic  after  the  interchange  of  their  respective  phenomenal  and  non-
phenomenal  states.  This,  however,  is  inconsistent  with  principle  (P).  From  this,  Tye 
concludes that a being like S' is not conceivable, and thus, that the absent qualia hypothesis 
is logically false. 
In the fourth section of this chapter, I will evaluate an objection presented originally 
by Van Gulick in (2012) whose objective is to show that the contradiction suggested by Tye 
does not arise. Van Gulick challenges principle (P) by arguing, first, that the existence of a 
being like A-Paul does not imply the possibility of a partial exchange between his non-
phenomenal states and the phenomenal states of Paul. Second, Van Gulick argues that, even 
if we accept that such exchange is possible, it does not guarantee the preservation of the 
functional equivalence between Paul and A-Paul. If this is true, the  reductio strategy of 
adopted by Tye is blocked: the resulting systems will exhibit a different cognitive reaction 
to the interchange process, but since principle (P) is not true, the contradiction suggested by 
Tye does not arise. 
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Finally, in the fifth section of this chapter, I present a strategy whose objective is to 
show that  two  beings  that  are  psychofunctional  duplicates,  like  Paul  and  A-Paul,  can 
interchange their respective phenomenal and non-phenomenal states in spite of Van Gulick 
objections. However, I consider that this proposal ultimately fails. The general conclusion 
of this chapter is that the interchange version of the replacement thought experiment does 
not  ultimately  show  that  assuming  the  existence  of  a  being  like  A-Paul  leads  to  a 
contradiction. Thus, the thought experiment does not adequately show that the thesis of 
absent qualia is logically false, and it does not give an adequate support to thesis (LSS). It 
is important to notice that my claim is not that thesis (LSS) is false: there might be other 
ways of arguing in favour of the claim that phenomenal experiences logically supervene on 
the property of instantiating a determinate functional organization. My claim is that this 




The  argumentative  strategy  adopted  by  this  new  version  of  the  replacement  thought 
experiment will be better understood if we consider a case very similar to the one illustrated  
by Paul and his functional duplicate, F-Paul. Remember that, as it was defined before, Paul 
and F-Paul are almost physically identical, with the difference that, instead of an organic 
brain, F-Paul possesses an artificial brain that shares the functional organization of Paul´s 
organic brain at  the neural  level.  Whether F-Paul had the capacity of having conscious 
phenomenal experiences or not was an open question. In this new case, however, Paul´s 
functional  duplicate  will  be  explicitly  defined  as  lacking  this  capacity.  In  order  to 
differentiate between these cases, this functional duplicate will be called A-Paul. 
The functional isomorphism between Paul and A-Paul will be defined in a different 
fashion, which can be understood with the help of a strategy that was originally proposed 
by Lewis in (1972) and that has become a standard definition of functionalism. Briefly, the 
proposal says that a mental state S – a belief, a desire, or a conscious phenomenal state – 
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can be defined as occupying a certain causal role or function with respect to a number of 
other  mental  states,  together  with  inputs  in  the  form  of  sensory  stimuli  and  outputs 
consisting in behavioural responses.
The  method  proposed  by  Lewis  starts  by  enumerating  a  number  of  platitudes 
concerning  the  causal  relations  that  exist  among  perceptual  stimuli,  mental  states  and 
behavioural responses. We may think that these platitudes take the form of a sentence like 
the following: when an individual is in a certain mental state and receiving such and such 
perceptual stimuli, this causes (with certain probability) this individual to go to such and 
such mental states and to produce such and such behavioural response. These platitudes 
may  include  causal  generalizations  concerning  a  mental  state  S.  These  generalizations 
establish the several relations that S has with other mental states, and with the inputs and 
outputs received and produced by the system to which  S belongs. As an initial example, 
consider the following schematic functional definition of pain: pain tends to be produced by  
bodily damage, and tends to generate the belief that the body has been wounded, as well as 
a sensation of anxiety, fear and the desire of being out of that state, which in turn produces 
a behavioural response that can take the form of wincing or moaning. 
Suppose that the mental state in question is the one that Paul is in when he smells a 
piece of Limburger cheese, and call it state  SCH. Among the several causal generalizations 
related to state SCH are, for instance, that state SCH tends to be produced by smelling a piece 
of Limburger cheese, that state SCH tends to produce in Paul the memory of having eaten in 
a restaurant, that state SCH  tends to produce in Paul the desire of eating Limburger cheese, 
that state SCH tends to produce in Paul a smile, and so on. Suppose now that there is a theory 
T  composed  by  sentences  expressing  all  these  generalizations,  which  can  be  put  in 
conjunction to form sentence T below (where each Sj  denotes the names of other mental 
states, and each Ij, Oj specify the inputs and outputs received and produced, respectively, by 
the system to which SCH belongs). 
T (S1 … Sn, I1 … Ik, O1 … Om) 
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The next step is to replace each state-name S1 … Sn by a corresponding variable, and to 
bind each of these variables by an existential quantifier. The resulting sentence 
(RT) ∃x1 … ∃xn T (x1 … xn, I1 … Ik, O1 … Om) 
is known as the Ramsey sentence of theory T. Sentence  (RT) offers  the conditions under 
which Paul can be said to be in state  SCH  (where  xCH is the variable replacing the name 
“SCH”): 
Paul is in mental state SCH if and only if ∃x1 … ∃xn [T (x1 … xn, I1 … Ik, O1 … Om) & 
Paul has mental state xCH].
The  definition  of  a  mental  state  in  terms  of  Ramsey sentences  makes  it  easy  to 
understand the idea that two mental states can be psycho-functional isomorphs. Two mental 
states are functionally equivalent in case they satisfy the same Ramsey sentence, that is, in 
case the relations they have with certain mental states, inputs and outputs are identical. 
Imagine,  for  instance,  that  for  each  mental  state  Si had by Paul  McCartney,  there  is  a 
corresponding state S′ i had by A-Paul.  In this case, the physical composition of A-Paul 
does  not  need  to  be  specified:  he  can  be  made  out  of  microscopical  computers,  tiny 
homunculi  or  almost  any  other  material.  To  say  that  Paul  McCartney  and  A-Paul  are 
psycho-functional  isomorphs,  it  is  necessary  that,  for  each  mental  state  Si satisfying  a 
condition of the form 
Paul McCartney is in state Si if and only if ∃x1 …  ∃xn [T (x1 … xn, I1 … Ik, O1 … Om) 
& Paul McCartney has state x′ i].
(where  xi is the variable that replaces the name  Si) there is also a mental state  S′ i that 
satisfies the condition  
A-Paul is in state S′ i if and only if ∃x′ 1 …  ∃x′ n [T (x′ 1 … x′ n, I1 … Ik, O1 … 
Om) & A-Paul has state x′ i].
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(where x′ i is the variable that replaces the name S′ i). Thus, mental states Si and S′ i are 
psycho-functional isomorphs in case they have the same relations with other mental states, 
inputs and outputs. Also, two beings A and B (like Paul and A-Paul) are psycho-functional 
isomorphs if all mental states in A have a corresponding mental state in B that has the same 
relations with other mental states, inputs and outputs, and vice versa. 
Section 2 
Intelligent beings
The thought experiment that will be presented in this section describes a process in which 
the conscious phenomenal states of Paul are interchanged with the phenomenally sterile, 
but  functionally  equivalent  states  of  A-Paul.  The  interchange  process  is  conceived  as 
preserving the phenomenal memories of Paul McCartney, as well as the non-phenomenal 
memories of A-Paul (if any). The strategy proposed by Tye is to show that this hypothesis 
leads to a contradiction that will arise as follows: after the interchange of internal states, the 
cognitive reactions exhibited by Paul McCartney and A-Paul will be different. One of them 
will  think that he lost  something that  he greatly appreciated (his conscious phenomenal 
states)  while the other,  in contrast,  will  think that  he won something valuable after the 
interchange (that is, the conscious phenomenal states of his functional twin). But if this 
cognitive reaction with respect to the outcome of the interchange process differs in such a 
way,  then  they  cannot  be  functionally  equivalent  after  this  process.  This,  however,  is 
inconsistent with a principle that, according to Tye, is both a priori and necessary.  
(P) Necessarily, if family F of mental states in being S has members that are one-to-
one functionally isomorphic with the members of family F' of mental states in being 
S', where S and S' are themselves psycho-functional duplicates, then exchanging the 
two families preserves psycho-functional duplication.67 
67 Tye (2006, p. 153) 
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Remember that Tye’s objective is not only to show that the absent qualia hypothesis is 
in fact false. According to Tye, it is conceptually impossible that two functional duplicates 
– like Paul McCartney and A-Paul – differ in that one of them has conscious phenomenal 
experiences  while  the  other  does  not.  If  the  arguments  that  will  be  shown in the  next 
paragraphs  are  sound,  the  absent  qualia  hypothesis  is  conceptually  false:  it  involves  a 
logical contradiction. In particular, the argument will show that assuming the existence of a 
psychofunctional duplicate that lacks conscious phenomenal states is logically inconsistent 
with principle (P). 
Tye assumes the existence of a division between the cognitive and the phenomenal 
aspects of the mind, and suggest that the phenomenal side is the most difficult part of the 
mind-body problem. He suggests that the psychological aspect  of the mind, that is,  the 
aspect  mostly  concerned  with  cognitive  states,  like  beliefs  and  desires,  constitutes  a 
problem that is indeed difficult, but not extremely puzzling for the philosophy of mind. 
According  to  his  position,  cognitive  states  do  not  present  a  difficult  challenge  for 
functionalism in particular, and suggest that a functionalist account of beliefs and desires 
should not be seen as particularly controversial. 
What seems to me clear is that any system that is a complete psycho-functional isomorph of me, that 
is, any system that duplicates my psychological states functionally across the board not only at the 
manifest, commonsense level but also at the level of science will be subject to beliefs as a matter of 
conceptual necessity.68
Tye assumes that, no matter their internal physicochemical composition, individuals 
that share the same psychofunctional organization of a person are also capable of having 
beliefs,  desires  and  other  cognitive  states.  Tye  claims  that,  in  contrast  with  conscious 
phenomenal states, cognitive states – beliefs in particular – are not especially problematic 
for functionalism. Tye argues as follows: the principles of psychological explanation seem 
to be easily applied also to individuals that share the same psychofunctional organization of 
a person. Tye suggests that the best way of explaining the behaviour of these duplicates will 
68  Tye (2006, p. 148) 
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be  to  attribute  them beliefs  and  desires,  just  as  we  do  when  we  want  to  explain  the 
behaviour of a person. Imagine for instance that somebody asked Paul´s psychofunctional 
duplicate a question like the following one: “What was the name of the rock band you 
created with John Lennon, George Harrison, and Ringo Starr?” Assuming that he wanted to 
give a true answer, he would respond “The Beatles”. If somebody asked him what was the 
name  of  the  city  where  he  met  John  Lennon  for  the  first  time,  he  would  answer 
“Liverpool”.  If  somebody asked him what  is  the  name of  the  person in  charge  of  the 
cinematography of the movie “Magical Mystery Tour”, he perhaps would leave his seat, go 
to his bookshelf to consult the information required in the back side of a DVD box (I am 
assuming that he would not  remember the name of that person) and once he finds the 
answer, he would say “Daniel Lacambre”. Now, if we wanted to give an explanation of A-
Paul´s behaviour, we would say that it is because he believes that there is a DVD box in the 
bookshelf where he can find the answer to that question, and that he has the desire of giving  
an accurate response. A-Paul´s behaviour allows the attribution of beliefs and desires, since 
it seems an adequate way for explaining his behaviour.  
A problem concerning this  proposal  is  that  it  is  perfectly  possible  to  imagine  an 
individual that behaves in an intelligent way, but without being intelligent at  all.  Block 
(1981) offered a thought experiment for showing that the attribution of intelligence and of 
cognitive  states  purely  from  behavioural  grounds  is  mistaken.  Two  systems  can  be 
behaviourally  alike  (concerning  their  actual  and  potential  behaviour,  their  behavioural 
dispositions and their counterfactual behavioural properties) and nonetheless differ in the 
way that they process information that mediates between perceptual inputs and behavioural 
outputs in such a way that this difference will determine that, while one of them is fully 
intelligent  and has cognitive states, the other is  not.  The nature of the systems internal 
processes is essential for determining whether they have intelligence or not. 
Block’s strategy is to describe a machine that is able to pass a behaviouristic test of 
intelligence, but whose internal configuration shows that it does not have intelligence at all. 
The logical possibility of this machine will show that behavioural criteria do not suffice for 
attributing intelligence, or the presence of cognitive states like beliefs or desires. The test 
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considered  is  the  famous  Turing  test,  which  was  originally  proposed  as  a  way  for 
determining if machines can think, and that is commonly interpreted as proposing sufficient 
conditions for intelligence. Turing considered that, due to the difficulty to disambiguate the 
terms occurring in the question ‘can machines think?’ it is better to consider a different 
strategy  for  dealing  with  this  problem,  although  formulated  in  a  comparatively 
unambiguous  way.  Briefly,  the  Turing  test  consists  in  playing  a  game  known  as  the 
‘imitation game’ which is played as follows: three players, a person, a machine and an 
interrogator or judge start a conversation. Both the person and the machine try to appear 
human, and if the interrogator cannot distinguish between them after a certain period of 
time, it is said that the machine passed the test.
Suppose the duration of the test is one hour and that the language used is English. Let 
us define the set T of sequences of English sentences that can be typed in one hour as the 
set of typable sequences of sentences, and the proper subset S of  T the set of all  sensible 
sequences  of  sentences,  defined  as  those  sequences  that  are  naturally  interpreted  as 
conversations.  The  machine’s  memory  contains  the  set  of  all  sensible  sequences  of 
sentences in the form of a list, and when the interrogator emits sentence  A, the machine 
searches on the list a sequence that starts with sentence A and answers the interrogator by 
emitting  the  next  sentence  B on  the  sequence.  When  the  interrogator  types  the  next 
sentence, the machine performs the same procedure, and so on, until the test ends. The 
machine proposed by Block is programmed in a way that allows it to produce a sensible 
verbal output for all possible verbal inputs produced by the interrogator, so it won’t be 
possible  for  him  to  distinguish  the  difference  between  this  machine  and  a  genuine 
intelligent being. The idea behind this experiment is that a device that has the intelligence 
of a toaster (or perhaps better, the intelligence of a vending machine) will be able to pass a 
behavioural  test  of  intelligence.  The  thesis  that  intelligence  can  be  defined  in  purely 
behavioristic  terms is, therefore, threatened by the logical possibility of this supposedly 
stupid machine.  If  this  unintelligent  machine  is  a  genuine logical  possibility,  then it  is  
possible for an unintelligent entity to pass the Turing test, and since this test is designed 
from a behavioristic point of view, Block claims that behaviorism is false.
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But although Block´s thought experiment might undermine behaviourism, there is a 
key difference between the system described by Block and Paul´s functional duplicate. The 
goal of the thought experiment presented by Block was not only to show that behaviourism 
is false, but also that they way in which an entity processes information is essential for 
determining whether it has cognitive states or not. This is precisely the difference between 
Block´s machine and Paul´s functional duplicate. In the former case, the internal states of 
the machine described by Block are completely different from the internal states of Paul. In 
the latter case, the internal states of A-Paul have been defined as being isomorphic to those 
of Paul.  
... it seems that our concept of a belief or a desire is the concept of a state that plays an appropriate  
functional role. So, it seems that my functional duplicate, like me, has beliefs and desires. And these 
beliefs and desires explain his behavior. The principles of psychological explanation apply to him just 
as they do to me. 69
Thus,  it  is  true  that  a  being  like  the  one  described  by  Block  can  behave  as  an 
intelligent being without having beliefs, desires or other cognitive states. However, in the 
case of a psychofunctional duplicate of a conscious being, like A-Paul, there are internal 
states that function in the same way as the beliefs and desires of Paul, that is, they have the  
same relations with respect to corresponding internal states and to inputs and outputs. 
Section 3
The interchange strategy
Let's consider now the interchange strategy in favour of the claim that the absent qualia 
hypothesis is conceptually false. Suppose that it is possible to conceive a psycho-functional 
duplicate of Paul McCartney that differs from him in that his internal states, in spite of  
being  psychofunctionally  identical  to  those  possessed  by  the  original  Paul,  lack 
phenomenal  properties.  To  mention  an  example,  imagine  that  Paul  McCartney  is  in  a 
certain phenomenal conscious state SE when he hears the lower string of his bass emitting 
69  Tye (2006, pp. 147-148) 
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the sound E1 (assuming that his bass is standardly tuned). Now, since A-Paul is a psycho-
functional duplicate of Paul McCartney, he will possess a corresponding internal state SE' 
that  has  the  same relations  that  SE has  with  respect  to  other  mental  states,  inputs  and 
outputs.  The  difference  will  be  that,  while  SE is  a  mental  state  that  has  a  determinate 
phenomenal character, state SE' is phenomenally sterile. The hypothesis that it is possible to 
conceive a psycho-functional duplicate like the one exemplified by A-Paul will constitute 
the reductio hypothesis in the argument offered by Tye.  
Now,  the  way  in  which  the  notion  of  psychofunctional  duplicate  has  been 
understood suggests the possibility of an interchange of families of functionally equivalent 
internal states. For instance, we may imagine that the interchange deals with those internal 
states  that,  in  Paul  McCartney,  concern  auditory  perceptions.  Since  A-Paul  is 
psychofunctionally  identical  to  Paul  McCarntey,  A-Paul  has  internal  states  that  are 
functionally isomorphic (in the sense explained earlier) to these auditory states, only that, 
according to the reductio assumption, they are phenomenally inert. Tye also mentions that 
the interchange does not need to be restricted to families of mental states: the interchange 
can also be of individual mental states M and M'. For instance, the state SE in which Paul 
McCartney is  when he hears  the  vibration of  the  lower  string of  his  bass  will  have  a  
corresponding  state  SE'  that  is  functionally  identical,  but  that  lacks  its  particular 
phenomenal properties. 
Imagine now that a group of scientists has built a very complicated machine similar 
to the one described earlier. In this case, however, this machine is capable of interchanging 
the  phenomenal  states  of  Paul  McCartney  and  the  non-phenomenal  states  of  his 
psychofunctional  isomorph,  A-Paul.  Briefly,  the  machine  works  as  follows:  when  the 
individuals are introduced in the machine their heads are put into a pair of helmets. When 
the machine is turned on, a huge number of tiny robots are introduced into the heads of Paul 
McCartney and A-Paul. These robots then perform a number of internal changes inside 
their  heads and, when the process is completed, Paul McCartney and A-Paul will  have 
interchanged  phenomenal  and  non-phenomenal  internal  states.  Paul  has  lost  all  his 
conscious phenomenal states, which were replaced with the non-phenomenal states of A-
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Paul,  and  at  the  same  time  Paul  has  preserved  his  previous  phenomenal  memories. 
Similarly, A-Paul has lost all his non-phenomenal internal states, which were replaced by 
the  phenomenal  states  that  originally  belonged  to  Paul  McCartney.  Also,  the  non-
phenomenal  memories  of  A-Paul  have  been  preserved.  This  is  the  way  in  which  Tye 
conceives the outcome of the interchange process: 
The result of these changes is that there is a partial exchange of phenomenal states and nonphenomenal 
states between the two people, [...] This exchange is such that were I and my functional duplicate [...]  
to agree to undergo the exchanger operation (as it comes to be called), I would lose all my phenomenal 
states,  other than those that are phenomenal memories,  and I would have them replaced by corres-
ponding ersatz phenomenal states.  NN would lose all his ersatz phenomenal states,  except those that  
are ersatz phenomenal memories,  and he would have them replaced by corresponding phenomenal 
states.70
Before continuing, it is important to note that the scenario just described does not 
specify the nature of the physical realizers of the phenomenal and non-phenomenal states 
possessed,  respectively,  by  Paul  and  his  psychofunctional  isomorph,  A-Paul.  In 
consequence, the description of the scenario does not include an explanation of what these 
miniature robots physically do in order to produce the interchange depicted in the thought 
experiment. Now, why might the specification of the physical realizers of these states be 
important?  According  to  the  way  this  strategy  is  originally  described  by  Tye,  the 
interchange process is conceived at the level of mental states, and not at the lower level of 
their physical realizers. Whatever the physical realizer of a certain mental state might be, or 
of a family of mental states, is considered relevant as long as it brings an interchange at this 
higher level. In some cases, the precise way in which these physical realizers are modified 
in order to generate the interchange at the level of phenomenal states is not difficult  to 
conceive.  Remember,  for  instance,  the  initial  version  of  the  replacement  thought 
experiment described in the introduction of the thesis: suppose that the subjects involved in 
the  interchange operation just  described are Paul  and F-Paul.  In  this  case,  the  reductio 
assumption  might  be  that  F-Paul  –  who  has  an  artificial  brain  that  implements  the 
functional organization of Paul McCartney at a neural level – lacks conscious phenomenal 
70  Tye (2006, p. 155)
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experiences. In such a case, the interchange will be between the phenomenal states of Paul 
and the nonphenomenal states of F-Paul. In this case, however, we know what the physical 
realizers of these states are: organic neurons in Paul´s case, and miniature computers in the 
case of F-Paul. 
The interchange process, however, is not clear when the psychofunctional isomorph 
of Paul has different physical realizers. Consider, for instance, Searle´s brain simulator, or 
Block´s Chinese nation. In the next section of this chapter we will see an objection that 
concerns the possible physical realizers of the internal states of Paul McCartney and A-
Paul. This objection does not question the possibility of psychofunctional duplicates, but 
identifies  a  problem  concerning  the  idea  that  these  psychofunctional  duplicates  can 
interchange internal states, preserving at  the same time their supposed psychofunctional 
isomorphism. Meanwhile, assume that the interchange described by the thought experiment 
is feasible, and lets see how can it be argued that to assume the absent qualia hypothesis  
leads to a contradiction. 
The next step is to elucidate the nature of the cognitive responses exhibited by Paul 
and A-Paul to the interchange operation. Initially, we may imagine that Paul McCartney,  
after the process has been completed, will become amazed at the outcome. He will notice 
that  he has  lost  something very valuable,  namely  his  phenomenal  conscious states.  He 
would  realize,  for  instance,  that  he  could  not  perceive  the  taste  of  a  pint  of  ale,  the 
characteristic sound of his bass, the red colour of London buses, or the pain caused by 
smashing his toe with a hammer. Note that, by assumption of the thought experiment, the 
process  preserved  all  the  phenomenal  memories  that  Paul  McCartney  had  before  the 
interchange  operation.  This  allows  him  to  notice  the  difference  between  his  current 
psychological situation and his past phenomenal experiences. 
The situation of A-Paul after the interchange operation exhibits a great contrast with 
respect to Paul´s: he now has conscious phenomenal experiences. He can now taste the 
flavour of a pint of ale, hear the sound of an orchestra, perceive the smell of a rotten egg 
and feel the painful sensation of smashing his fingers with a hammer. Analogously with the 
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previous case, A-Paul´s non-phenomenal memories were preserved after the interchange 
operation, and these memories allow him to compare his present situation with the one 
before the interchange operation. 
Now, imagine now that a group of doctors propose Paul McCartney the operation 
just described. The doctors tell him that the operation would be completely safe. Moreover, 
he will be assured that the operation will preserve all of his cognitive capacities, together 
with  his  past  phenomenal  memories.  The  only  drawback,  however,  will  be  that  the 
interchange operation could not be reversed. Given this information, would Paul accept the 
operation? Note that he has sufficient information concerning the outcome of the operation: 
he  is  aware  that  his  cognitive  capacities  will  not  be  diminished,  and  further,  that  his 
memories  concerning  his  past  phenomenal  experiences  will  still  be  there  after  the 
operation. He has a sound basis for deciding whether to accept the interchange operation or 
not. Now, assuming that Paul McCartney enjoys the taste of a pint of ale, and the sound of 
his bass, the answer would be most likely negative. Of course, we can imagine a situation 
in which Paul has a terrible disease, and he is informed that, unless he accepts a medical 
treatment involving extremely painful procedures, he could not be saved from death. In this 
case,  Paul  might  happily  accept  to  be  operated.  Perhaps  the  option  of  living  without 
conscious phenomenal experiences is much better than living in constant pain. But if we 
assume that Paul is completely healthy, and that he appreciates (at least most of the time) 
his  conscious  phenomenal  experiences,  it  seems clear  that  he will  reject  the operation. 
Again, losing his conscious states means losing something that he regards as valuable. 
But let´s consider again principle (P). If this principle is true and we assume that the 
interchange operation just described is conceivable (i.e., if we assume that the interchange 
between  the  phenomenal  and  non-phenomenal  states  of  two  isomorphic  beings  is 
conceivable),  then  Paul  and  A-Paul  must  be  psycho-functional  duplicates  after  the 
operation. This is precisely what principle (P) assured: exchanging one-to-one isomorphic 
families of mental states of mutually psycho-functional duplicates must preserve psycho-
functional duplication. But this evidently clashes with the earlier discussion concerning the 
cognitive responses of Paul and A-Paul to the interchange operation. As we have seen, Paul
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´s evaluation of the outcome of the interchange operation will be mostly negative: after 
comparing his current situation with his earlier phenomenal memories he will notice that he 
lost the capacity of perceiving colours, of tasting a good slice of Wellington steak, or of 
hearing  the  sound  of  a  musical  instrument.  A-Paul´s  evaluation,  in  contrast,  will  be 
extremely positive: based on his non-phenomenal memories, he will thought of his new 
situation as being richer and much more exciting than his previous mental life: after all, he 
is now able to perceive colours, of tasting a nice steak, or of hearing the music of the 
Beatles. 
The contradiction that dismisses the reduction assumption – namely, that the internal 
states of the psycho-functional isomorph of Paul do not have any qualitative properties – is 
now obvious. The preceding reasoning shows that the cognitive reactions of Paul and A-
Paul to the interchange operation are different: on the basis of his phenomenal memories, 
Paul will believe that he lost something valuable (his conscious phenomenal experiences). 
Also, on the basis on his non-phenomenal memories, A-Paul will believe that he gained 
something  of  value.  But  according  to  principle  (P)  (that  Tye  regards  as  a  necessary, 
conceptual  truth)  Paul  and  A-Paul  will  still  be  psychofunctionally  duplicates  after  the 
interchange  operation.  Thus,  their  corresponding  cognitive  reactions  to  the  interchange 
cannot  be  different.  This  is  precisely  the  contradiction  detected  by  Tye.  But  if  the 
assumption that the internal states of A-Paul do not have any qualitative properties implies 
a logical contradiction, it must be logically false. This shows the absent qualia hypothesis –
the  reductio assumption of the argument, which is understood as the claim that psycho-
functional isomorphs of human beings lack qualitative states – is also logically false. 
... if [Paul and A-Paul] are genuine functional duplicates, then there cannot be a difference in our cog-
nitive reactions of the sort I have been insisting upon (a difference that will manifest itself in a differ-
ence in verbal behavior, for example). But there must be such a difference, I have argued. That is what  
the above reasoning compels us to conclude. The contradiction reached here shows that it is not con-
ceptually possible for me to have a complete functional isomorph who undergoes merely ersatz phe-
nomenal states. Necessarily, any system that functionally duplicates me is phenomenally conscious. 
The absent qualia hypothesis, therefore, is false even on its weakest interpretation.71
71  Tye (2006, p. 159) 
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A possible way of arguing against this outcome is to say that, although A-Paul gained 
something valuable after the interchange operation, his cognitive response will be identical 
to Paul´s: he will believe (falsely) that he lost something valuable. The problem with this 
approach  is  that  A-Paul´s  belief  is  generated  introspectively  in  virtue  of  his  previous 
memories. But since his power of introspection and his memories are working as well as 
Paul´s,  it  is  simply  not  clear  how  A-Paul  could  have  reached  the  belief  that  he  lost  
something of value. This first approach seems to be clearly inadequate. Perhaps we could 
accept that Paul has lost something valuable, while A-Paul has won it, but there will be no 
difference in their cognitive reactions. By comparing his actual phenomenal experiences 
with those in his memory, Paul would think that he lost something important. However, A-
Paul´s  reaction  with  respect  to  the  outcome of  the  operation  will  be  identical:  he  will 
sincerely believe that something valuable has disappeared. The difference, of course, is that 
F-Paul´s belief is false. The problem, of course, is that the way in which F-Paul´s false  
belief  is  generated  is  left  unexplained.  Remember  that  one  of  the  assumptions  of  the 
thought experiment is that F-Paul, as a functional isomorph of Paul McCartney, will have 
cognitive capacities like introspection. He is able to examine his current mental states and 
to compare them with his previous memories. 
Section 4 
Objections to the interchange strategy
In (2012) Van Gulick presents an objection against Tye's thought experiment. Van Gulick's 
strategy is to argue that the supposed contradiction identified by Tye simply does not arise, 
and consequently, that the reductio is blocked. As we have seen, a crucial premise of Tye´s 
argument  is principle (P), according to which the interchange of one-to-one isomorphic 
families  of  internal  states  between  two  psycho-functional  duplicates  preserves  psycho-
functional duplication. Van Gulick identifies two crucial questions related to principle (P): 
(a) Would the conceivability of A-Paul entail that a partial exchange of corresponding 
states between Paul and A-Paul was also conceivable? 
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(b) Must this exchange leave Paul and A-Paul functionally equivalent to each other, 
as principle (P) asserts? 
To the  first  question,  Van Gulick answers  as  follows:  even if  it  were possible  to 
conceive a system like A-Paul (that is, a qualia-lacking system that is a psycho-functional 
isomorph of a conscious being) it is extremely doubtful that the corresponding phenomenal 
and non-phenomenal internal states of these systems can be interchanged. To the second 
question,  Van  Gulick´s  response  is  clearly  negative:  even  assuming  that  the  proposed 
interchange is possible, we cannot be sure that we will end with two functionally identical  
systems. But in either case, the contradiction suggested by Tye does not arise. In the first  
case, the supposed interchange of phenomenal and non-phenomenal states between Paul 
and  A-Paul  would  not  be  granted,  and  thus,  Tye´s  argument  would  lack  an  essential 
premise. In the second case, and even assuming the possibility of such an interchange, the 
cognitive responses of Paul and A-Paul to the operation will be different, but since they 
cannot  remain psycho-functionally isomorphic after  the interchange of phenomenal  and 
non-phenomenal states, there will be no inconsistency with principle (P), and thus, Tye´s 
argument would be blocked. 
First objection: it is not obvious that the internal states of two isomorphic systems can be  
interchanged. 
Lets begin with the first questionable assumption identified by Van Gulick, namely, 
that an interchange of phenomenal and non-phenomenal subsets of internal states between 
two psycho-functionally isomorphic beings is conceivable. Van Gulick reminds us first that 
the question whether the interchange is empirically feasible or not is not relevant in the 
context  of  Tye´s  argumentation:  what  matters  is  the  logical  possibility  of  such  an 
interchange.  But even in this case,  and when the particular  details  concerning how the 
interchange  can  be  realized  are  considered,  the  conditions  of  this  realization  are  not 
obvious. 
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Remember that the argument presented by Tye is designed as a response to the cases 
illustrated  by thought  experiments like  Block´s  Chinese  Nation and Searle´s  system of 
water pipes already discussed in the first chapter of this thesis. As it has been mentioned 
before,  a  way  for  setting  up  the  hypothesis  of  absent  qualia  has  been  to  suggest  the 
possibility of extremely unconventional systems that realize the functional organization of 
conscious beings. The claim that these systems lack conscious phenomenal properties is the 
target of Tye´s argument. Now, it seems to be clear that an interchange of internal states like  
the one depicted in the thought experiment proposed by Tye must be conceivable also in 
these cases. Otherwise, the result of this thought experiment cannot be fully general. But – 
Van Gulick argues – if Tye's goal is to argue that functional duplicates that do not share the 
same  phenomenal  conscious  states  are  conceptually  impossible,  it  is  not  sufficient  to 
exhibit that a contradiction follows from imagining a single case. The argument must cover 
all  these  unconventional  realizations.  But  if  Van  Gulick  is  right,  the  possibility  of 
interchanging a subset  of functionally equivalent internal states between a being with a 
brain and one of its isomorphic bizarre realizations is far from being obviously conceivable.
Remember again Block´s Chinese Nation thought experiment. A network of people 
equipped  with  radios  send  and  receive  data  in  such  a  way  that  the  whole  process  is 
isomorphic to the pattern of signal interchanging in the brain of a conscious person. The 
role fulfilled by these people will depend, among other things, on the level of functional  
organization of the network. Perhaps a number of people inside the Chinese Nation form a 
structure that corresponds to the Visual Cortex of that conscious person. Or perhaps the 
functional organization of the Chinese Nation is at the neural level, and in such a case, the 
structures formed by people correspond to each of the neurons of the brain. In any case, the 
Chinese  Nation can be said to  implement  the  functional  organization of  the brain  at  a 
certain level when the whole system is divided into an appropriate number of parts with a 
corresponding physical state, in such a way that the causal dependency relations among 
these  parts  and the  inputs  and the  outputs  received  by the  system mirrors  the  abstract 
specification of the functional organization of the brain at the selected level.  How can we 
conceive an interchange of the physical realizers of corresponding internal states between 
the Chinese Nation and this conscious person? Van Gulick notices that the property of a 
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certain structure of realizing a certain role inside a system will depend on the causal context 
of the larger system within which this structure is embedded. In the case of the Chinese 
Nation  and  the  conscious  person,  an  interchange  of  phenomenal  and  non-phenomenal 
internal states between them will involve an interchange of the physical realizers of these 
states. In the case of conscious states related to visual experiences, for instance, this might 
involve the interchange of structures associated to the Visual Cortex. The problem is that it  
is simply not obvious how a structure formed by people interchanging radio signals can 
make a relevant causal contact with structures formed by organic neurons that work by 
interchanging electrochemical signals. 
Any such exchange of token states would require more than the mere physical interchange in space of 
the two sets of realizers.  At a minimum the exchange of mental states would have to involve the 
respective sets of realizers making relevant causal contact within their newly surrounding systemic 
contexts, and it is not obvious that doing so would be possible in all such cases. How would neural  
states be interchanged with nation-of-China states without destroying the respective systems and thus 
any possibility of causal engagement?72
But according to Van Gulick, in order for achieving Tye's aim – that is, in order to 
show  the  impossibility  of  conceiving  isomorphic  systems  that  do  not  share  the  same 
conscious phenomenal states – it is necessary to show that the physical realizers of this 
particular  mental  ability  are  able  to  maintain  the  same  causal  relations  with  the  new 
systemic contexts, no matter the particular characteristics of these physical realizers. But 
that this is possible in the case of Paul´s neural states and the Nation-of-China states is far 
from being obvious. 
Given the enormous diversity in how functional organizations might be realized, not only in their 
particular  concrete  structures,  but  also in  how those  structures  must  interact  at  multiple  levels  to 
produce the requisite total organization, it is not at all certain that interchanges between isomorphic 
sets of states are always conceivable between systems that are equivalent relative to a given psycho-
functional specification [...] Thus contrary to Tye’s claim, the conceivability of absent qualia functional 
duplicates does not entail the conceivability of a partial exchange of isomorphic states of the sort he  
72  Van Gulick (2012, pp. 279-280) 
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proposes between conscious beings and their duplicates. The conceivability of such duplicates does not  
in itself guarantee the conceivability of partially exchanging states with them.73
Second  objection:  even  assuming  that  an  interchange  of  internal  states  between  two  
isomorphic  systems  is  possible,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  interchange  preserves  the  
functional isomorphism between them. 
The second problem identified by Van Gulick seems to be even harder. Suppose for 
a moment that the interchange described by Tye is effectively conceivable: it is possible to 
interchange  different  physical  realizers  of  functionally  equivalent  internal  states  in 
isomorphic  systems.  However,  eve  if  Tye  is  right  in  this,  it  does  not  follow that  this 
interchange preserves psycho-functional duplication. The problem arises from the way in 
which an internal structure plays a role inside the system in which it is embedded. That a  
certain structure is capable of playing a certain role depends, first, on its particular causal 
profile:  on the  physical  effects  of  this  structure inside  the  system to  which  it  belongs. 
Second, it also depends on the causal profiles of the other structures that belong to the 
system. An organic neuron fulfils a determinate role inside the brain insofar as it has a 
certain causal effect on other neurons, a causal effect that is determined by its capability of 
receiving, processing and sending electrochemical signals. A certain structure composed by 
people inside Block´s Chinese Nation has also a certain causal effect on other structures 
due to its capacity of receiving, sending and processing radio signals to other structures 
inside the system to which it belongs. 
Imagine now that certain instance of Block´s Chinese Nation is psycho-functionally 
equivalent to Paul McCartney. This instance of the Chinese Nation has a family of non-
phenomenal states FCH that are isomorphic to family FP of phenomenal states of Paul. In the 
case of the Chinese Nation, the physical realization of family FCH of non-phenomenal states 
involves structures of Chinese people, while in the case of Paul the physical realization of 
family FP of phenomenal states involves neural structures. These structures have certain 
73 Van Gulick, (2012, p. 280) 
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causal effect inside their corresponding systems due to the particular way in which they 
interact  with  the  other  structures  of  their  respective  systems.  But  if  the  structures  that 
realize families FCH and FP of isomorphic states are interchanged, it is simply not clear how 
they can work in the new systems in such a way that the functional equivalence between 
them is preserved. How can the structures that work through radio signals interact with a 
system whose basic structures work through electrochemical signals? Van Gulick illustrates 
problem with two systems F1 and F2 whose physical realizers are, respectively, gears and 
hydraulic mechanisms: 
The fact that the gears of F1 and the hydraulics of F2 enable them to function equivalently within their  
original causal contexts in no way implies that they would engage their reversed contexts in equivalent 
ways. Indeed they might fail to engage in any useful way at all, and even if they did engage, the results  
might be quite disparate in the two cases. The gears of F1 would not likely interact with the hydraulics 
of S2 in a way that mirrored that between the hydraulics of F2 and the gears of S1. The particular  
token states of F1 and F2 might continue to function within their isolated families but interact with 
their larger systemic surroundings in very dissimilar ways.74
Against Tye´s claim, Van Gulick concludes that principle (P) is not a necessary truth. 
First, that we can conceive a being like A-Paul – that is, a being that is psycho-functional 
isomorph to Paul  – does not  mean that we can conceive  an interchange of isomorphic 
mental states between them. The physical realizes of these mental states have certain causal 
profile inside their original systems that might not match with the new systems after the 
interchange. Second, even if we accept the possibility of such interchange, it is not granted 
that Paul and A-Paul preserve their mutual psycho-functional isomorphism. 




Remember again the two reasons offered by Van Gulick for claiming that the contradiction 
in  Tye's  reductio  argument  is  blocked:  the  first  is  that,  even  if  a  psycho-functional 
isomorphism between a human being and another physical system is conceivable, it does 
not follow that their  corresponding psycho-functionally states can be interchanged. The 
second is that, even it is assumed the conceivability of such interchange, it does not follow 
that the systems remain psycho-functional isomorphic after the interchange. By arguing in 
favour of these affirmations, Van Gulick intends to show that there is no contradiction, and 
thus, he concludes that Tye's argument is blocked. 
It is clear that in some cases, the physical realizers of families of internal states of 
two isomorphic systems cannot be interchanged in such a way that they causally interact 
with their new surroundings. When the physical nature of the realizers of corresponding 
families  of  isomorphic  internal  states  is  unknown,  it  is  not  possible  to  determine  the 
conditions  for  interchanging these  families  of  internal  states.  Due to  the  wide  physical 
variety  of  structures  that  can  realize  these  internal  states,  we  cannot  assure  that  the 
interchange  of  these  structures  brings  with  it  an  interchange  of  respective  isomorphic 
families of internal states. But in other situations the problem is simply not present. A case 
that clearly illustrates this situation is F-Paul´s artificial brain, which implements the same 
organization  of  Paul´s  organic brain at  a  neural  level.  Remember that for each organic 
neuron  inside  Paul´s  brain,  there  is  a  corresponding  artificial  neuron  inside  F-Paul´s 
artificial  brain  that  performs the  same input-output  function,  in  the  sense  that  when it 
receives a certain electrochemical signal, the artificial  neuron process it  and then sends 
another electrochemical signal to the rest of the brain. 
Assume now that  certain  organic structures  inside  the  brain  of  Paul  and certain 
artificial structures inside the brain of F-Paul physically realize, respectively, families F and 
F∋ of internal states, which are isomorphic in the sense described earlier. The difference, 
again, is that family F has phenomenal properties, while family F∋ lacks them. But note that 
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in  this  case the  causal  profile  of  organic and artificial  neurons is  identical:  an organic 
neuron receives as its input a determinate electrochemical signal, processes it and generates 
an electrochemical output that is in turn sent to other organic neurons inside Pauls brain. An 
artificial neuron can be defined as doing exactly the same. Of course, the way in which this 
signal is processed does not need to be identical to the way in which the organic neuron 
does it: this artificial neuron might be simply a capsule where a little homunculus generates 
the adequate signal by following a set of instructions. Note that in this case, the physical 
realizers of families of internal states F and F∋ are clearly interchangeable. The reason is 
that they share the same causal profile: both organic and artificial neurons send the same 
electrochemical signals to the rest of the brain. 
With this in mind, we can argue as before: we adopt, as our reductio hypothesis, that 
F-Paul´s  internal  states  lack  phenomenal  properties,  in  spite  of  being  functionally 
isomorphic to Paul´s. Paul and F-Paul are then put in the machine described earlier, where 
tiny robots are introduced into their heads and make the necessary changes in their brains. 
In  this  case,  however,  we  certainly  know  what  these  little  robots  are  doing:  they 
“disconnect” the neurons inside Paul´s brain that form the structures that realize family F of 
internal states, and install them in the places formerly occupied by those artificial structures 
that realized family F∋ of internal states inside the artificial brain of F-Paul. Equally, these 
artificial structures are in turn installed in the proper places of Paul´s brain. The argument 
can now proceed as before: after the interchange, Paul would think that he lost an important 
part  of his mental life, namely, the conscious phenomenal experiences associated to the 
family  of  states  F,  and  he  would  consider  the  outcome  of  the  operation  as  negative. 
Meanwhile,  F-Paul  would  think  that  he  gained  something  valuable:  the  conscious 
phenomenal experiences lost by Paul. F-Paul would consider this a positive result, since 
this  means  that  his  mental  life  is  richer  than  before.  This  difference  in  the  cognitive 
reactions of Paul and F-Paul contradicts principle (P): if they remain psycho-functionally 
isomorphic  after  the  replacement,  then  there  cannot  be  a  difference  in  their  cognitive 
reactions  to  the  operation.  Thus,  the  assumption  that  F-Paul´s  internal  states  are 
phenomenally inert must be false.  
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Of course, the point of Van Gulick is that this strategy is not general enough. The 
interchange proposed by Tye can be conceived between beings whose internal states have 
physical realizers that, once interchanged, can interact causally without a problem, like in 
the case of Paul and F-Paul. But what would happen with the bizarre systems proposed by 
Block (the China-body system) and the brain simulator made from water pipes proposed by 
Searle?  As Van Gulick  suggests,  if  Tye intends that  his  thought  experiment  achieves  a 
certain level of generality, it does not seem sufficient to imagine the thought experiments 
with two beings whose physical realizers can be obviously interchanged.  
There is, however, a strategy I want to propose for arguing in favour of the claim 
that,  even  in  the  case  of  these  bizarre  systems,  families  of  mental  states  can  be 
interchanged. Ultimately, I think that this strategy will not succeed, but not exactly for the 
reasons suggested by Van Gulick. As I will argue in the General Conclusions, the most 
troubling issue concerns the physical nature of the signals interchanged by these isomorphic 
systems.  Meanwhile,  the  strategy  I  suggest  in  the  paragraphs  below  will  serve  as  a 
motivation for the discussion presented in the General Conclusions of the thesis. 
Suppose that the brain of Paul implements, at a neural level, a certain functional 
organization O that can be abstracted into a Combinatorial  State Automaton CSAO.  For 
each neuron inside Paul´s brain, there is a corresponding vector V of CSAO that determines 
the precise input-output function of this neuron (call it neuron n0). Now, imagine that the 
government of China – for using the example proposed by Block –has decided to build a 
system made from Chinese people that is a psychofunctional duplicate of Paul. For each 
neuron  inside  Paul´s  brain,  there  will  be  a  structure  made  from  Chinese  people  that 
implement the same vector.  In particular,  there will  be a structure CH that  implements 
vector V. Now, it is clear that the formalization of this vector does not include the nature of 
the input and output signals. In the case of the neurons inside Paul´s brain, these input and 
output signals have an electrochemical character. In the case of the Chinese Nation, these 
signals might be verbal and are transmitted, perhaps, by radio. 
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If the brain of Paul and the Chinese Nation system implement the same functional 
organization by implementing the same CSA, there will  be structures made of Chinese 
people  that  perform  the  same  functional  role  of  neural  structures  inside  Paul´s  brain. 
Assume, for instance, that there is a neural structure N that realizes a certain family F of 
phenomenal internal states inside Paul´s organic brain, while the Chinese Nation structure 
CH implements  family  F∋ of  non-phenomenal  internal  states  inside  the  Chinese  Nation 
system. It is clear that structures N and CH realize families F and F∋ of internal states in 
virtue of their respective causal  profiles.  This is precisely the reason that prevented the 
interchange proposed by Tye. But imagine now the following scenario: imagine that we 
connect to structure CH a transmitter device T that works as follows: T receives the verbal 
signals that are produced by structure CH and transforms them into radio signals. Imagine 
also that we remove the neural structure N that  physically realizes family F of internal 
states inside Paul´s brain, and in its place we install a receiver device R whose function is,  
first,  to  receive  the  radio  signals  generated  by  device  T  and  transforms  them  into 
electrochemical signals that are in turn sent to the rest of Paul´s brain. The process can be 
illustrated schematically: 
Structure  CH  (Verbal  signals)  ⇒ Transmitter  T  (Radio  signals)  ⇒ Receiver  R 
(Electrochemical signals) 
The same procedure can be applied to the Chinese Nation system: to begin with, we 
know that there is a structure N inside Paul´s brain that realizes family F of internal states. 
We can connect to this structure a similar transmitter device T∋ (of course, with a much 
smaller size than the former) that, after receiving the electrochemical signals generated by 
structure N, transforms them into radio signals. We now remove structure CH inside the 
Chinese Nation system and install in its place a device R∋ that receives the radio signals 
generated by T∋ and transforms them into verbal signals that can now be sent to the rest of 
the Chinese Nation system. 
Structure  N (Electrochemical  signals)  ⇒ Transmitter  T∋ (Radio signals)  ⇒ Receiver  R∋ 
(Verbal signals) 
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Now, the first problem identified by Van Gulick was that an interchange like the one 
proposed by Tye could not be accomplished due to the size of the corresponding realizers of 
families of internal states: evidently, we could not replace a neural structure with a structure 
of the Chinese Nation system without destroying Paul´s brain. But in the procedure just 
described, devices T and R are designed to fit physically into the corresponding systems. 
The second problem was that the causal profiles that allow structures N and CH to realize 
families F and F∋ of isomorphic internal states are different, and thus, an interchange of 
these structures would not guarantee an adequate causal interaction with the rest  of the 
system. However, devices E and R have been described as transforming the signals from 
one system into signals that fit the causal profile of the other. 
The  crucial  issue,  however,  is  whether  we  can  understand  this  process  as  an 
interchange of families F and F∋ of internal states between Paul and the Chinese Nation 
system. It can be suggested that, since the respective physical realizers N and CH of these  
internal states are not physically interchanged, but remain in their corresponding systems, 
there is not a real interchange of families F and F∋ of internal states. However, I think that 
we have good reasons to affirm that the procedure just described can be understood as 
interchanging these families of isomorphic internal states between Paul and the Chinese 
Nation system. Note that when device R is installed into Paul´s brain in place of neural  
structure N, there is a causal chain of signals that begins when structure CH emits a certain 
verbal signal. Clearly, device R generates certain electrochemical impulses in virtue of the 
instructions it  receives, via radio, from device T. Device T, in turn, generates this radio 
emission by transforming verbal signals received from structure CH. If by some mistake 
structure CH sends a different verbal signal, then device T would transmit a different radio 
signal,  which  after  being  received  by  device  R,  would  in  turn  generate  a  different 
electrochemical  signal.  The same happens when device R is  installed into  the  Chinese 
Nation system in place of structure CH, although in this case, it generates a determinate 
verbal signal in virtue of the radio instructions sent by device T, which in turn are generated 
in virtue of the particular electrochemical signal produced by neural structure N. The role 
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of device R is simply to receive radio signals and to transform them into signals that have a 
causal effect into the respective systems. 
Conclusions
In spite of these considerations, I think that the strategy presented above does not ultimately  
show that there is a genuine interchange between the phenomenal and non-phenomenal 
states of Paul and the Chinese Nation system. According to the strategy presented in this 
section,  we can interchange  the  phenomenal  and non-phenomenal  states  of  isomorphic 
subjects by attaching transmitters and receivers to the physical realizes of these states. In 
order to assure a causal match with the new surrounding systems, it was stipulated that the 
receivers  transform the  radio  signals  into  electrochemical  or  verbal  signals  capable  of 
interacting, respectively, with Paul´s brain and with the Chinese Nation system. However, it 
can be argued that the respective phenomenal and non-phenomenal character of the states 
of these isomorphic systems are generated not because they fulfil a certain functional role 
inside  their  respective  systems,  but  simply  because  the  signals  interchanged  by  their 
corresponding physical realizers have a determinate physical character. It can be argued 
that  the  physical  realizers  of  the  states  of  Paul  are  capable  of  generating  phenomenal 
experiences in virtue of the transmission of electrochemical signals. Conversely, the non-
phenomenal  character  of  the  states  of  the  Chinese  Nation  system  depends  on  the 
transmission, by their physical realizers, of verbal signals. 
Now, remember that the neural version of the replacement thought experiment faced 
a  similar  problem.  If  it  is  stipulated  that  the  neural  replacements  transmit  the  same 
electrochemical signals interchanged by the organic neurons of the brain of a conscious 
person,  a  system  composed  of  artificial  neurons  that  shares  the  same  functional 
organization  of  this  brain  may  have  the  capacity  of  generating  conscious  phenomenal 
experiences. But if the replacement scenario is described in this way, it is not possible to 
assure  that  the  new  system  generates  conscious  phenomenal  experiences  in  virtue  of 
implementing  the  functional  organization  of  the  brain  at  the  neural  level,  since  the 
electrochemical signals transmitted by organic neurons were preserved. 
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We have  seen,  however,  that  artificial  neurons  do  not  need  to  be  described  as 
interchanging  the  same  electrochemical  signals  transmitted  by  organic  neurons.  In  the 
initial stages of the replacement process, artificial neurons need to transmit electrochemical 
signals in order to establish an adequate connection with organic neurons. However, when 
more and more artificial neurons take the place of organic ones, the use of electrochemical 
signals  will  not  be  necessary.  However,  in  the  case  of  the  interchange  version  of  the 
replacement thought experiment, the character of these signals was preserved in order to 
assure an adequate causal match with the respective new systems. For this reason, it is not 
clear then that there was a genuine interchange of the phenomenal and non-phenomenal 
states. For instance, when receiver R is attached to the physical realizers of the phenomenal  
states of Paul, it  receives radio signals and transforms them into electrochemical signals 
that match the causal structure of his brain. But if we assume that these signals have a 
crucial role in the generation of these phenomenal experiences, Paul would not notice any 
change in the character of his experiences. His experiences will be exactly as before the 
interchange. Equally, the Chinese Nation system will not perceive any change with respect 
to its non-phenomenal states. There will not be any difference in the cognitive reaction of 
these systems to the interchange, and thus, the reductio strategy will be blocked.
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General Conclusions 
The main objective of this thesis was to present and offer a detailed evaluation of some of 
the most discussed versions of the replacement thought experiment in the contemporary 
philosophical literature. The several variations of the replacement thought experiment have 
been conceived as supporting a functional account of mentality, and more particularly, a 
functional  account  of  phenomenal  consciousness.  The first  versions  of  the  replacement 
argument presented in the third chapter support thesis (NSS): 
(NSS) There is a set F of functional organizations such that the property of a system P 
of generating conscious phenomenal experiences naturally strongly supervenes on P 
instantiating a member of set F  
The regions-of-the-brain version of the replacement thought experiment describes  a 
device that preserves the same causal relations that a region of the brain associated with a 
certain mental function has with the rest of the brain. In particular, this device affects the  
regions  responsible  for  the  linguistic  behaviour  of  the  subject  in  the  same  way as  the 
original organic region, and thus, his behaviour would not be modified by the replacement 
of  the  organic  region.  I  suggested  that  there  is  indeed  something  problematic  in  the 
assumption that a subject that lacks conscious phenomenal experiences can behave in a way 
that is consistent with the presence of these experiences. However, I argued that this is not 
sufficient to show that the absent qualia hypothesis is false. Also, and even assuming that 
the phenomenal experiences of the subject were preserved by the replacement, it can be 
argued that the neural activity present in the replaced region, and that was associated with 
the generation of these experiences, was relocated to other regions of the brain. For these 
reasons,  I  concluded  that  the  regions-of-the-brain version  of  the  replacement  thought 
experiment was not entirely satisfactory. 
The  neural  version  of  the  replacement  thought  experiment,  on  the  other  hand, 
provides an adequate support of thesis (NSS). We have seen that it is possible to argue that  
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the  capacity  of  generating  conscious  phenomenal  experiences  is  preserved  along  the 
sequence of replacement cases. There are very good empirical reasons for thinking that the 
generation of consciousness involves a large number of neurons working together and that 
it does not disappear when a single neuron in the brain of a subject is eliminated. Thus, it is 
extremely unlikely that consciousness disappears when a single artificial neuron takes the 
place of an organic one. Also, the subject cannot be aware that his conscious phenomenal 
experiences gradually fade along the replacement sequence. The reason is that there is no 
place in the brain for instantiating this awareness. Finally, if it is assumed that the conscious  
phenomenal experiences of the subject fade and he is not aware of it, his judgements and 
beliefs concerning these experiences would be systematically wrong. This clashes with the 
fact that the judgements that a subject makes concerning his conscious experiences are 
normally  accurate.  In  particular,  this  assumption  clashes  with  the  Reliability  Principle 
proposed by Chalmers, according to which our second-order judgements concerning our 
conscious experiences are normally correct. Since these second-order judgements can be 
mistaken  in  some  cases,  these  principles  do  not  have  a  logically  necessary  character. 
However, these principles suggest the presence of a strong empirical regularity concerning 
our  second-order  judgements.  These  cases  exhaust  all  the  possible  ways  in  which  the 
conscious phenomenal experiences of the subject disappear when the neurons in his brain 
are replaced by artificial ones and thus, it shows that the thesis of absent qualia is, at least, 
naturally false. The neural version of the replacement thought experiment also shows that 
there is at least one functional organization – namely, the functional organization of the 
brain at a neural level – such that its implementation by a physical system is sufficient for 
the generation of conscious phenomenal experiences. More precisely, it shows that thesis 
(NS) is true: there is at least one functional organization such that the property of a system 
P of generating conscious phenomenal experiences naturally supervenes on the property of 
P of instantiating this functional organization. 
In the third chapter of this thesis, we have seen a further objection to the claim that 
the implementation of a certain functional organization by a physical system suffices for the 
generation  of  conscious  phenomenal  experiences.  According  to  the  thesis  of  Universal 
Instantiation, for any computer program C and any sufficiently complex physical object O, 
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there is a description of O under which it is implementing program C. Now, we have seen 
that  any  given  functional  organization  can  be  abstracted  into  a  CSA.  This  allows  the 
formulation of the supervenience theses (NSSM): 
(NSSM) There is a set C of Combinatorial State Automata such that the property of a 
system  P of  generating  conscious  phenomenal  experiences  naturally strongly 
supervenes on the property of P of instantiating a member of set A. 
But if the thesis of Universal Implementation is accepted, the consequence would be that 
any object can implement any CSA, including the CSA that corresponds to the functional 
organization of the brain at a neural level. Thus, thesis (NSSM) would have the consequence 
that  almost  any  object  is  capable  of  generating  conscious  phenomenal  experiences. 
However, the implementation conditions of a CSA proposed by Chalmers do not allow the 
trivial  implementations  suggested  by  Searle.  In  order  to  implement  a  CSA,  a  physical 
system would need to satisfy the counterfactual transition rules of the CSA. However, we 
have seen that it is extremely unlikely that an arbitrary physical system could satisfy these 
rules. Due to these reasons, thesis of Universal Instantiation seems to be false, and thus, it  
does not constitute a risk for the replacement strategy. 
In the fourth chapter of the thesis, I presented and evaluated a different version of the 
replacement  argument,  whose aim was to  support the claim that  the duplication of  the 
functional organization of the brain by a physical system suffices not only for preserving 
the capacity of generating conscious phenomenal experiences, but also for the preservation 
of the particular qualitative character of these experiences. More precisely, this version of 
the replacement thought experiment supports thesis (NSS2): 
(NSS2) There is a set F of functional organizations such that the qualitative character 
of the conscious phenomenal experiences of a physical system supervenes naturally 
on the property of P of instantiating a member of set F.
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We have  seen  that  this  version  of  the  replacement  thought  experiment  has  been 
proposed for arguing against the thesis of inverted qualia, which consists in that the visual 
experiences  generated  by  two  isomorphic  systems,  P  and  Q,  may  differ  in  that  the 
qualitative properties of the visual experiences generated by Q are phenomenally inverted 
with respect to the visual experiences generated by P.  The replacement scenario of this 
version of the replacement thought experiment describes two beings – Zero-Paul and Ten-
Paul – that differ in that there is a section O of the brain of Ten-Paul that has been replaced 
by  artificial  neurons,  while  the  corresponding  section  A inside  the  brain  of  Zero-Paul 
remains  composed by organic  neurons.  We assumed then that  region O was implanted 
inside the brain of Zero-Paul along section A, in such way that the movement of a switch 
from position a to position o determines which of these regions is connected to the brain of 
Zero-Paul.  It  was  also  assumed,  as  a  sort  of  reductio hypothesis,  that  the  qualitative 
character  of  the  visual  experiences  of  Zero-Paul  and Ten-Paul  are  noticeably different. 
Now, if the assumption were true,  the visual experiences of Zero-Paul would change in 
front of his eyes, but he would not be able to notice this. Thus, he would not be able to form 
the judgement that something wrong is happening with his visual experiences when the 
switch  is  moved.  This  assumption  clashes  with  the  Coherence  Principles  suggested  by 
Chalmers, and thus, it is extremely unlikely that the visual experiences of Zero-Paul change 
when the switch is moved. 
Van Heuveln et al argue that this version of the replacement thought experiment fails. 
First, they claim that  the movement of the switch from position o to position  a does not 
necessarily preserve the identity of the individual. It is perfectly possible to argue that the 
movement of the switch generates two different beings, each of them having phenomenal 
experiences with different qualitative characters. Thus, no single being could have been 
able to experience a change concerning visual experiences, since these experiences belong 
to two different individuals. Second, he suggests that the generation of visual experiences 
involves the same mechanisms related to the recollection of these experiences, particularly 
those located in the visual cortex. It would be possible that the qualitative character of the 
visual experiences of Zero-Paul and Ten-Paul are different, but Zero-Paul would not notice 
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any change when the switch is moved. Thus, the  reductio strategy of this version of the 
replacement argument would be blocked. 
Against the objections presented by Van Heuveln et al, I argued first that this version 
of the replacement thought experiment does not need to consider a qualitative difference in 
the visual experiences of the subject involving more than ten per cent of the brain, and thus, 
it is unlikely that the replacement of this part generates two different individuals. Second, I 
noted  that  patients  that  suffer  cortical  blindness  do  not  normally  forget  the  qualitative 
character of their previous visual experiences. Thus, it is unlikely that the visual memories 
of an individual were so dependent on the visual cortex. Finally, I argued that assuming that 
a system can only experience a change in his current visual experiences by recollecting 
previous visual experiences is not justified. Zuboff´s version of the replacement thought 
experiment clearly depicts a change that would be experienced spatially and not temporally 
in case that the inverted qualia hypothesis was true. These reasons show that the objections 
presented by Van Heuveln et al against this version of the replacement thought experiment 
ultimately fails. 
I consider that the reasons presented in the last section of this chapter ultimately show 
that interchange version of the replacement thought experiment fails. Remember that the 
interchange version of the replacement thought experiment was understood as providing 
reasons in favour of thesis (LSS):
(LSS) There is a set F of functional organizations such that the property of a system P 
of generating conscious phenomenal experiences logically strongly supervenes on P 
instantiating a member of set F.  
Also, if thesis (LSS) is true, then the thesis of absent qualia is logically false: a system that 
is  a  functional  duplicate  of  a  conscious  being  cannot  lack  the  capacity  of  generating 
conscious  phenomenal  experiences.  Against  Van  Gulick's  objections  to  the  interchange 
version of the replacement thought experiment, I proposed a strategy for interchanging the 
phenomenal and non-phenomenal states of functionally identical subjects that consisted in 
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attaching, to the physical realizers of these states, transmitters and receivers in order to 
allow an adequate causal match with the new systems. However, it is still possible that the 
respective  phenomenal  and  non-phenomenal  character  of  these  states  depended  on  the 
signals interchanged by their corresponding physical realizers, which are preserved because 
they allow a causal match with the new surrounding systems. 
Remember that building artificial neurons that duplicate the signals transmitted by 
organic  neurons  seems  to  be  perfectly  conceivable.  However,  if  the  replacements  are 
defined as transmitting exactly the same electrochemical signals transmitted by the organic 
neurons of Paul´s brain, we cannot be sure that the conscious phenomenal experiences of 
Paul are preserved in virtue of the functional organization of the system. However, the use 
of  the  same  electrochemical  signals  is  necessary  only  during  the  initial  stages  of  the 
replacement process, when artificial neurons are connected to organic ones. In later stages 
of the process, when two artificial neurons are connected, these signals can be dispensed 
with. 
However, that the physical realizers of the internal states of Paul and the Chinese 
Nation system can dispense with these electrochemical signals is not so clear. As we have 
seen, we need to be sure that the physical realizers of the internal states of the system 
causally interact with the new systems after the interchange. The only way of doing this, 
however, is to stipulate that the receivers installed on the realizers of these internal states 
transmit signals that match with the causal  structure of the corresponding systems. The 
interchange  version  of  the  replacement  thought  experiment  faces  thus  the  following 
dilemma: if the transmission of the same input-output signals is preserved, the risk is that 
the physical realizers of internal states cannot match with the causal structure of the new 
system. But if these input-output signals are modified in such a way that these physical  
realizers  can  match  with  their  new surrounding systems,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how the 
process produces a genuine interchange of the phenomenal and non-phenomenal states of 
these isomorphic systems. The reason, as we have seen, is that the signals interchanged 
may  have  a  crucial  role  in  the  generation,  respectively,  of  the  phenomenal  and  non-
phenomenal states of Paul and his Chinese Nation isomorphic system. 
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